Harsha Kakar
The writing was on the wall. Once the Valley started moving towards normal, Pak had to find alternate means of highlighting the Kashmir problem at the international level. The surgical strike, post Uri,put them on the defensive and they resorted to increased firing on the LOC and IB. This did help them initially, but after suffering high casualties and damage to defences, their DGMO called his Indian counterpart requesting for a ceasefire. This left Pakistan with only one option, which was to launch Fedayeen attacks on military bases. These operations had to be limited to J and K, to keep it confined to disputed territory and avoiding civilian casualties.
Nagrota was chosen because of its proximity to the border and Jammu, as also a major cantonment, through the middle of which, the National Highway to Srinagar transits. It has a large civilian population. Military establishments are located on both sides of the highway, hence approachable. Being a major garrison station, it has a multitude of depots and installations. Most establishments have normal walls and security fencing due to the sheer size of area occupied.
For years, funds for enhancing security precautions in military camps were restricted. This was based on the logic that resources being limited, if expended for security fencing and walls, would leave little money for fresh construction or maintenance of existing assets. To construct high walls like a jail would also be a wrong precedent. It could make an installation more secure, but also create a fortification mentality, compelling troops to look inwards rather than outwards. US bases in Kandahar and other parts of Afghanistan, meant to be secured by every modern device and high walls were also never true success stories. Fedayeen always found ways and means of striking within. Further, most Indian cantonments are surrounded by civil areas and locals transit through them. Blocking civilian movement or increasing limitations and enhancing checking would only alienate the population.
Borders are controlled by multiple agencies. While the army controls the LOC, the BSF monitors the IB. No matter how many layers are in place, some infiltrators manage to sneak in. It can never be a zero-sum game. There are always gaps due to terrain configurations, which are exploited. Once infiltrated, they are guided to their targets by local supporters. Simultaneously, when a Fedayeen is involved in an attack at a time and place of his choosing, casualties are bound to occur as he has come to kill and be killed. He is armed and trained accordingly. With local support, he knows the existing vulnerabilities of his target and the route in. He has no requirement for a route out, as he is expected to die for the cause. For a layman, unfamiliar with matters military, in any attack the initiative always lies with the attacker. It is he, who after due reconnaissance and inputs selects his point of attack and timing. The defender is unaware, unless intelligence inputs provide him with specific details.It is nigh impossible to guard every inch of the perimeter with limited resources at night; hence Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) are maintained to respond. Further there are always vulnerable areas in every installation. At times, security lapses occur, which benefit the attacker. In this case, the militants infiltrated across the border, possibly through a tunnel, discovered later, prepared to die. Had it been discovered earlier, there could have been heightened security, which again is no guarantee for success. They chose their target after due inputs and possibly had local help and guidance.
There have been claims that no lessons were learnt from earlier incidents of Pathankot and Uri. That fact is not true. Every terror strike, brings forth new lessons. Post every strike, additional precautions are implemented and operating procedures duly amended. It is easier to battle terrorists in the open than inside a garrison, where stores and built up accommodation exists, as also in some cases, families reside, enhancing vulnerabilities. The intention therefore is to eliminate them before they enter. This is attempted by regular patrols and pickets, which at times may not detect militants, as civilians also move in vicinity. Hence such incidents would occur.
Coming to the Nagrota strike specifically, there are reports of initial lapses, again expected in such incidents, mainly due to the element of surprise and initial confusion, following which there was a coordinated counter-action. The first doubt was on the number of terrorists, which is but natural, in such a scenario. It was raw courage of the officers and men forming part of the counter strike, which confined the terrorists into a limited area and saved women and children, who if had become casualties or hostages, would have had a more devastating effect. Those who became martyrs, did so, uncaring for themselves or their families, but ensuring that others were safe. This was the Indian army ethos of ‘service before self’ at display. It is easy to sit back and criticize, mainly by our so-called arm chair specialists, but difficult to execute. Only those on the firing line, realize how difficult it is to deal in such a situation, where gut feeling, courage and raw instincts are all that can guide you in an environment of uncertainty and confusion.
The battle against terrorism can never be won overnight. It is a prolonged slogging match. The nation has taken a stand to defeat the designs of Pakistan and for that, such sacrifices must be accepted. We as Indians,criticize fast, but praise slowly. Politicizing or criticizing such events must cease and valiant sacrifices by our officers and men should never be permitted to go in vain. Further, this will not be the last such attack. Similar attacks and casualties can be expected, until we and the world compel Pak to stop. Finally, for every such attack, dozens are nipped in the bud,at various levels of preparation, well before they are launched.
(The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army)
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