Ata Hasnain
The Darbar is now at Jammu, the traditional seat of the J&K Government for the winter. Almost at the end of the summer sojourn at Srinagar the Prime Minister visited the Valley and announced an unprecedented Rs 80,000 crore allocation for development of the state. It should have created a ripple of enthusiasm; it did not because strangely the political focus of the time was away from J&K. Tragically, the state erupts into the national psyche only at times when negative events are being reported. That has been an unfortunate phenomenon about J&K right through 25 years. However, for those who remain enthused about the state’s future always look for a glimmer of hope and a silver lining. It is difficult to find one in the complex maze which makes up J&K’s security situation, political climate and social scene. I have always resisted short term reviews and eschewed these for a long term vision but now even I am forced to seek solace in whatever positives one can find and hope that one can dwell on that.
Three things stand out in the security scenario post summer. First, it has been a good season from the counter infiltration angle. Neither has a high profile foreign leadership found place nor have the numbers increased, even if they may not have reduced. Jammu division has seen no resurgence for a continued period of three years and more, the sporadic terrorist attacks from across the IB notwithstanding. The Valley has witnessed a number of encounters in the hinterland, mostly in traditional areas. The Rajwar and Hafruda forests and the adjoining villages remain in ferment and this is where a focus of the security forces is required; not just from an intelligence and security angle but also from the angle of outreach. Traditionally, areas which have large terrorist footprint get addressed last in the psychological outreach. That is a mistake I realized very late in my tenure of command and strongly recommend to the hierarchy of today to make good. There is no dearth of initiatives for public outreach in an area where terrorist support has been strong. Kinetic methods are absolutely necessary but a long term vision demands that the area be fully stabilized socially. Secondly, the focus of turbulence and resistance has obviously shifted to South Kashmir. While the very ebullient areas of Anantnag are quieter now it is Pulwama district, with its stronger Jamat influence which appears the area of focus of anti-national elements. Shupian, Pulwama town and Tral are areas of concern because this is where the alienation is strongest and the youth most vocal. The entire South Kashmir, however, is in the grip of a movement of young educated and well to do Kashmiris who appear to still owe allegiance to Syed Salahuddin but wish to give a different color to their movement. They are shunning the old leadership as they gather strength and with an approximate strength of 35-45 are forming the hard core of the HM in South Kashmir. This movement, an inevitable phenomenon which was expected to rise at some time, has no Pakistani presence and is locally led and motivated. It has, however, not been able to execute any major terrorist acts as yet as it is still recruiting and is apparently short of arms, ammunition and other wherewithal. Weapon snatching has been its forte and social media messaging to motivate and recruit, using transnational Islamic extremist ideology as the theme, has been rife. The security forces have had their successes in South Kashmir and some very high profile ones but this young leadership appears to be creating the myth of Shabir Baduri and Arif Khan, two prolific HM terrorists who survived the dragnets laid out for them many times in the Nineties and the early part of the Millennium. Burhan Wani, the main leader of the new young group, is trying to achieve a messiah image like many terrorists of the past. Efforts at prevention of recruitment have partially succeeded due to efforts of the JK Police and Army but the element of radical appeal is disconcerting. This is the third issue which needs highlighting. What we are witnessing internationally are ardent efforts by radical Islamists to rally the forces of radicalism. The Islamic State or Daesh is the manifestation of this and now the lead organization which is spawning these efforts through social media. Inevitably, in a flat, globalized world such trends flow and J&K has been a target of the same. However, many observers forget that Pakistan’s efforts to introduce a radical culture in J&K to transform the sponsored proxy war from a politically oriented conflict to an ideological one have been ongoing for very long. In fact through the Nineties the focus of our counter terror efforts was invariably on the elimination of terrorists and strengthening of the grids for both counter infiltration and counter terrorism. These have been successful but our efforts towards the non-military aspects of counter terrorism have not been sufficiently energetic. We always knew about creeping radicalism replacing tolerant Sufi ideology but could do very little about it. This has largely been due to the insufficient attention paid to the social aspects of the sponsored internal conflict and in fact an apparent lethargy in educating the security forces about the faith based aspects on the misplaced notion that countering the social ills is not part of their responsibility.
Modern irregular and hybrid conflict dwells increasingly upon social aspects which includes faith issues. Modern soldiers have to go beyond the ordinary kinetic route if they wish to put an end to such conflicts.
Maturity of nations afflicted by such internal conflicts, which are further exacerbated by unfriendly neighbors, is displayed in their ability to recognize the nature of conflict and create organizations to counter specific aspects. The Army has been India’s best bet in all such conflicts, withstood the test of time and invariably delivered. However, beyond the point that the Army can restore a situation, it has to either change tack or consciously educate its rank and file on the changing nature of conflict and handle the situation in a very hybrid way. That is not easy and takes commitment beyond single tenures of commanders. Yet, in the absence of their being just no other organization which can take the next steps towards Conflict Termination it is only the Army which has the organizational strength and zeal to deliver. This realization has to come right at the top through professional advice. The current state of civil military relations in India does not allow such a frank and professional system of advice. Otherwise by now a quasi-civil-military organization to fight the ill effects of radicalism should have emerged long ago. It won’t, again for long due to sheer lack of understanding; the Army will therefore continue to perform all tasks in the changing environment. That it should perform this with a far greater sense of understanding is the challenge for the leadership. The centers of learning all over Northern Command must be put to good use to bring about the desired change after the necessary brain storming.
Perhaps, with money in the coffers and a little more political will the main parties will now get down to planning just how this money is to be spent. Financial management and optimization of funds for the right quarters will greatly assist the state. Roads and power will no doubt take the bulk of the package but one of the aims of the administration must now be to have a consultative machinery to distribute funds between the three sub regions, transparently. It should be the prime mover towards building more trust and thus greater integration as a Government.
(The writer is a former GOC of the Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Delhi Policy Group and Vivekanand International Foundation)
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