Sub-Saharan African States Gulf War’s Profound Impact

Prof Adam Burakowski

The war involving the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other is having a profound impact on Sub-Saharan Africa, including countries far removed from the immediate conflict zone. This impact is overwhelmingly negative.

Rising oil prices and disruptions in the supply of raw materials essential for fertilizer production have affected nearly every country in the region. A handful of Sub-Saharan African nations—Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea—are oil exporters and are recording short-term gains. However, even in these countries, higher fuel prices are placing a heavy burden on household budgets. Benefits are largely concentrated among elites, while the general population faces rising living costs.

Some countries located along alternative maritime transport routes—bypassing the Bab al-Mandab Strait—have also experienced short-term gains due to increased shipping traffic. However, if the crisis becomes prolonged, these advantages are unlikely to last. Even sectors such as aviation illustrate mixed outcomes: Ethiopian Airlines faces both significant losses and potential opportunities.

Immediate Impact & Early Disruptions
Sub-Saharan Africa is highly vulnerable to global economic fluctuations. In this case, the impact has been particularly strong due to the region’s proximity to the Middle East. Unlike more distant conflicts, this war has produced immediate and multifaceted consequences.

The aviation sector was among the first to be affected. Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s largest carrier, had been operating around 100 flights per week to the Persian Gulf, all of which were suspended on February 28. Losses in the first week alone were estimated at $140 million. Other carriers—Kenya Airways, Air Tanzania, and RwandAir—followed similar measures.

The conflict also raised concerns about African migrant workers in the Gulf region. Approximately three million Sub-Saharan Africans reside there, with the largest group—around 715,000—living in Saudi Arabia. These workers are primarily employed in construction, domestic service, security, and healthcare.

Contrary to initial fears, most were not “stranded.” They are long-term residents and did not plan to return abruptly. Only a relatively small number—ranging from several thousand to tens of thousands—sought immediate repatriation. Logistical challenges and high evacuation costs delayed returns, and the issue soon faded as many either returned gradually or chose to remain.

Political Neutrality
The outbreak of war took political elites in Sub-Saharan Africa by surprise. Public opinion in many countries tends to be sceptical of U.S. foreign policy, though this does not necessarily translate into support for Iran. The dominant concern across the region is the risk of escalation and its implications for global stability.

The African Union (AU), led by Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, responded quickly by calling for de-escalation. Initial statements alternately condemned actions by both sides while urging dialogue and restraint. The AU also proposed mediation by Oman, signalling a preference for external facilitation rather than direct involvement.

Individual states largely followed this line. Senegal condemned the use of force; Nigeria called for restraint and dialogue; Kenya described Iranian attacks as a grave threat while urging de-escalation; Chad expressed solidarity with Iran but also criticised its actions elsewhere. Even South Africa—traditionally critical of Israel and supportive of Iran—adopted a more restrained tone than expected.

This reflects a longstanding policy of non-alignment rooted in the post-colonial era. Sub-Saharan African states prefer not to take sides in global conflicts and instead prioritise stability, particularly in regions critical to global energy supplies.

Limited Diplomatic Engagement
Beyond issuing statements, Sub-Saharan African nations have shown little inclination to play an active diplomatic role. The AU’s references to external mediators such as Oman, as well as acknowledgment of efforts by countries like Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt, highlight its limited engagement.

Subsequent AU statements reiterated concern over attacks on infrastructure and emphasised adherence to international law and the UN Charter. Following the announcement of a ceasefire in early April, the AU welcomed the development and expressed support for continued dialogue.

Overall, neither the AU nor individual African states have adopted a clearly defined position on the conflict. Even countries with traditionally strong ties to Iran or critical views of Western policy have avoided explicit alignment. This underscores a pragmatic approach focused on stability rather than ideology.

Economic Consequences
The economic consequences of the conflict are significant and potentially long-lasting. Reports suggest that if the war continues for more than six months, Africa’s GDP could decline by 0.2–0.3% points.

The most immediate impact is the rising cost of living. Fuel prices have increased across the region, affecting both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. In exporting countries, domestic markets remain exposed to global price fluctuations, limiting the benefits of higher revenues. In non-producing countries, the impact is more severe, with fuel shortages reported in some cases, such as Malawi.

Even more concerning is the disruption to fertilizer supplies. Production depends heavily on natural gas from the Gulf, and the conflict has led to significant reductions in availability. In some cases, supply has fallen by nearly 90%, driving price increases of 15–45%.

Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa relies heavily on imported fertilizers. Rising costs have led to reduced usage, which is expected to decrease crop yields by 20–30% in many countries. This, in turn, threatens to exacerbate food insecurity and malnutrition across the region.

Short-Term Winners
Despite the generally negative outlook, a few short-term “winners” have emerged. Oil-exporting countries have benefited from higher global prices, with Nigeria standing out due to the scale of its energy sector. Its Dangote Refinery is operating at full capacity but is unable to meet demand. Other exporters, including Angola, Ghana, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea, have also seen increased revenues, though not enough to offset broader economic pressures.

Certain ports have also experienced increased activity as shipping routes shift away from the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Ports in Mauritius, Lamu (Kenya), Maputo (Mozambique), Durban and Cape Town (South Africa), and Walvis Bay (Namibia) have all reported higher traffic. However, these gains are likely to be temporary. If the conflict continues, rising costs and global instability will outweigh these benefits.

Remittances & Labour Markets
Remittances are another critical factor. According to pre-conflict estimates, Sub-Saharan African countries receive approximately $54 billion annually from citizens working abroad, with significant contributions from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Unlike North African workers—many of whom are employed in tourism and transport sectors vulnerable to crisis—Sub-Saharan migrants are concentrated in construction, healthcare, and domestic services. These sectors are relatively resilient and may even expand in the event of post-war reconstruction.

As a result, remittance flows are unlikely to decline significantly in the short term and may even increase if reconstruction efforts create new demand for labour. However, a prolonged conflict could eventually affect employment opportunities and income stability.

Aviation & Strategic Adaptation
The aviation sector illustrates both the risks and potential opportunities arising from the conflict. Ethiopian Airlines has suffered significant losses due to suspended Gulf routes, but it is also seeking to adapt by expanding into new markets, including Europe and Asia.
While fuel shortages and rising costs pose ongoing challenges, such strategic adjustments may allow some carriers to mitigate losses. It remains uncertain, however, whether these efforts will fully offset the impact of the crisis.

In all the war highlights structural vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to external shocks. While a small number of countries and sectors have experienced short-term gains, the overall impact is overwhelmingly negative.

If the war persists, the economic outlook for the region is likely to deteriorate further. In this context, the swift resolution of the conflict remains the most critical factor in mitigating its impact on Sub-Saharan Africa.

Copyright, India News And Feature Alliance
New Delhi
1 May 2026