NC struggles for the restoration of statehood

K N Pandita
knp627@gmail.com
In his recent public address in Budgam, Dr Farooq, president of the National Conference, spoke about the historical efforts made by his party in the service of the people and its role in the development of the State. Who can deny the claims he made? That is history.
But the fact is that it is the duty of democratically governed states to serve the broad interests of the nation and divert their efforts to the development of the State. In that sense, the National Conference has played its genuine role. It is no obligation that NC has won. At best, it is an admiration.
He raised the issue of the restoration of statehood of J&K. Again, he cited the Supreme Court as well as the statement of the Home Minister on the floor of the parliament about the restoration of statehood at its proper time. All this is history without bias.
Admittedly, the status of J&K as a state is an important issue when studied from an historical perspective. But the story needs to be told or retold in its entirety and not by piecemeal. There are some vital questions which Dr Farooq should have reflected upon with earnestness.
For example, it is unavoidable for the head of a very important and historical political party like NC to raise the question of why the withdrawal of Article 370 was necessitated in 2019, while from the date of its enactment till 2019, the article was not touched by the governments at the centre. He should have told the people what the compulsions were for the NDA government to bring about the State Reorganisation Act even if the home ministry’s arguments were not acceptable to him.
From the early 1980s, separatist and secessionist elements in J&K, particularly in the Kashmir Valley, had become active. The election of 1986 was crucial, for it reflected deep polarisation of the Kashmir majority community, the then backbone of the National Conference. The opposition, not only to the NC but to the very concept of accession of the State to the Indian Union, was challenged with the Jamaat-i-Islami in the forefront. How the NC leadership handled this situation is a subject never debated freely and never brought to the public domain by the NC. The result was that the views of the MUF, and later on, the role of MUF leadership that had shifted its base to Muzaffarabad, began to be accepted by the Kashmir observers everywhere.
A decade later, in 1996, through the efforts of the Union government to restore democratic dispensation in J&K, elections were held, and the NC returned to power. Dr Farooq Abdullah took up the reins of the government. With the re-establishment of a democratically elected government, the logic demanded that the elected government instituted a comprehensive inquiry into the most vital issues facing the state such as (a) the exacerbation of separatism and secessionism in Kashmir (b) the fast rising crescendo of Jamat-i-Islami’s fundamentalist ideology in Kashmir (c) the infiltration of Jamati ideology into the organs of the state (d) the cross border terrorism in which Pakistani ISI created its moles in Kashmiri community, (e) terror against Kashmiri Pandit minority – their genocide and ultimately their ethnic cleansing. These were no small and inconsequential happenings for a State that was very strongly projected by Pakistan as a disputed land.
But the state government, perhaps abetted by the then Central government, just put an iron lid on these fundamental issues. Conversely, not only NC, but most of the political parties in Kashmir conveniently adopted double standards of defining their position in the wake of opposition to the accession of the State and extension of many parliamentary rules and regulations to the J&K State. This was the period when the sense of separate identity of the State from the Indian nation identity became deeper and deeper among the people of Kashmir.
The sad part of this story is that the local political parties, NC in the frontline, the opposition in the assembly, the state bureaucracy, the media outlets and prominent opinion-making institutions, all adopted a soft, rather conciliatory attitude towards the separatist ideologues.
During the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Central government seemed to have envisioned the consequences of this grave situation in the State. It tried a diplomatic prescription to overcome the situation and ensure that saner elements were given a chance to have their say. Omar Abdullah, the son of Dr Farooq Abdullah, was inducted into the Union Council of Ministers as MOS in the External Ministry, and Dr Farooq Abdullah was also inducted in the Union Ministry as Minister-in-Charge of Renewable Energy.
PM Vajpayee also made a very bold (through to some observers a controversial) step of a bus journey to Pakistan in 1998, exclusively with the purpose of improving friendly relations with that country. He was well received, and even during his visit to the memorial of Allama Iqbal, he went to the length of accepting the division of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 as a reality. It should be remembered that he was severely criticised by many, including right-wing politicians in India, but he did not flinch. In Kashmir, he had publicly stated that “Kashmir issue ko jamhuriat, insaniyat aur Kashmiriyat ke nate samajhna hoga.” The Kashmir valley leadership of all hues greeted him warmly for this statement. And remember, Vajpayee was the tallest political leader in India of his day.
But alas! While Vajpayee was building the path of peaceful coexistence in Islamabad and Lahore, the Pakistani army chief was secretly planning to control Kargil heights and cut off India’s connection with Leh. This was how the ISI and Pakistan worked to deprive Kashmiris of a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.
In 2002, PDP, largely supported by the Jamati Islami, assumed power, forming a coalition government with the Congress. Its second term of power ensued in 2015 with the BJP coalition, which lasted just one year. The period between 2002 and 2016 was most crucial in modern Kashmir history. It was virtually the Jamati Islami running the show with Congress or BJP as the show boys. This was the period when all political parties of Kashmir, in or out of power, converged on one line of action. It was to play a double game, what we traditionally call hunting with the hare and hunting with the hound. Covert and overt connections grew between local moles and their masters across the border. The slogan of “talk to Pakistan” became louder day by day, and continues even now with a very shrill voice. The Kashmir leadership was eager to make Pakistan a formal partner in the issue.
Whether the terrible event of Iran-Israel-US triangular war has opened the eyes of the Kashmiri people to the catastrophe caused by extremism and Theo-fascism across the globe, will best be answered by their leadership. But to be fair, the fundamental issue is not the restoration of statehood; fundamental issues are of development, of industrialisation, of connectivity, of boosting Kashmir tourism and trade and normalising radicalism, etc., if the real interests of the people of Kashmir are to be served.
Lastly, it has to be remembered that J&K is a deficit state. Its development and progress can take place only with massive funding by the Centre. The Centre is not imposing any obligation by providing developmental funds and schemes. That is an obligation for the Centre not only for Kashmir but for all the federating states of the Union. J&K has the privilege of being included in the hilly region states, which are allocated additional funds for development under the given procedure of the Union Finance Ministry.