Obja Borah Hazarika
The curtain finally rang down on Independent India two most audacious terrorist attacks, Parliament House in December 2001 and Mumbai’s 26/11 2008 with the hanging of December 2001 Parliament House main conspirator Afzal Guru on 9 February. Three months after Mumbai’s lone surviving gunman Ajmal Kasab was sent to the gallows on 21 November last year. Underscoring, the Manmohan Singh Government would no longer be soft on crimes against the State and was firm in its resolve of zero-tolerance on terrorism.
Pertinently, the change of heart is primarily because with the General elections due in 2014, the UPA is keen to silence the Opposition’s stringent criticism over the delay in Guru’s execution thereby exposing itself to attacks of its inherent weakness in dealing with terrorism along-with sending a stern warning to future terrorists that it would brook no nonsense.
Recall, post both attacks India broke off diplomatic relations with Pakistan. Although, every time ties were restored in the hope of perceived normalcy, notwithstanding the underlying suspicions and trust deficit which hovered over talks. Thereby, rendering it difficult for the neighbours to make much progress.
Undoubtedly, with both India and Pakistan being nuclear countries, the Indian sub-Continent is considered a potential military and even nuclear flashpoint by many nations. Also, continued regression of relations between the two, bodes ill for the future of South Asia in particular and the world in general. Given that worsening of relations between the neighbours has the potential to have a ripple effect in several countries and even Continents. More so in today’s age of globalization, characterized by time-space compression which has rendered political boundaries meaningless.
Indeed, despite attempts made by both New Delhi and Islamabad to strengthen ties with each other, progress has been sluggish. The main perpetrator of 26/11 LeT founder Hafiz Saeed remains at large in Pakistan, despite the US and India putting pressure on Islamabad to convict him for his alleged involvement in planning the Mumbai attack. Needless to say with New Delhi’s determination to portray a tough stand on terrorism, as evident by Kasab and Afzal Guru’s hanging, demands for Saeed’s extradition would grow louder and non-compliance by Islamabad could ratchet up tensions between the neighbours.
All this is very well, but despite Kasab and Guru’s hanging, sadly India’s counter-terrorism policy continues to be weak and in dire need of reform. Given that the two terrorists attacks targeted the political and financial hubs New Delhi and Mumbai speaks volumes about our security apparatus weakness.
It is no secret that the country’s internal security system remains highly fragmented and poorly coordinated. Policing responsibilities is under jurisdiction of the States, worse not only are these local forces poorly staffed, but also fall behind in standards of training and are poorly equipped. Add to this duplicity in investigation and law enforcement among State and Central intelligence agencies.
Further, at the Centre the Home Ministry has the Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service, and the National Investigation Agency under its watch. The Research and Analysis Wing and Central Bureau of Investigation under the Prime Minister are also responsible for detecting and solving national security threats.
Additionally, both the State and Central authorities are coordinated through joint committees and task forces. These coordinating mechanisms synchronise intelligence gathered by all the components of the Indian security establishment and aim to formulate threat perceptions and responses. Alas, these are often slow thereby making them ineffective.
Importantly, methods to anticipate and combat terrorist attacks need to be strengthened. Given that increase in resources and strengthening infrastructure is a necessary prerequisite for the Indian security establishment for ensuring a policy of effectual responsiveness to terrorism.
In addition, organizational challenges abound, with the States and Centre wrangling over autonomy and control of counter-terrorism apparatus, as revealed by the latest debate over the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Several Chief Ministers have virtually vetoed the NCTC on the grounds that it would undermine the federal structure of the Constitution.
Thus, in order to more effectively combat terrorism it is necessary to formulate a strategy that is inter-Ministerial, inter-agency and inter-departmental which must balance the interests of the Central and State Governments. A strong legal infrastructure is also needed in order to ensure an efficient counter-terrorism policy.
India must learn from the best practices of other nations to ensure that an effective counter-terrorism policy is instituted. Cooperation with international partners would also buttress New Delhi’s counter-terrorism efforts. Additionally, coordination between all domestic agencies involved in combating terrorism should be a priority.
Clearly, executing those accused in terrorist cases sends a strong message to potential terrorists. However, unprepared security agencies and a shoddy counter-terrorism infrastructure make India vulnerable to further attacks. Terrorism continues to remain a grave national security threat, rendering it absolutely necessary for the Government to construct an effective counter terrorism infrastructure. INFA