Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (Retd)
The ongoing debate of a ‘leaner and meaner’ Defence Forces reveals as much as it hides – the imbalanced ‘tooth-to-tail ratio’ (or T3R) propounded as the ostensible reason is a valid concern, albeit, masking a convenient military solution to what is essentially, a non-military problem. The real devil lies in the spiraling national budget that calls for immediate pruning of certain ‘non-essential’ spends, and herein lies the difficult government task of ‘cutting spends’ on sectors, that could have severe electoral repercussions e.g. MNREGA (hence, electorally ‘less relevant’ sectors attracted cuts e.g. allocation for University Grants Commission, UGC was reduced by a staggering 55%, from Rs 9315 crore to Rs 4286 crore or even cuts to the Child Health Interventions). Similarly and unfortunately, beyond the optics and shenanigans of hyper-nationalism, the Defence Forces are not electorally unified or relevant, and therefore perennially suspect to enduring governmental decisions in their strides.
Reality is, the size and scale of the Defence Forces are in direct correlation to the threat perceptions – it is no one’s case that the neighbourhood is more peaceful now, than before. China and Pakistan are jointly belligerent with unprecedented military investments and brazenness (e.g. South China Sea build up, CPEC investments, joint JF-17 Fighter Aircraft Program and the growing Pakistani nuclear arsenal estimated currently at 120, are few of the obvious joint strategic moves), and now even Nepal and Maldives are openly sulking with India and dangerously flirting with China – internally, J&K and North East remain tense and active. Unanimously, the strategic fraternity is of the opinion that India needs to be prepared for a ‘two-front’ eventuality – such a collusive scenario is to be contextualized with current levels of preparedness/depletedness (e.g. Air Force has 35 fighter squadrons against a requirement of 45). The contradiction of real Military requirements versus external (non-military) exigencies is personified with the urgency of raising a Strike Mountain Corps, facing China (envisaging additional 90,000 soldiers approx.).
The strategic imperatives that are integral to improving the ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio has inherent prerequisites of redefining Military concepts and doctrines like unified command and control structures, rapid mobility, weaponry and process modernisation etc. none of which is accompanying the current ‘flab’ debate or committee mandate. An isolationist and simplistic ‘headcount’ is typical bureaucratic approach of ‘salami-tactics’ without appreciating the military construct of either the head, or what constitutes the tail. Any review of the ‘tooth-to-tail’ discussion without rewriting the National Defence Strategic outlook is puerile and disastrous – as there is no parallel urgency in either ‘integrating’ services or appointing CDS etc. that are key constituents towards a ‘leaner and meaner’ organization in its true operational spirit.
It is true that there are structural inefficiencies and opportunities to optimize roles and responsibilities within the Defence Force’s structure – however, an institutional track record would bail out the Indian Defence Forces from taints of functional sloppiness or inertia vis-à-vis other governmental institutions like the Police Forces, Railways, PSU’s or even civilian set-up’s in the Defence sector like DRDO, BHEL or HAL. Seemingly, there seems to be no committee or urgency constituted on cutting the ostensible ‘flab’ in any of these set-up’s (These have delivered sub-optimal solutions like the Arjun Tank, Tejas LCA and worse, could not even produce a standard rifle for the Infantry) . In any case, there is an ongoing process of reviewing structural issues and preparedness of the Armed Forces (e.g. Perspective Planning at the Army Headquarters) which could be nudged to either accelerate or sharply review the existing structures in a less public manner to ensure optimisation of resources – however to allude to simplistic examples like when the Defence Minister stated, ‘Every military station has telephone operators. What is the need for operators in today’s time when everything is automated?’ is factually true, though, politically expedient, convenient and not really germane to the real issue of modernising an army into a leaner and meaner force – besides offering misleading logics that could lead to irreversible disservice to the totality of the Indian Defence Forces, and ultimately to the nation.
Increasingly, there are extraneous non-core-functional commitments and requisitions enforced on the Defence Forces, owing to the institutional failings and shortcomings of the other governmental institutions. Neither is there a similar call to cut ‘flabs’ in such other institutions and nor is any committee instituted to curb the easy requisitioning or deployment of the Defence Forces from bailing out the other faltering governmental structures – e.g. from policing jobs on border and in the hinterland (for which a host of State and National Para-Military forces exists), from natural disaster relief works (for which Disaster Relief Forces exist), from civic responsibilities like ensuring water supplies by opening canals when domestic stir takes place or more recently like laying yoga mats or building pontoon bridges for Godmen ! Fact is, there is a certain pent up frustration that haunts the Defence Forces with the background of OROP and the subsequent 7th Pay Commission that confirmed the ‘secondement’ of the Defence Forces when it came to any issue of parity and equality, even though the track record of the institution would suggest otherwise.
There is an urgent need for an comprehensive and holistic review of both modernising the Defence forces (with robust threat perceptions built-in) and also defining the role of the Defence Forces in non-core commitments – this should finally define the processes and organisation reviews and structures, capital investments and optimisations in toto, given the reality of finite budgetary constraints and environmental assessment. However a convenient, lazy and piece-meal approach that keeps both the eyes on the balance sheet, without adequate attention to the capability levers is shortchanging the institution, once again. Unfortunately, the other inefficient sectors of the Government do not endure such fine-combing and arbitrary review of staffing – a systemic curse of the ultimate reins in the hands of time-serving bureaucrats of the Defence Ministry with limited appreciation of military matters and doctrines. Even, staffing ‘flab’ review committees with ex-servicemen without the complete and holistic ‘modernisation’ mandate, allows the Government the plausible line of deniability of interference or vested interest, whilst, ensuring the institutional tinkering with impunity.
Genealogically, the term ‘flab’ is an anathema for the Defence Forces – it is not reflective of their physical, mental or psychological character. The disciplined comity of the Defence Forces has seen a gradual deterioration of internal health with continuing chipping-away of its tangible and intangible constituents – the fact that the Army is deficient by 12,000 officers is a telling testimony of the ‘unattractiveness’ of profession and the operational risks it entails. Amidst all this, the silent soldier endures the barbs of ‘flab’, till the next requisitioning of a task. It is not that the issue of a ‘leaner and meaner’ Defence Force is wrong, it is the spirit, real intent and half-baked rigour behind the brouhaha of a ‘leaner and meaner’ force, that warrants a questioning concern.
(The author is former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)
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