Dr Ganesh Malhotra
The entire princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India by signing of the Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947. But right at beginning Pakistan attacked Jammu and Kashmir and occupied a major portion of the territory of J&K. The matter was taken to UN despite India’s superior position to take back that area from Pakistan. The UNSC resolution on Jammu and Kashmir adopted in 1948 envisaged three conditional steps i.e. withdrawal of all Pakistani regular and irregular troops from the region to the satisfaction of the UN; thereafter, a reduction in the number of Indian troops to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of law and order; and then, a plebiscite under UN supervision. The resolution became irrelevant after Pakistan refused to take the first step – which was mandatory for its implementation. But redundant status of resolution could not be highlighted and Pakistan along with other such elements has been allowed to give apparent legitimacy to this redundant resolution by their false propaganda.
Finally, 22nd February 1994 Indian parliamentary resolution reiterated the legal position that the entire territory of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and asked Pakistan to vacate the area under its illegal occupation. This resolution says
“On behalf of the People of India, Firmly declares that – (a) The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means; (b) India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity; and demands that – (c) Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression; and resolves that -(d) all attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.” The Resolution was unanimously adopted.
Main point here is why need arose to pass such a Resolution in 1994? Didn’t India get any opportunity to reclaim this lost territory despite India’s superior position?
British influence through Nehru on India’s policy on Kashmir continued to be exercised. Mountbatten used every trick on Nehru and Nehru succumbed to it like flattery, appeal to idealism, assertion of his military authority to instil the fear of war, threat of action by the UN, and even ridicule heaped on India’s capacity to wage war – to persuade Nehru to accept the cease-fire at Uri. Moreover, Nehru declared the cease-fire at the behest of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah for keeping him in centre of all future political discourses. Nehru losing opportunity to reclaim the lost land went to Pakistan for compromise and returned empty-handed from Lahore and thereafter decided to go to the UN. This hurt India’s interests on two counts: One, it internationalised the Kashmir dispute; and two, it stopped the Indian Army from finishing the job of throwing out the intruders. In fact, it is said that the ceasefire was ordered at a time when the Army needed just a few more days to complete its task. Further, the decision to beseech the UN showed India up as a weak state that needed third party intervention to throw out an aggressor. It led to the UN setting up a Commission and posting its observers along the ceasefire line and encouraged the US and other Western nations to meddle in Indian internal affairs.
Second opportunity India got at the time of signing of Indus Water Treaty but Nehru made India at receptor end not on giver end. Indus Waters Treaty was signed by Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1960 with Pakistan President Ayub Khan to buy peace at a time when tension between India and China was going out of hand.
Nehru virtually gifted to Pakistan 80 percent of the water, amounting to some 5,900 tmcft every year. One can imagine how huge a quantity this is that the Supreme Court’s order to Karnataka to release 3.8 tmcft of Cauvery water to Tamil Nadu has created so much violence.
World leaders gave Nehru a standing ovation for his “generosity”. Nehru called it a “goodwill” gesture. But over time, Nehru’s thoughtless action has hurt the economic interests of the country in general, and Jammu and Kashmir in particular.
Even the role of World Bank has not been fair in the inherently unequal Treaty. The Bank served as the agent of Pakistan to partition the Indus-system rivers floating the negotiating rules and ramming it down India’s throat. India’s full sovereignty rights were limited to the smallest three of the six rivers.
There is no international law till now which could compel India to give water to Pakistan. Being as a good neighbour India did show a goodwill gesture but at the cost of its sovereignty and national interest. Same Pakistan hit back immediately after five years in 1965 with an ugly plan to snatch Kashmir from India. At the time of signing Indus water treaty India could have easily negotiated peace with Pakistan but did not.
India was able to capture a reasonable area of Pakistan — the grain producing area — in the 1965 War. Any deeper thrust would have affected Pakistan. Ayub Khan realised that Pakistan was not going to win the war and India if not checked was in a position to capture Lahore.
The Indian Army had captured the Haji Pir Pass which overlooks Pakistan occupied Kashmir, but as a result of the negotiations in Tashkent the following January between India and Pakistan, for some reason, we did not insist on Pakistan vacating Chhamb. As a result, even today Chhamb is with Pakistan.
We don’t know what were the reasons that we gave back the Haji Pir Pass which was strategically very important. Today the entire infiltration into Kashmir takes place from that area. If we had retained that post that we had captured, things could have been different. Haji Pir was given to Pakistan because of the Indian Government’s magnanimity.
A lesson we need to learn is if you start losing the gains of war at the negotiating table, they become a disincentive for future wars. You can never ever gain anything on the political table what you lose on the battleground. Your occupation on the ground has to be very firm so that the enemy knows that you are not going to give up. If you are not sure of your aims and objectives, you shouldn’t go to war. The Indian Army was in a very strong position when the 1965 War was called off.
India could not leverage the fruits of the 1971 war victory to produce an advantageous geopolitical settlement. India was negotiating from a position of (POWs) strength and prestige with Pakistan; 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, including the entire military leadership in East Pakistan, had surrendered to Indian forces. India had also captured strategic locations in Kashmir and 5,000 square miles of Pakistan’s territory in Sindh and south Punjab.
Later at the Shimla Peace Conference, India brought in Kashmir issue. The Cease Fire Line (agreed as per Karachi agreement of 1949) was converted to LC or Line of Control, a sort of halfway house between cease fire line and international border. Though not marked on the ground, it is marked on the map in great detail after a joint ground survey. But at the conference it was also agreed to Let Each Side Retain The Territory Captured By Each Other In Jammu and Kashmir while withdrawing to own side of the international border (Clause 6, section 4 and 5 Simla Agreement).
So from above points it becomes very clear that India did not utilise the opportunities available at its disposal to take back the lost territory of J&K. This area under illegal occupation of Pakistan and China is being used as major threatening link for India by two hostile neighbours. This area has also cut off India’s direct land link with Afghanistan and Central Asia.
(The author is a J&K based strategic and political analyst)
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