Col B S Nagial (Retd)
Carl von Clausewitz says, “In a time of war, we should have the probability of victory on our side”. After Kargil War, it was said that the Indian Army failed to visualise such a misadventure of the Pakistan Army in 1999 in the Kargil sector. However, I must say, in hindsight, that Pakistan Army did not expect this kind of reaction from the Indian Army, which had the backing of our political leadership. The result was the Pakistan Army’s humiliating defeat, embarrassment, and incredibility.
In the Kargil War, Pakistan Army surprised us by taking initiatives as it did in 1947-48 and 1965, and China did in 1962. Enemies attacked us and thus violated our territorial and sovereign integrity. Though there was nothing in black and white, it was discussed at various levels and was conveyed to the Indian Army to ‘get the Kargil intrusion vacated and restore the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC)’. So Indian Army conducted the OP-VIJAY with a rider that LoC should not be crossed. The order to ‘restrain’ must have come out for reasons:
* India and Pakistan signed the Lahore declaration in Feb 1999 to maintain peace and stability in the region after attaining nuclear weapons.
* Due to the nuclear tests, the relations with all the major countries in the world were on a downward spiral. So, to maintain international opinions in favour of India, our political leaders must have thought to restrain.
* Since both India and Pakistan had obtained nuclear weapons, our political leadership must have thought this could lead to some disaster.
* Had this conflict escalated, the world’s major powers could have intervened immediately to stop the war, which would have led to the loss of the territory as it happened in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971.
* Had India escalated this fight in response to intrusion, the world could declare India an aggressor, thus casting it in the mould of an irresponsible nation.
The Indian Army restricted the ‘Op-Vijay’ to the LoC along the J&K region and avoided a full range of war along the International Borders (IB), thus not violating the international norms and limiting the operations to the Kargil sector only. This restricted the use of armour forces and exploitation of the full range of its superior military potentiality. This option also restricted the employment of various other arms and services due to terrain constraints. Worldwide this course of action of India received wider acceptance and praise.However, it exerted a lot of strain on the Indian Army, but politically it was justified somehow.
The Indian Army responded to Pakistan Army’s incursions with challenging fight-clearing operations, which took pains by not punishing Pakistan in her territory. The Indian Army paid a very high cost for this in terms of dead and wounded soldiers but did not escalate the fighting.
But I must say ‘restrain’ is the tool of the powerful, unlike popular misconceptions that’restraint’ is a sign of weakness and a reflection of cowardice. But it shows how one could dominate by restricting one’s might and power. Restraint is not a privilege of a weak being at the mercy of superior power. The ‘restrain’ empowers a regulated and gradual reply, empowering the use of various statesmanship tools to limit the effects of war/conflict.Ultimately, it is prudent not to allow the war to run away on its course but to rein and control it.
Kargil War was a ground-breaking occurrence in the history of the Indian Army. For the first time, the sacrifices, hardships, nobility of spirit and war pains were displayed intensely to raise the national consciousness through electronic and print media. Names of features like Tiger Hill, Tololing, etc., and our martyrs became part of our national consciousness.
Several lessons were also learnt in the operational field to shore up the bulwark of our defences. The primary lesson learnt was to keep our borders secure. For this,we must keep ourselves up-to-date and comprehend our enemies’ strategic and military psyche.
Immediately after the war, the Indian Army realised that the command and control of the Chinar Corps required a change. It guarded almost 1490 km Line of Control(LoC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC) with Pakistan and China and was also involved in counter terrorism operations in Kashmir. A new corps with additional troops was raised in Ladakh. After the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army prepared to cater for conventional and sub-conventional conflict levels below the all-out war. All these factors led the Indian Army to work on a ‘limited war doctrine’ catering to India-Pakistan &China security threats.
To increase efficiency and coordination while reducing duplication, a new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) position was created to usher in greater jointness in the Armed Forces – making him the chief military adviser to the Government of India and the Ministry of Defence. The Integrated Defence Staff was set up vide Government of India, Ministry of Defence on 23 November 2001 for a better Security Management System.
Defence Intelligence Agency, the Government has also set up the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) under DG DIA to co-ordinate and synergise the intelligence Wings of the Services. The DIA is responsible for providing integrated intelligence inputs to the higher echelons of Defence Management.
The Defence Procurement Board was set under the defence secretary to undertake the entire spectrum of the procurement function to bring professionalism and cost-effectiveness to the procurement process for defence.
On 24 July 2022, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced the setting up ‘joint theatre commands’ to augment coordination in Indian Armed Forces. It is a welcome step. The plan is to have five unified or theatre commands, which will help in better planning and military response, and aim to have a unified approach to fighting any future war.
Also, Govt of India has launched an Agnipath scheme for the country’s armed forces intending to make Army, Navy and Air Force leaner without compromising their combat abilities. This is a welcome step.
No other profession in which personality training is more important than the military. War is the domain of danger. To live in this element of danger and daring, courage is essentially required. When soldiers perform their assigned tasks, they transmit their identities in their organisation. They work as a team and repose trust and faith among themselves and the organisation. They complete their task even at the cost of their lives. The soldier’s morale is the most significant single factor in the war and is sustained and strengthened by two crucial factors ‘Camaraderie and spirit de corps.’ The foundation of the Indian Army rests on these two pillars. The Kargil War will go down in military history as a legend of bravery, courage, endurance and the highest form of leadership displayed by the Indian Army.
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