Farooq Ganderbali
One little noticed fact in the political landscape of Pakistan in the recent past has been the ending of the 2009 ordinance for Gilgit-Baltistan, meaning thereby that elections are due to be held to elect a new Chief Minister and other organs of the state as outlined in the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-governance) Ordinance. What Nawaz Sharif subsequently has done is to appoint a Caretaker Government and a new Governor, the latter being a Federal Minister and a member of the PML (N). The astute Sharif is thus trying to move his own men into position in Gilgit-Baltistan, an area recognised by the Pak Supreme Court in 1993 as being part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947.
The fact is that Islamabad has since 1947, ruled over Gilgit-Baltistan with an iron hand and has controlled the strings of power directly through the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas. It is only the Northern Areas Legal Framework Order of 1994 which introduced a semblance of self-governance in these remote mountainous areas. The 2009 ordinance introduced by the then PPP Government in power in Islamabad aimed at precisely what Nawaz Sharif is doing now, to put in place their own nominees in the ‘Government’. The point is that this is a sensitive area, illegally handed over by a British officer in 1947 to Pakistan and then incorporated into the Pakistan system of things without so much as a sound, Islamabad has never really given the people of Gilgit-Baltistan any basic rights. Instead, the region has remained under military control mostly and bereft of the most basic amenities.
Measures taken in the form of the 1994 order and 2009 ordinance have proved to be an eyewash, as real power is retained in the hands of the federally-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan Council, which can overturn any legislation promulgated by Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly that has no jurisdiction on key income generating sectors of local economy. The Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs in Islamabad actually dominates the administration of the area. The present arrangement is not sufficient even to give the people of Gilgit-Baltistan a chance to be a formal citizen of Pakistan.
The Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973 do not cover Northern Areas as part of Pakistan. Thus, the people of the area have little by way of political rights. Early efforts at political organization can be traced to the 1960s when the Gilgit and Baltistan Jamoohri Mahaz was formed. Subsequently, in 1973 the Gilgit Baltistan Students Federation was organized in Karachi. This group made it a point to spread awareness about the problems of the region. Subsequently, the Tanzeem-e-Millat got merged with the Pakistan People’s Party.
Three years prior to that, the first elections were held in GB and an Advisory Council consisting of 16 members was formed. In 1977, when Gen. Zia ul Haq introduced martial law in Pakistan, GB also became a martial law zone. At this time, Zia was quoted by Pak newspapers as saying that GB territory was not disputed. The 1994 LFO was amended by Pervez Musharraf to empower the Northern Areas Legislative Council to legislate on 49 subjects. Today, there are a number of political formations such as the Balwaristan National Front and the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement, with each constituency demanding political independence to autonomy within Pakistan.
Gilgit-Baltistan is dominated by Shias and efforts to introduce Sunni culture into the region have aggravated tensions. Gilgit-Baltistan covers 72,971 square kilometers and has an estimated population of 1.2 million and includes four denominations of Islam—Shiite (39 percent), 2 Sunni (27 percent), Ismaili (18 percent), and Noorbakshi (16 percent)—and at least twenty-four ethnic and linguistic groups.
As a 2013 USIP Special Report on GB highlights, religious tolerance was, and still is, characteristic of the people of the region, given that bulk of the population lives in rural areas where family ties, cooperation, and interdependence for managing common resources take precedence over religious identities. Moreover, Islam came to this area through Sufi saints, who preached tolerance and universality of human values. Even in the southern district of Diamer, which borders on the more conservative Kohistan district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, music and dance were common, even among madrassa students, which remained benign until they were infiltrated by sectarian forces from outside the region.
In 1988, towards the end of Zia-ul Haq’s rule, a lashkar (religious militia), according to some estimates of more than eighty thousand men, invaded Gilgit and massacred more than four hundred Shia community members and burnt down entire Shia villages. This was the new sectarian war in Gilgit-Baltistan, one that has involved well-equipped militant organizations, often supported by external sponsors, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, which provide money and training. Unlike previous sectarian clashes, which were usually limited, the post-1988 conflict has become more violent, unpredictable, and severe. Between 1988 and 2010, 117 sectarian-related murder cases were registered, indicating the rise in sectarian related violence in the region.
Pakistan has tried its level best to distinguish between the area it calls Azad Kashmir (with its own constitution) and Gilgit-Baltistan, earlier known as Northern Areas. This disambiguation has been done to ensure that Pakistan’s duplicity in treating one area as two different entities, which was part of the state of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which acceded to India in October 1947, for the purposes of the UN Resolutions of 1948 and 1949 has been kept hidden from the international community.
Gilgit-Baltistan’s strategic importance is established in the context of growing Pak-China economic relations. Bordered and connected with China through the Karakoram Highway, the region serves as the gateway to economic connectivity. Exploiting the economic opportunities offered by the region without first giving its people the right to self-govern and granting ownership of resources has been the trademark of successive Governments in Pakistan.
Three trends are currently operating in Gilgit-Baltistan. First, there is the Chinese connection. China is investing in road and energy connectivity to Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan forms a vital part of this endeavour. The Pakistan-China Economic Corridor is an example of this. Recall that Chinese workers, in large numbers are present in Gilgit-Baltistan for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway and other projects. This presence necessitates the presence of PLA border forces to ensure their security. Second, the sectarian crisis created by General Pervez Musharraf (when he served as Brigade commander in the area) persists and remains a threat to the social stability of the region. Finally, politics in the area is still tenuous and uncertain. Both national parties, PPP and PML (N) are trying to make their presence felt, but find it difficult given the ethnic differences.
With a fragile sectarian social fabric in Gilgit-Baltistan, one must closely monitor Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to consolidate the PML (N) base. Knowing fully well that the Pak Army has a key role to play in Gilgit-Baltistan, Sharif is trying to ensure that the tacit military support that he has in Islamabad gets extended there also. More importantly, he may well use the sectarian card to grab power, a step which could have a retrograde effect in the long run.
Trending Now
E-Paper
Follow our WhatsApp channel