Harsha Kakar
Two recent employments of the army have come into the limelight. The first was the quota agitation in Haryana and the second, the construction assistance to the Art of Living program in Delhi.
The handling of the quota agitation in Haryana by the state and Central Government set a wrong precedence. An agitation, which commenced peacefully and then suddenly spiralled out of control and left the governments wondering what actions needed to be taken. The agitators blocked road and rail routes to the capital, as also prevented water supply. There was complete panic andthus the army was rushed in. The state DGP admitted that there were lapses in the deployment of state forces.
Quota agitations are not new. The last few years have seen two similar agitations, the Gujjar agitation in Rajasthan and the Patidar agitation in Gujarat. In both the cases, the civil administration was above the situation and responded by employing forces commensurate to the development of the agitation. The army was involved, however in a limited manner and mainly to re-instil confidence in the public. In every case, the state police failed to control the situation.
All agitations commence peacefully and then begin to degenerate. State intelligence agencies have to be on their toes to gain inputs for the government to act. Timely and correct intelligence results in systematic response, prevents damage and reduces casualties. Failure of intelligence results in the state governments being caught on the wrong foot and forced to react to situations, which normally go beyond their control.
The police are the first casualties as they are present and invariably under strength at the commencement of any agitation. It is equallysurprising that even when the armed police forces are deployed, they fail. Equipment wise, each state boasts of the latest and the best riot control gear, which also fails to control agitators. Hence logically the reasons appear to be lack of training, poor leadership, ambiguous orders and limited support.
This results in the state requesting the centre for assistance. In normal conditions, less when there is a natural calamity, the centre initially deploys paramilitary forces. These are generally available in almost all states and are capable of rapid deployment. These forces are also trained in dealing with law and order situations and can supplement state resources. The state police invariably employ their personnel alongside, to enable central forces to enforce the power of arrest and detention.
The army is always the means of last resort. The reason is that once the situation is handed over to the army then it is the army, accompanied by a local magistrate which is supposed to bring it under control. The first task for the army is to instil confidence and faith amongst the local population by announcing that the army is now responsible for enforcing peace.
Bringing the army into the conflict even before the central paramilitary forces are deployed, as it occurred in Haryana, has disadvantages. Firstly, it announces the level of panic which the agitation has created on the government. In the case of the recent agitation, it conveyed to the organizers that they have partially succeeded. Secondly, the agitation was in some places still peaceful, with protestors sitting on railways tracks or on roads. The army is not supposed to resort to police action of lathi charge and other means to dislodge them. This is a police or CRPF task. Hence the army is of little use in such scenarios. The defence minister’s comment that he has tasked the army to clear the roads and railway lines was a comment in futility and resulted in the protestors blocking roads employing burnt or deflated vehicles and damaging tracks. Finally, as a state, it should be consideredas a sign of weakness when they sign the document stating ‘the situation has been handed over to the army’.
The army has been objecting for decades on other security forces copying its combat fatigues. To differentiate between forces deployed for controlling the agitation, the army marched carrying placards indicating that it is the army. This has happened for the first time, as due to road blocks the army was inducted laterally by helicopters and moved on foot. It was a ridiculous sight.
The handling of the quota agitation thus brings forth lessons for the future. Firstly, there is a need to retrospect as to why intelligence failed. Secondly, is the perpetual failure of state police forces to control a situation, thus leading to rapid deterioration of law and order. Thirdly, a study needs to be conducted by the army with the aim of recommending to the government as to when and under what scenarios should it be deployedand with what aim.
The second controversial employment was the support to the Art of Living program. The army was made responsible for the construction of a pontoon bridge, employing its war reserves of bridging equipment.This again sets a wrong precedence, as it could be misused for other events, at the whims and fancies of organizers and their political linkages. The army is involved in national events like the KhumbMela, but never for personalized events. The organizers were of the view that it is natural, due to the nature of the event. They gave the impression that such misuse is a financial saving to the organizers.
However, whenever the army is employed in assisting the civil authority, on duties of non-military nature, the employment costs are evaluated and billed to the concerned state or department. The cost includes complete cost of the force employed, fuel, wear and tear of equipment and other charges. This amount is then credited to the defence ministry and the national exchequer by the concerned state or department. In the case of the art of living program, I wonder who would bear this cost. So far no mention has yet been made of the same. I also hope this event remains a one off show and misuse stops rather than spreads.
(The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army)
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