Dr. Maciej Gaca
The March session of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), often described as the country’s “parliament,” is widely regarded as its most important annual political event. Traditionally, observers—especially in Europe—focus on economic indicators emerging from the meeting: growth forecasts, industrial priorities, consumption trends, and the direction of the next five-year plan. This year was no exception. Analysts examined China’s commitment to Industry 4.0, export performance, and whether domestic consumption would finally take center stage.
However, this economic lens, while not incorrect, is increasingly insufficient. It captures surface-level developments but misses a deeper transformation underway in China under Xi Jinping. The central issue is no longer just what China produces, but what kind of society the state is attempting to build.
From Economic Planning to Social Engineering
The NPC formally approves decisions already made by the Communist Party, including legislation and personnel appointments. While economic plans remain important, this year’s most consequential development may not be the five-year plan at all, but rather new legislation aimed at reshaping society.
In particular, the law on promoting ethnic unity and progress, adopted on March 12, 2026, signals a significant shift. Unlike earlier policies focused on managing minority groups, this law seeks to reorganize the entire social space. Its central concept—“community consciousness of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi)—frames unity as a normative goal to be actively constructed.
The law mobilizes all sectors of society: schools, media, government bodies, businesses, religious institutions, and even families. This is not merely administrative policy; it is a comprehensive project of social engineering.
Language as Infrastructure of Unity
A key instrument of this transformation is language policy. The law mandates the widespread use of the state’s common language, Putonghua, across education, administration, and public life.
Schools must adopt it as the primary language of instruction. Media platforms, publishing, and digital spaces are required to prioritize it. Even in regions where minority languages are spoken, the state language must take precedence in status and usage.
Educational reforms reinforce this shift. Centrally compiled textbooks are strengthened, and curricula must include content promoting national unity and collective identity. These measures extend beyond formal education into broader socialization processes, including family life and media consumption.
The implications are far-reaching. Language becomes not just a communication tool, but a mechanism for shaping thought, identity, and participation in public life.
Expanding Control into Everyday Life
The legislation goes further by integrating these principles into multiple domains. It calls for the creation of “mutually embedded communities,” encouraging population mixing, shared education, and coordinated urban planning. Policies promote mobility, cross-regional schooling, and integrated housing environments.
At the same time, the amended Law on the State Common Language and Script, implemented in January 2026, strengthens enforcement mechanisms. It expands the role of regulators, introduces reporting systems for violations, and allows for penalties across sectors—from media to workplaces.
Language is thus transformed into an object of supervision. The state does not merely recommend its use; it actively enforces it through legal and administrative means.
Beyond Minorities: Reshaping the Entire Linguistic Landscape
While such policies are often framed as targeting ethnic minorities, their scope is broader. China’s internal linguistic diversity—including major regional languages such as Cantonese and Wu—is also affected.
These languages historically functioned as full-fledged mediums of public life in economically and culturally significant regions like Guangdong and Shanghai. They were integral to commerce, media, and local identity.
Today, their position is shifting. They are not banned, but their institutional support is declining. Education, administration, and professional environments increasingly favor standard Mandarin. As a result, regional languages are gradually confined to informal, private contexts.
This process weakens their ability to reproduce as living systems of communication and cultural expression.
Historical Continuity and New Capabilities
Efforts to unify language and culture are not new in China. From the standardization policies of the Qin dynasty to the promotion of a national language in the 20th century, Chinese state-building has long involved attempts to align center and periphery.
What distinguishes the current era is not the goal, but the means. Earlier states lacked the capacity to deeply penetrate everyday life. Even under Mao Zedong, cohesion relied more on ideological mobilization than systematic linguistic and social regulation.
Today, the state combines longstanding ambitions with modern tools: digital surveillance, bureaucratic oversight, legal precision, and extensive administrative reach. This enables a level of intervention in daily life that was previously unattainable.
Importantly, this process now extends beyond minority regions. It encompasses the entire country, including historically distinct cultural and linguistic centers.
From Multi-Centeredness to a Single Normative Core
The cumulative effect of these policies is a gradual dismantling of China’s cultural multi-centeredness. Regional languages and identities, once capable of sustaining alternative narratives of modernity, are losing their institutional foundations.
The standard language becomes not only the medium of state communication, but also the primary vehicle for cultural transmission and social participation. Over time, this reduces the space for diversity and reinforces a single normative center.
This transformation does not occur through outright prohibition, but through structural incentives. The state reshapes the environment in which individuals make choices, privileging certain forms of expression while marginalizing others.
Why Now? The Limits of Economic Legitimacy
The shift toward social homogenization reflects changing conditions. For decades, the Chinese political system relied on a tacit contract: economic growth in exchange for limited political freedoms.
That model is now under strain. Economic growth has slowed, structural challenges have intensified, and global tensions have increased. Under these conditions, economic performance alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee stability.
The response is to strengthen social cohesion through cultural and ideological means. Uniformity becomes a safeguard against fragmentation and unrest.
Ideology and the “Rebirth” of the Nation
This shift is also reflected in evolving ideology. The concept of the “great rejuvenation” or rebirth of the Chinese nation has become central. However, such a project requires a clearly defined and unified national identity.
As a result, the notion of Zhonghua minzu is transformed from a descriptive category into a normative one. It is no longer simply a recognition of diversity within the state, but a vision of unity that must be actively cultivated.
Language, education, and historical narrative become tools for constructing this shared identity. The goal is not just political stability, but a deeply internalized sense of belonging to a single national community.
Conclusion
The developments following this year’s NPC session should not be understood solely in economic terms. While the five-year plan outlines production goals and growth strategies, the more significant shift lies in the reorganization of society itself.
China’s leadership is increasingly prioritizing social cohesion over economic expansion as the foundation of political stability. Through legal frameworks, educational reforms, and language policy, the state is shaping the conditions under which individuals participate in public life.
This process does not eliminate diversity immediately. Local languages, identities, and practices persist, especially in private spheres. However, their institutional support is diminishing, reducing their long-term viability.
In this sense, the transformation is gradual but profound. It represents a move from a system sustained primarily by economic performance to one grounded in managed unity and shared identity. Under Xi Jinping, the future of the Chinese state is increasingly tied not just to what it produces, but to how it moulds the society that produces it.—INFA
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