Bridging the Power Deficit

Jammu and Kashmir is once again in the midst of a familiar and deeply frustrating crisis-an acute shortfall in electricity during peak summer months, exposing systemic failures and decades of neglect. With a current electricity requirement of 2800 MW, the UT is battling a power deficit of 700 MW. While 1200 MW is received from the central pool, around 500-600 MW is procured additionally every day. Still, the remainder is managed through rotational power cuts that cripple essential services, especially during heatwaves when temperatures soar to 45°C in many districts.
What is most alarming is not the shortage itself-which is a recurring seasonal feature-but the chronic inability of successive administrations to address the root causes. Despite commendable efforts that have brought down J&K’s power liability, the region remains incapable of purchasing sufficient power to meet demand. This paradox stems from deeper issues-financial constraints, abnormally high AT&C losses, rampant power theft, outdated infrastructure, and ineffective administrative response. J&K continues to report some of the highest AT&C losses, a problem that lies at the core of its financial distress. While a part of this is due to technical shortcomings, a significant share is commercial-rooted in theft, inaccurate billing, and corruption. Shockingly, even fully smart metered zones are plagued by power theft. The result is that genuine revenue collection falls far short of potential, leaving the department unable to reinvest in upgrading infrastructure or purchasing surplus electricity.
Compounding the issue is the mismatch between the actual power load and what is reflected on paper. Most households continue to draw far more power than they are officially sanctioned for, but the department has failed to update sanctioned loads, leading to a gross underestimation of demand. As a result, local distribution infrastructure, including street-level transformers and substations, buckles under the weight. The frequent burnout of transformers and grid failures at major stations like Barn and Bishnah is symptomatic of this broader infrastructure collapse. Overloading in one zone often causes power disruptions in other areas, underlining how fragile and overstretched the transmission network has become. Despite multiple rounds of funding, policies, and public assurances, the basic backbone of the region’s power transmission and generation capabilities remains critically underdeveloped. Projects drag on indefinitely, and upgrades, when they occur, barely keep up with growing demand.
This administrative lethargy has cascading effects. Water supply systems dependent on electric pumps fail, leaving residents without drinking water. Hospitals suffer outages that put patients at risk, and students preparing for exams are left sweating in the dark.
The department must realise that power consumption in the UT is only going to rise exponentially, driven by expanding urbanisation, digitisation, and domestic demand. Long-term planning, infrastructure upgradation, and robust financial discipline are non-negotiable. The rot in revenue collection and enforcement must be addressed head-on. The Government must implement strict accountability mechanisms, both at the administrative and field levels. Merely reshuffling officials or releasing advisories won’t help. The system needs to be cleaned from top to bottom, with audits, vigilance, and real-time monitoring of power usage and transformer performance.
The Central Government, to its credit, has been generous in supporting J&K year after year, keeping the region’s power supply afloat. If UT fails to manage its resources more effectively, such assistance may not always be forthcoming. On the policy front, the recent proposal for a new hydropower strategy focusing on small plants is a step in the right direction. J&K boasts massive untapped hydroelectric potential, yet it continues to rely heavily on external procurement. This contradiction must end. Generation must be ramped up through time-bound execution of new plants, including micro- and mini-hydel projects that can decentralise supply and reduce strain on major grids. The problem is not just technical-it is managerial, financial, and deeply structural. A new approach is required-one that is grounded in data, driven by transparency, and enforced with accountability. Trial-and-error solutions are no longer effective. Only bold, focused, and honest governance can illuminate J&K’s dark corridors.