Ladakh’s deal, Leh’s divide

Pushp Saraf
pushapsaraf@yahoo.com
The political storm that swept through Leh in the first fortnight of May barely crossed the Zojila Pass. It never quite entered the national discourse. That was surprising. The developments had seemed serious enough to derail the Union Home Ministry’s May 22 meeting with Ladakh’s leaders on their long-standing demands, particularly statehood and inclusion under the Sixth Schedule.
Yet, unexpectedly, the temperature dropped. The central demands were pushed into the background. All parties agreed instead to work toward an administrative, legislative, financial, and constitutional framework under Article 371, with details to be developed through stakeholder consultations. It felt less like a breakthrough than a truce after years of confrontation. It was a climax not many expected but welcomed it.
The Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) had repeatedly set expectations high, insisting they would settle for nothing short of their stated goals. Six years had passed with the Union Home Ministry refusing to entertain discussion on statehood. On the Sixth Schedule too, the story had been one of reversal. Different arms of the Union government had initially signalled a firm yes. What followed was a more emphatic no.
The rupture within
Beneath the appearance of consensus, the fault lines within Ladakh – and within Leh itself – had already begun to show. On May 4, in a surprise unilateral move, the Apex Body formally accepted the nearly year-old resignation of its founder and veteran leader, Thupstan Chhewang, as chairman. Thupstan had submitted his resignation on July 6, 2025, from both the Apex Body and the High-Powered Committee, stating that he did not wish “to be entangled in competing interests.” Having stepped away from electoral politics, he said he had consciously distanced himself from partisan considerations and individual agendas. During the intervening months, interestingly, the Apex Body had continued to involve him in all major negotiations with the Union Government, making its eventual decision to formally accept his resignation appear abrupt and, to many, unnecessary.
The matter did not end there. Activist-turned-politician Sonam Wangchuk, present during the announcement, alleged that Thupstan had received external funding to organise a gathering of Buddhists at a hotel in Leh.
Stung by the allegations, Thupstan waited until the sacred Piprahwa relics of the Buddha – displayed in Leh for public darshan – had departed for Delhi on May 15 before responding. At the first opportunity later that day, he struck back at a press conference. It was an unusually charged, hour-long appearance from a leader known more for restraint than confrontation.
Thupstan firmly rejected Wangchuk’s allegations and turned the accusation around, claiming it was Wangchuk who had accepted external funding in the name of Ladakh. More significantly, he argued that Wangchuk had repeatedly diverted the Apex Body from its original objectives by introducing issues outside its agreed mandate, trapping it in a prolonged deadlock with a BJP-led Central Government that had made its position unmistakably clear: neither statehood nor the Sixth Schedule was on offer.
Breaking with the prevailing line, Thupstan argued for accepting an Article 371 arrangement as a practical interim settlement while continuing to pursue the larger constitutional goals. His position drew on both personal conviction and Ladakh’s own political experience. Leh, he noted, had once accepted the Autonomous Hill Development Council as an interim arrangement while pressing for Union Territory status which was eventually achieved. Thupstan himself had resigned from both the BJP and Parliament in protest at the party’s failure to honour that promise. Nevertheless, he welcomed the final decision wholeheartedly when it came. He did not return to the BJP, choosing instead to work for Ladakh outside electoral politics. It was a commitment he kept. It was in pursuit of Ladakh’s larger interests that he took the lead in setting up the Apex Body alongside Thiksay Rinpoche, the late Lama Lobzang, and senior political leaders Tsering Dorjay and Rigzin Jora (both of them had been Cabinet Ministers at different times in the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir State as the BJP and the Congress nominee, respectively. Dorjay has since left electoral politics while Jora remains a leading light of the Congress).
This exchange of allegations was intense and highly visible within Ladakh. It exposed more than a clash of personalities. It revealed deeper disagreements over political strategy, representation, leadership, and Ladakh’s constitutional future to the extent that the Apex Body raised objections over the inclusion of Thupstan and BJP leader and former Chief Executive Councillor Tashi Gyalson in the talks in a letter to Union Minister of State for Home Nityanand Rai without actually mentioning their names.
The middle path gains ground
The May 22 outcome confirms that Thupstan’s line of thinking has gained ground. For some time, many serious voices in Ladakh had been moving toward a negotiated settlement rather than a confrontationist strategy. This was more so after September 24, 2025, when four young people lost their lives during a demonstration that turned violent.
That shift had already found public expression. In a detailed article titled “Wisdom Lies in the Middle Path”, published in January this year, scholar of Buddhist studies and environmental activist Thinles Dorje argued: “A customised provision similar to Article 371 can bypass the upheaval associated with statehood and the misalignment of the Sixth Schedule. This approach offers protection for cultural heritage and land rights, addresses the concerns of youth, civil society, monks and ulemas, while also aligning with national security objectives. Moreover, it ensures equal standing for both Leh and Kargil, ultimately granting Ladakh a future that resonates with its identity.”
Organisational turbulence ahead
The coming days are likely to see intensified efforts to preserve unity among Buddhists. Serious attempts are reportedly underway to ensure that Thupstan and Tsering Dorjay, long regarded as political allies, do not drift further apart. Symbolic photographs of the two embracing have circulated widely on social media, projecting cohesion at a sensitive moment. Dorjay has remained active as co-chairman of the Apex Body and continues to move in tandem with Wangchuk, who has emerged as a more visible public face because of his stronger social media presence.
These dynamics may make a reorganisation of the Apex Body difficult to avoid. Among the proposals which have been set afloat is the principle of “one person, one post” aimed at separating leadership responsibilities so that the same individual does not simultaneously head both the Apex Body and the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), a position currently held by Dorjay. The present situation appears more complex than the political realignments of the early 2000s, when leaders including Rigzin Jora broke from the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF) to revive the Congress. Over time, a clearer picture is likely to emerge regarding the future cohesion and representational balance of the Apex Body, which remains primarily Buddhist while also including members from the Shia Muslim community.
In Kargil, the KDA remains institutionally intact and believes it still has substantive ground to pursue. Its demand for the elevation of the densely populated sub-divisions of Shakar-Chiktan and Sankoo into separate districts remains unresolved. While this grievance is expected to form part of its broader submissions on Article 371’s implementation, it may not indefinitely postpone agitation if progress is not forthcoming.
The coming period will test not only the internal cohesion of the LAB and the KDA, but also their ability to translate competing aspirations into a shared political framework. A constitutional accommodation may now be under discussion. But the politics of Ladakh remains far from settled.