Neeraj Singh Manhas
China has enacted a new “Land Borders Law” in October 2021. The law aims to strengthen civil-military contact and coordination in order to safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and land borders. Although China has stated that this law will have no effect on current border accords and cooperation, it contains various sections that could further scare small and weak neighbouring governments such as Nepal and Bhutan.
Primarily, the law seeks to establish boundary markers along all of the state’s borders. It then calls on the army and police to protect China’s borders and empowers patrol personnel to use police tools and weapons against intruders. Second, the law requires the state to develop border towns and to provide them with connectivity, public services, civilian, and defence infrastructure, making them more favourable for settlement. Additionally, it encourages civilians to protect their homelands and lend assistance to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) when necessary.
At first glance, the law purports to protect and secure Chinese territory. However, it becomes more avaricious when coupled with China’s plan of salami-slicing and relocating its civilian population in neighbouring countries’ territories.
Nepal and China officially delineated its borders in 1961 through a give-and-take exchange of regions. In 1963, both states added over 99 pillars to denote their borders. However, because they were constructed in isolated places, the Nepali authorities paid little attention to inspecting or patrolling them. As a result, they were left unprotected from weather damage or displacement by China.
Nepal will be hesitant to challenge and scrutinise China as it strives to maintain this delicate balance between the Asian giants, much to China’s advantage.
Today, over seven of Nepal’s fifteen districts bordering China experience territorial intrusions by the latter. It comprises Dolakha, Gorkha, Darchula, Humla, Sindhupalchowk, Sankhuwas a, and Rasuwa districts. China has also occupied settlements in Darchula and Gorkha, most recently the Rui village. China had also constructed 11 buildings in the Humla district’s far outskirts by September 2020. China later discovered that the pillars in this district had been broken or relocated.
However, these Chinese incursions are not a new occurrence in Nepal. However, Nepal’s unwillingness to face China due to geopolitical constraints and political instability has been a long-standing issue. As a result, neither country has conducted a combined border check since 2006, when the problem of pillar 57 arose. However, as previous Nepalese Prime Minister KP Oli moved closer to China by breaking bridges with India, ignoring this Chinese assault became a routine occurrence.
However, with the new government, a research panel was established under the Ministry of Home Affairs. China’s structures and activities within Nepal’s boundaries were confirmed in its report. Additionally, it assessed Chinese impediments and restrictions on Nepali individuals’ daily activities.
Although the Nepali government recently brought this matter to the attention of the Chinese authorities, there has been much caution and delay in lodging this complaint. And this is despite the fact that both countries have established a permanent structure.
The reason for this is that Nepal not only gains economically from China, but also leverages its proximity to the latter to avoid becoming overly reliant on India. In this scenario, China’s border law presents a new challenge to Nepal. Nepal will be hesitant to challenge and scrutinise China as it strives to maintain this delicate balance between the Asian giants, much to China’s advantage. China will thus take advantage of this opportunity to expand connectivity, settlements, village construction, and salami-slicing tactics along its Nepali border. And a good deal of the issue becomes much more complex to fix as these Chinese townships and settlements are more militarised and more connected.
Settlers, salami slicing, and Bhutan’s unresolved borders:
Bhutan, on the other hand, is without a permanent system for resolving its border disputes with China. Bhutan has a special bond with India and has been sceptical of China for a long period of time. Additionally, it lacks diplomatic relations with its northern neighbour. However, both parties have held 24 rounds of negotiations and ten rounds of expert-level meetings to resolve their boundary problems since 1984.
China attempted to resolve the border disputes in 1996 by requesting Bhutan to maintain its northern lands in exchange for relinquishing its contested western territory. Bhutan, on the other hand, rejected the contract due to Indian security worries. Bhutan and China struck an agreement in 1998 to maintain the status quo in the disputed territories while negotiations proceeded. Nonetheless, they completed a three-step roadmap for resolving the border dispute in April 2021 and signed a memorandum of agreement (MoU) in October 2021.
Nonetheless, China has used coercive and settlement techniques against Bhutan despite these advancements and assurances. China now controls and settles the entire Menchuma valley and Beyul in the north. China’s scheme dates all the way back to 1995, when it dispatched the first group of Tibetan herders to live in the uninhabited territory of Beyul. These residents obstructed Bhutanese herders from grazing their livestock, confronting and harassing them in the process. When the Bhutanese herders ultimately left Beyul for the south, the Bhutanese soldiers assigned to protect them also left the region. China began resettling the Northern disputed territories by exploiting the vacuum. In 2015, it announced the establishment of its first village, Gyalaphug. By 2017, the community had been expanded with new roads, structures, and military outposts. In Menchuma valley, a similar occurrence occurred.
Bhutan’s military is severely limited in terms of infrastructure and material resources to counter Chinese incursions, villages, and settlements.On the western side of the border, nothing has changed. Between 2006 and 2009, China made over 38 incursions into western borders. Following the Doklam conflict in 2017, the former consolidated its position throughout the western frontiers. China had even constructed a well-connected and assisted village within Bhutan named Pangda by 2020. And, despite the latest Memorandum of Understanding and its timeline, four new Chinese settlements are likely to have been built in western Bhutan between May 2020 and November 2021.
China has thus violated agreements and memorandums of understanding with Bhutan in order to further its territorial and strategic interests. Its objectives include establishing diplomatic relations with Bhutan, resolving the border dispute, and, most crucially, containing India’s expansion in the Siliguri Corridor. Bhutan’s military currently faces serious infrastructure and material constraints in combating Chinese incursions, villages, and settlements. However, most of this discrepancy will only widen with the passage of this new law, as China will use it to expand its territorial gains through border villages, which will be supplemented by increased militarization and connectivity.
These minor states are vulnerable to China’s salami-slicing methods and intrusions since they are located between India and China and are compelled by their unique balance strategies.
As a result of China’s land border regulation, the Himalayan countries of Nepal and Bhutan now face a new set of issues. The law, which is intended to protect China’s territorial integrity, appears to be just another tool of Chinese aggression and expansion. These minor states are vulnerable to China’s salami-slicing methods and intrusions since they are located between India and China and are compelled by their unique balance strategies. Additionally, both countries will struggle to reverse or dissuade additional Chinese colonies and communities, as well as their rising connection and militarization, due to their lack of material capabilities and strategic infrastructure.
(The author is Director, Indo-Pacific Raisina House, New Delhi, India)
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