Harsha Kakar
The deposition recently by David Coleman Headley to a special court in Mumbai, via video conferencing enabled the Indian intelligence agencies to piece together the small gaps which had existed in their assessment of the Mumbai attacks. Headley had visited India on a few occasions to conduct reconnaissance for the ISI prior to the attacks. His deposition helped seal the links between the ISI and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). He conveyed and brought formally to fore, what was known all along, that it was an operation planned and coordinated by the ISI, on behalf of the Pakistan army, however executed by the LeT. His deposition contained details of his meeting with various members of the LeT and the ISI, who were responsible for the conduct of the operation.
The main facts which Headley brought to fore, was that the LeTis an organization, raised, funded and controlled by the ISI, or in simple terms the military and hence the government of Pakistan. If a similar analogy is adopted, then the Taliban would also fall in the same category. Thus, Pakistan is officially employing terrorism as an instrument of state policy and harming nations of the region, for their personal interests. At the same time, if the inputs obtained are given to Pakistan and they are compelled to take action, then logically action would also need to be taken against their ISI, which is unacceptable to their military. Hence status quo would be the ultimate result.
Another important fact which was given by Headley was the collection of targets which he was asked to recce. This list is important as it conveys to respective agencies those locations which were and would in all likelihood remain on the terrorist radar.
It is well known that Pakistan has done little to take those responsible to task. Their investigation has hardly progressed. There have been umpteen promises to India and the world, however, no positive action has been witnessed. Their permanent complaint has been that the inputs provided by India are insufficient for the court. The inputs as shared by Headley could easily have been obtained by them, directly from the US, had they so desired.
The other angle, which most suits Pakistan, is that Headley is a terrorist and hence his words would never be reliable. The statement by Headley, without his personal presence would also never be admissible in a Pakistani court, while it is clear, that the US would never allow him to be taken to Pakistan. Therefore even sharing such inputs with Pakistan would in reality be an exercise in futility. However, as it keeps asking for more inputs, the Government would in some time frame share them.
Pakistan has followed the same story line time and again. The SIT formed post the Pathankot strike, has continuously stated that the inputs given are insufficient. The FIR lodged last weekend by Pakistan is a general one and well short of Indian expectations. In a development concerning the trial in Pakistan of those responsible for the attacks on the Mumbai trains in Jul 2006, the court has desired that all twenty four Indian witnesses be brought to Pakistan for recording their statements. This again would stall the proceedings till eternity. This attitude, which has begun to become a norm, is a clear reminder that there would be no serious actions against the perpetrators of attacks on India.
For the Government of India, expecting action by Pakistan, prior to commencing talks is unrealistic. The Pakistan Government can and never would take any serious action against its own organizations. Further, since within their nation, there are organizations which are against peace with India, the possibility of arresting those responsible only appear remote. This leaves India with limited options.
If India is to contemplate dialogue, without assured action by Pakistan, then politically the Government has to be prepared for strong criticism. Further there would always be the thought in the minds of strategists that should another terrorist strike take place; all progress would come to naught. In addition, the government would also need to be prepared for a counter strike. If it does not do so, it would be seen as weak and incapable of protecting its population. This action would also bring any progress back to ground zero, while escalating the situation. Therefore this could end up as a zero sum game.
The other alternative is to delay commencement of dialogue for a prolonged period, basically to continue testing the waters. Positive signals by Pakistan emanating from the correct quarters, clearly highlighting that terrorist action is being curtailed and the organizations being brought under tighter controls could be the trigger for recommencement of talks.
However, the above would only have a meaning, provided both countries feel that talks are essential. In case both have differing views, then what has been happening each time, would continue to happen in the future too. In such a case, it is better that status quo becomes the order of the day and all suggestions for talks are ignored. When that is accepted, then it would remain ascenario of ‘no war- no peace’ and permit India to retaliate at will, as suggested by the Defence Minister, post any misadventure by Pakistan. As I have written in this column before, talks would only have a meaning, if the offer was to come from their side. Till then, we need to continue to develop capabilities to retaliate in a manner which we deem suitable.
(The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army)
feebackexcelsior@gmail.com
Trending Now
E-Paper
Follow our WhatsApp channel