The Saudi Conundrum

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
The Middle East has always stood out in the competition between regions demanding attention of analysts but perhaps never to the level it is so today. The complexities are so immense that no single field is sufficient to give any pointers of things to come. It actually a demands a series of analyses; and if that be so, with Saudi Arabia it must begin. The temptation to veer off and look at connected links is strong in a situation where each link leads to different lines of thinking.
Clearly, with Libya, Iraq and Syria the Middle East has had more than its share of turbulence. The violence brought on by the events of the Arab Spring which preceded this phase, is already forgotten with time. However, the Arab Spring has had profound effect on the situation today.
One could not have imagined the status of Saudi Arabia as it is today, having been one of the most powerful states in the Middle East. A combination of factors appears to have diluted its power and comparative strategic significance. This needs brief investigation although I am convinced that Saudi Arabia’s geo-strategic location, its energy resources and its ideological bent continues to make it one of the most significant countries in the world.
Vast in geographical size, small by strength of population but hugely significant for the presence of the two most important locations for Islamic pilgrimage, Mecca and Medina, the Saudi state has lived/survived through a formula of power sharing between the clergy and the Royal Family.
The latter has been free to pursue its interests as long as it gave the required space to the clergy. Its extremist form of Islam, Wahabi or Salafi as it is better known, has survived and in fact proliferated due to the space given to the clergy which otherwise does not interfere in matters of the state’s foreign and monetary policies. Internally, the clergy ensures the existence of a virtually theocratic state abiding by Islamic principles.
Saudi Arabia’s real strategic value arose with two events in the Seventies. The first was the Yom Kippur War of Oct 1973 when Anwar Sadat’s Egyptian Army almost ran over a surprised Israeli Army. In a reversal of fortunes and with some poor strategy the Egyptians and the Syrians lost yet another armed standoff with Israel. The power of oil was just then realized; withholding production or sale could cause intense crisis in states which were dependent on it. The Saudis had much of it, way too much and their power grew exponentially.
Much of their oil was imported by the US and the extraction was mostly under control of American companies. The US needed Saudi Arabia as much as it needed Iran with whom it had a special relationship. Both flanks of the Persian Gulf in its hands made the US energy secured. In 1979 came a crisis which enhanced the Saudi importance beyond limits.
Iran erupted and the revolution sent a message of possible Shia resurgence; Shia was anathema to the Saudi Salafis. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in end 1979 brought the alliance of US-Saudi-Pakistan together strengthening the strategic significance of the Saudis. It then virtually became the flag bearer of Islam choosing to spread its brand of Salafism at the behest of its clergy, much of what brought the Islamic world to the sorry state it is in today.
Destiny kept smiling as Saddam Hussain of Iraq chose to invade Kuwait in 1990 leading to Gulf War I where Saudi territory formed the pivot for the US led Allied counter operations. All this while its economy flourished with the robust sale of energy and the decline of Iran after its isolation.
The Saudis opened doors for various Diasporas who came in droves to run the state. Quality of life enhanced to opulent levels but no attempt was made to improve the local human capital, possibly at the behest of the clergy which always felt threatened by any invasion of western values and modern education.
Post the Cold War, the marching economies of the West, China, India and Japan, became dependent on assured Saudi oil supplies. The strategic significance of Saudi Arabia was at its highest. Iran was still in the dumps after its disastrous war with Iraq in the Eighties. The only drawback was the rising tide of Salafism led by the Al Qaida which had an axe to grind with the Royal Family. The West led by the US knew that its interests lay in the fossil fuels and the pliancy of the Royals.
Despite 9/11 and the fact that the majority of the 19 terrorists who led it being from Saudi Arabia the West was unwilling to provoke the Saudis; it chose to target Iraq once again on grounds that a clandestine nuclear program was in the making in Iraq.
It could not achieve its full objectives and left a smoldering Iraq in 2011 without the end game of conflict termination. The empowerment of the Shia majority created a Sunni backlash with supposed full backing of Saudi Arabia. This was the beginning of the process of change of balance of power in the Gulf region.
Saudi Arabia’s security concerns had already enhanced with the breakout of Arab Spring movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt worried the House of Saud and is an issue never adequately explained. The stability of Saudi Arabia’s arrangement of power sharing between the clergy and the Royal Family appeared threatened because the Brotherhood’s philosophy believed in unity of the clergy and the state.
It was the US which had encouraged the Brotherhood’s emergence by democratic means; its downfall within a just over a year at the hands of the Egyptian military was supported by Saudi Arabia which rushed financial support to the Sisi Government when the US held that back. This became the second of the schisms in US-Saudi interests.
The third was the increasing US evolution of Shale gas industry which reduced its dependence on Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia’s twin strengths, energy and ideology, which gave it the strategic importance of the times are thus both under question.
To add to its woes has emerged the fast improving relationship between Saudi Arabia’s nemesis,Iran and the West; the Nuclear Deal being the core center. The Saudis do not want this to happen. In its stance Saudi Arabia ignores a basic truism of international relations.
This relates to the age old adage – ‘in international relations there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; it is interests which dictate the discourse’. Perceiving the strangulating influence of Iran in areas of its strategic interest the Saudi response has been knee jerk and without full consideration of implications.
It decided to pursue a kinetic route in Yemen against the Iran backed Houthis, against Western advice, set up a coalition to do that, took the lead but found potential partners on whom it relied not playing ball; Pakistan being the most glaring example. It is now immersed in an operation which is draining resources and the energy has run out.
It recently decided to execute Sheikh Nimr el Nimr, a Saudi Shia cleric in an apparent bid to demonstrate its strategic independence, extract Sunni support at home and abroad and curb potential internal unrest by the minority. It has only led to further strained relations with Iran and not contributed one bit to the larger issue of fighting the danger of ISIS (Daesh).
The last and extremely relevant element of strategic posturing to offset Iran’s rising star is the cementing of a relationship with Israel. This immediately ensures that the Iran-Hezbollah dominance of the Levant is countered to a great extent. Two questions immediately arise; first how much will this influence other areas such as Southern Iraq and the Gulf region; two, the manner that the US will handle its relationship with Israel given the level of antipathy between Israel and Iran.
The major thing for the moment is the state of the Saudi economy. No one will want a meltdown here given Saudi Arabia’s geo-strategic and geo-political importance. It will create conditions far reaching and extremely negative; vacuums get filled by forces such as ISIS which is dangerously close, and that is something the world cannot afford.
The meltdown of states such as Libya, Syria and Iraq has had profound effects on international stability; no one can afford anything similar in Saudi Arabia. The reports about securing a few nukes from Pakistan could be worrisome but these are unlikely to be true because the world’s sanctions on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would have to follow, which would be never in both the nations’ interests.
For India in particular, our interests are intrinsically linked to the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region; in fact the entire Middle East. A 7.2 million diaspora is not something small and our energy needs too are huge. We need Saudi Arabia and we need Iran. Anything we can do to keep the region stable will be in our and the world’s interest.
(The writer is a former GOC of the Chinar Corps and now a part of two major Delhi think tanks, Vivekanand International Foundation and Delhi Policy Group)
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