(A General’s dedication to the people of Jammu & Kashmir)
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
With the Golden Jubilee of the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict almost upon us events to mark and remember the sacrifice of a number of martyrs/heroes of the Indian Armed Forces and many others not in uniform, are in the offing. In India the conflict is overshadowed by its richer and more high profile cousin, the 1971 Conflict. The latter created a new nation while the 1965 Conflict was a transitory event between the disaster of the Sino India border war of 1962 and the iconic strategic victory in 1971. The investigative spirit and ownership of the 1965 conflict has been missing for long allowing Pakistan a virtual moral right to celebrate a victory it never won. The central theme and the larger national aim of Pakistan in 1965 was the physical capture of territory of J&K to force India to part with its hold on the state. Less than 18 months before, the Pakistan government had bartered away the Shaqsgam Valley of Baltistan to China, for the abstract benefit of strategic goodwill. It expected China to do much more to support Pakistan’s military misadventure which was essentially timed to exploit what it perceived as India’s low point – the aftermath of military defeat in 1962, the presence of a new and comparatively inexperienced political leadership after Nehru and the turbulence of reorganization which was underway in the Indian Army.
J&K, the crown of the Indian subcontinent, was the prize that Pakistan sought and perceived it could wrest militarily. To test the waters it first launched an operation in the Kutch sector of Gujarat, far removed from the territory it aimed to wrest; smart thinking indeed. The Indian Army’s main concentration was in Rajasthan, Punjab and J&K. Admittedly the response in Kutch was inadequate. Territory was lost, with casualties. The subsequent ceasefire brokered by the UK put the Kutch issue for arbitration. As per Altaf Gauhar, Pakistan had been emboldened by its perceived military success and this triggered the launch of Operation Gibraltar in early Aug 1965; the operation had been carefully and secretly prepared with the self-perception that the population of J&K would support Pakistan if hundreds of infiltrators were launched to tie down the Indian Army’s rear area and cause mayhem. This would instigate the people to rise and overthrow the Indian administration even as the Army battled on all fronts including the LoC. There it would meet the might of the Pakistan Army and supposedly be defeated due to inferior fighting capability of individual soldiers.
With compulsory military training for recruitable young men in PoK Pakistan created a joint force of civilians and military men. The strength was between 5000 and 8000. Eight to ten infiltrating columns of approximately 300-400 men each were created, named after personalities from folklore and armed with Browning MGs, mortars and explosives, to exploit the wide gaps in the Indian Army defenses. The simultaneity of launch may have caught the Indian troops off guard as intelligence from across Line of Control was sketchy. The Gibraltar Force elements were discovered mostly by nomads in the high altitude areas where they intended to mingle with the Bakarwal population which abounds there in the summer months. The deployment of the Indian Army was not as dense as it is today; the area south of Pir Panjal saw at least three to four such forces of varying strength being infiltrated. The Indian Army did suffer casualties particularly in the Tangdhar sector but Nasta Chun Pass remained secure from the infiltrators. The forested area between Gulmarg and Baramula remained a potent area for bases which had to be destroyed by deliberate search and destroy operations as much as in the Khag-Sutharan forest of Budgam. Operation Gibraltar failed to enthuse people of J&K and India launched Operation Bakshi on 26 Aug 1965 employing 68 Infantry Brigade to capture and deny the main base of the infiltrators in the Haji Pir bulge. By 28 Aug 1965 Haji Pir pass had been captured by the daring action of Major (later Lt Gen Ranjit Dayal, MVC) and his unit 1st Para but the link up with Operation Faulad from the direction of Poonch was only possible on 9 Sep 1965.
For the residents of Jammu it is always good to be reminded that they reside on real estate which is one of the most strategic pieces of territory in India’s mainland. On either flank of Jammu city lie two arteries which are eyed by Pakistan; first is the highway to Pathankot which almost hugs the international border. Severance of this artery cuts J&K’s main link with rest of India making it highly vulnerable; second is the link from Jammu to Rajouri and Poonch via Akhnur. The latter has the crucial bridge over the Chenab River which if captured would effectively seal the fate of the Indian forces in Rajouri and Poonch. The area south of Akhnur leading to the border is a narrow swathe of territory named on the two towns which exist within – Chhamb and Jaurian. This is the territory which Pakistan has to capture to threaten the Akhnur bridge. Jammu’s huge built up area breaks the vulnerability of the roads virtually segmenting them and providing the Indian Army easier defensive opportunity. So, in many ways the civilian population’s presence in good numbers is also to India’s military advantage.
On 01 Sep 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam in the Akhnur sector with the aim of relieving pressure from the Uri-Poonch sector, where the Haji Pir operations had upset their equilibrium. The iron girder bridge at Akhnur over the Chenab river was the prime objective. With Indian forces in the Valley and Poonch-Rajouri sector involved in stalling the progress of infiltrators of the Gibraltar Force the Akhnur sector was lightly held, a risk that had to be taken. Pakistan read the situation well and had the requisite intelligence. The decision to strike here was important from the Pakistan point of view. If Operation Grand Slam had succeeded the Indian Army would have little to respond with. Four battalions and a squadron of tanks held the Akhnur sector. Its strategic connotations were clear; the securing of the Jammu-Rajouri communication artery would throw Indian responses out of gear making it difficult for India to proactively engage anywhere else. It was thus launched as a response to the successful operation by the Indian Army in the Haji Pir area of Uri sector in Kashmir.
While the Pakistani advance in Chhamb – Jaurian was making some headway the Indian Army continued the consolidation of Uri sector in the Haji Pir area. The initial Pakistani operations on 01 Sep 1965 failed to make the breakthrough across the line of the Munawar Tawi forcing Pakistan to relieve Maj Gen Akhtar Malik from his command. His division had also lost Haji Pir a few days ago. Maj Gen (later General and President) Yahya Khan was appointed GOC Pakistan 12 Division. Yahya made the crucial error of giving a day’s tactical pause as he eased himself into the saddle. These 24 hours were exploited by the Indian Army to reinforce Akhnur and Operation Grand Slam was thus contained but not without loss of crucial territory which gave Pakistan a virtual launch pad against Akhnur.
To relieve pressure on Akhnur India opened the Sialkot and Lahore fronts with two corps sized offensives. J&K was thus saved as Pakistan had to divest much of its offensive resources towards the defensive role in these areas. The issue of interest for the people of J&K should be the question why India lost Haji Pir bulge at the negotiating table in Tashkent. If it had remained in India’s hands a drive from Uri to Poonch in a little over an hour would have been possible; today it takes two days or more to travel that distance. However, war is a strange phenomenon. It alters boundaries to advantage and disadvantage. The explanation that history has is that loss in Chhamb and Jaurian had to be offset by return of Haji Pir. However, there has never been an official explanation for this. Pakistan’s military failure all over the J&K front despite repeated use of irregular warfare has never taught it adequate lessons.
In all three, Jammu region, the Valley and in Ladakh (Kargil) Pakistan’s military misadventure failed to achieve its objectives. The Indian Army no doubt rebounded after the disastrous war of 1962 but it was as much the victory of the people of J&K without whose patriotic fervor and support the Indian Army could never have optimized its response.
(The writer is a former General Officer Commanding of 15 Corps, which fought the 1965 War in J&K, currently associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group)
(feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com)
Follow our WhatsApp channel