Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
A few things about J&K of the current times are most noticeable. Educated and articulate ex government servants who held important positions are rubbing their hands in glee. In the Valley’s media they are openly expressing their views in support of the new militancy which has emerged in South Kashmir. Local youth, many of them educated and from well to do families, who have joined militant ranks are receiving motivation from many of those who had kept quiet some years ago. In fact the notion that the Valley is back to the Nineties, when militancy was at a real high and continuing to expand, is being contested on grounds that this time around the movement is entirely local; sponsored, led and motivated without proxy influence of Pakistan or the United Jehad Council.
There can be no doubt that after many years the winter has witnessed as many if not more than the number of encounters in summer when supposedly the infiltration begins and movement of militants is easier. Those who have been following the Kashmir story would recall that in the Nineties and the early Millennium winter was a quiet period only at the LoC; the hinterland had a concentration of terror groups taking refuge in villages and towns as the Army continued to make their existence in the forests and higher altitude hideouts untenable, by destroying these or keeping a strong control over resources. In the last five years or so as militancy dwindled winter was quiet all over again. However, the winter of 2015-16 has witnessed a return to the bad days with hinterland encounters on the increase. The concentration of this is in the turbulent Pulwama and Shupiyan areas with Kulgam not far behind. All three areas are in South Kashmir.
The elitist and intellectual observers in the local media are also drawing gleeful attention to the phenomenon of mobs led by youth descending upon encounter sites to unnerve and heckle the Army, CRPF and JK Police elements intensely involved in the operations to eliminate the terrorists. In earlier years these gatherings were seen only during funerals of local terrorists. However, for some years now a trend of large turnout at funerals of Pakistani terrorists has also been witnessed. The media puts it down to resurgence in sub nationalism, led and manned locally. It is apparently giving a high to Separatists and their supporters although their role is being acknowledged as marginal. The gathering of women in hundreds with singing songs eulogizing martyrdom of the so called mujahids witnessed during the Pampore encounter is also being quoted as an example of mounting alienation and the latent Kashmiri desire for freedom and in fact even looking towards Pakistan for merger.
How dangerous is this trend? What should the security forces being doing to wrest advantage and how far is J&K’s political landscape responsible for this? All interesting questions, which deserve answers over a series of analyses. This surely is not the last of those analyses. Again, knowledge of the history of militancy/terrorism in J&K is essential to arrive at any conclusions. The first recall should be the fact that the nature of proxy conflict in J&K has been a dynamic affair with ups and downs every few years. In 2008 the Separatists experimented with revisiting the street turmoil methodology of keeping themselves relevant, after the strength of terrorists had dropped drastically and the Army’s dragnet at the LoC was getting increasingly successful. Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal, the then GOC 15 Corps, had taken the initiative to bring a surge in strength deployed at the LoC which brought great success. The street protests, accompanied by stone throwing followed SAS Geelani’s concept of what was then known as the ‘Chalo Programme’ (meaning – Let Us Go); days and relevant landmarks were selected for a mass movement of humanity from different parts of Kashmir concentrating at that landmark. We witnessed UN Chalo, Anantnag Chalo or Hazratbal Chalo programs which choked roads brought security forces in contact with civilians and created massive law and order problems besides generating extremely negative passions. Politicians of Kashmir were unused to this kind of mass movement and the security forces untrained to handle street protests. It led to abdication of the political space with only the security space left entirely to the security forces who were initially unnerved. They responded just as the Separatists wished them to respond, crudely and violently. It led to 117 deaths of mostly young people in the streets in 2010 increasing alienation manifold.
The energy of 2008-10 could not continue in perpetuity. It had a major effect on the population with academic sessions of children lost, tourism business in doldrums and even the fruit crop not being lifted sufficiently thus adversely affecting the movement. The terrorist strength continued to dwindle and he Army went into engagement mode from 2011 to 2014. However, true to prediction the cycle of low violence in this period is now witnessing a returning spiral. It is happening with renewed vigour and a different tack just as it has always happened in J&K in the last 26 years. This seems to be creating ripples in the media and finding much excitement among local intellectuals. The Separatists of the old ilk are not behind this; their calls for bandhs and protests have increasingly been resisted by the people. It has little colour of inspiration from Pakistan but observers say that the ideological hand is deep.
The Army, CRPF and JK Police have to sit together and apply their minds to it just like they did in 2010 when the famous 15 Sep 2010 Core Group Meeting demarcated individual responsibility of the three organizations against the stone throwing mobs. The intelligence services have to get deeper behind the curtain to ascertain who exactly is behind this, where the finances are flowing from and what are the methods of connectivity between towns and villages, besides social media.
Kashmir’s media is congratulating the youth for yet again finding something innovative to beat the security forces with. However, the forces are not really unnerved because the experience of 2008-10 and the lesser movement in 2011-14 have given experience to the commanders and troops. There has been unfair criticism in the national media against the Army alleging that it has come under pressure of the mobs to hurry its operations and has therefore suffered casualties. This is furthest from the truth. However, there is no denying that at the rapid rate of encounters in South Kashmir we are slowly witnessing an increasing size of protests. These are virtually suicidal in nature daring the security forces to fire at them, with parents declaring their happiness at sacrifice of their sons. These are not things which happen when militancy is in its dying days. To that extent the Kashmiri intellectuals are right and are taking great pleasure from the same.
This will need further and deeper analysis but for now let me leave a thought with readers. Each time the security forces led by the Army have succeeded in bringing the situation to near normalcy we have witnessed a bounce back. The inability of the political leadership to adequately garner the space has allowed this to happen. One of the major reasons for this is the lack of grassroots political activity in the Valley. There is simply no political connect with the street by political functionaries. What is professed to be political contact is simply a few meetings with political workers in major towns; the village is completely ignored except at the time of elections. The lack of Panchayati Raj is hurting J&K more than we may like to admit. The inability of the PDP-BJP combine to get the act of governance going and now its inability to decide the future, is hurting the state badly. There is a need for positive political activity beyond electioneering and unless that happens arresting the return to the Nineties is going to be difficult.
I predict a hot summer made even hotter by some innovative ways of protest which is going to draw the Army in, in a negative way. We have experienced the burning of Army ambulances before; mass surges to surround Army convoys may be the next. Either way the Core Group should be meeting more often and ideating on ways and means of neutralizing this latest challenge in J&K.
(The writer is a former GOC of the Chinar Corps and now a part of two major Delhi think tanks, Vivekanand International Foundation and Delhi Policy Group)
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