Strengthening judiciary

Arun Jaitley
In the past the world has witnessed a large number of countries where democracies have collapsed.  In recent years there have been  positive movements for restoration of democracy in several nations.  India presents to the world an example where despite cynicism, poverty and being a developing economy, we have continued to strengthen each of our democratic institution. We have an independent Election Commission, an independent and strong judiciary, a professional military and a strong and vibrant media, a powerful civil society and vibrant multi-party democracy with a strong parliamentary institution.
When I analyse the history of India’s Judicial  institutions, I find satisfaction in the fact that  it has immense credibility and has stood the test of times. It has upheld the constitutional values, strengthened the fundamental rights and acted as an adjudicator in disputes between citizen and citizen on one hand and the citizen and the State on the other. Its’ decisions are widely respected.  Historically, individuals who man this institution have been men of credibility whose decisions are well regarded by the society.  As someone who is committed  to judicial independence and with my experience  at the Bar, in the government and in Parliament, I set upon the task of introspecting where the institution stands today.  I flag the following subjects  with the intention  of strengthening the judicial institution.
The Judiciary
The judiciary is failing to attract  the best available talent. In the post liberalization scenario, when commercial  litigation has increased  manifold, the incomes of lawyers have increased substantially, the best at the Bar are reluctant to take up career as judges.  They find the service conditions relatively modest and are not willing to regard assignment as judges as a part of national duty.  I do believe that there is a need  to  substantially improve the service conditions of the judicial officers  and judges at all levels.  The service conditions should be able to attract  the best talent.  Awareness needs to be created amongst the members of the Bar  that the system  needs the best to be elevated as judges.
Appointments
We have gone through an evolution in the appointment process of judges.  We started off with a statutory process where the Chief Justice of India recommended the names to the Government for elevation in the High Courts and the Supreme Court and the Government ordinarily accepted the recommendation.  The 1982 Judgement of the Supreme Court categorically gave primacy to the word of the Executive and their view started prevailing.  With the backdrop of the 1973 supersesions and the 1975 transfers of inconvenient judges during Emergency, the government began to assert   itself in the 1980s.  This decade witnessed politicization in the matter of appointment of judges.  The 1993  judgement of the  Supreme Court  was a reaction  against this politicization .  The consultation with the Chief Justice of India soon became  a binding advice  of the Chief Justice.  The Chief Justice became the key individual in the matter of appointment of judges.  What if the CJI did not exercise the power judiciously?  The 1998 reference shifted the eventual authority to collegiums created in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.  That is the system  under which we function.
The collegium  system is certainly superior to the system  where the Executive had the last word.  We should never consider going back to the age of Executive primacy but I do believe that the collegium  system has failed to select the very best and select them expeditiously.  At any given point of time a very large number of vacancies in the High Courts  remain unfilled.  This is contributing to the pendency of arrears in the High Courts.  The collegium system  both at the level of   High Courts and Supreme Court  has several shortcomings.  Firstly, there has been a tendency of members of the collegium to promote those who have been  close to them.  In the High Courts members of the collegium have nudged  the cases of their favourites; at times even at the cost of ignoring merits.  Secondly,   the collegium system  is resulting in the art of the possible – by accommodating various members of the collegium, a balancing act is arrived at and a panel of names prepared. Thirdly, in the Supreme Court it has been observed that there is the  creation of an unstated institution known as ‘The Constituency Judge’ Naturally, judges of the Supreme Court  who would be more concerned about  the parent High Court to which they belong. Their ability to influence appointments in that High Court is unprecedented. This has resulted in both quicker elevation of some people as also denial of appointments to many of the deserving persons.  The denial of elevation or a delay in elevation of those whom the constituency judges did not favour is a reality.  This veto has not always been  exercised  for reasons connected with merit.
I do believe that time has come to review the system of collegium as it functions today.  I would support the constitution of a National Judicial Commission which should be empowered  to deal with appointments and also  such disciplinary matters  which fell short of the requirements for an impeachment.  The National Judicial Commission should comprise of senior judges of the Supreme Court, the Law Minister as a representative of the Executive and some eminent public persons (people with legal background or otherwise) who could be appointed  by a collegium comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India.  For appointments in the High Court the Chief Minister and the Chief Justice of the High Court could be added.
I am deeply concerned with the fact that  in several High Courts appointments have been  made where  the best  had been ignored and undeserving  have been elevated. The National Judicial Commission will have to follow an objective criteria which is statutorily defined.  Judicial officers who are elevated to the High Courts have service records which represents their potential.  It is important that  such an exercise should be undertaken  with regard to Members of the Bar also.  The world has been made easier with the advent of the information technology.  How many cases a lawyer has argued?  How many publications does he have to his credit?  What were his academic credentials?  How many judgements, in cases that he argued, have been reported?  How many juniors has he trained?  What is his declared income?  After he crosses the threshold on basis of an objective criteria which is in-built in the above mentioned and several other questions it is then for the Commission to judge his temperament, his integrity, his aptitude as a judge.  The element of subjectivity  needs to be reduced.
Accountability
We are currently following  the process of in-house accountability of judges .  Judges appoint  judges, judges judge judges.  The jurisdiction of accountability needs to be  shifted to the National Judicial Commission.  It is only extreme cases which involve impeachment  of an errant Judge   the said proceedings  will be required to go  before the Legislature.
Retirement of judges and Post retirement assignment
I am in favour of increasing the retirement age of judges at the level of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.  I am, however opposed to the present institution of post retirement jobs to the judges except  in very rare cases.  The tendency to man all tribunals and vest certain executive functions  to retired judges  has created an impression that a large number of judges expect a post retirement assignment almost as a matter of entitlement .  Post retirement jobs impinge on the judicial independence.  The desire of a post retirement job  can influence the pre-retirement judgements.  I will refrain from giving examples but at any stage I can assure you that I am  aware of many such illustrations.  I would recommend that the pension of a retired judge should be equal to his last drawn pay.  Once the age of retirement is increased it will be a good case for subsumig  the work done by tribunals within the structure of the normal judiciary.  Sitting judges are accountable.  They have an interest in further enhancement of career.  They are accountable  to their own institution  and even to the Legislature in the event of an impeachment.  Retiring judges have no such avenue of accountability.
Separation of Powers
Separation of powers is an important pillar of the Indian Constitutional order.  The job of the judicial institutions  is to adjudicate  issues which arise before it.  Law making is a parliamentary function.  Governance is an Executive function.  Of late, we have witnessed the encroachment on the principle of separation of powers.  There are hardly any illustrations where the Executive or the Legislature  has encroached on judicial powers.  The regrettable truth  is otherwise.  There has been judicial interference in a case as to how a terrorist hold out should be tackled and how many calories should be fed to the terrorist who attack India’s sovereignty.  There have been recent adverse comments on economic policy which is a subject purely in Parliamentary or Governmental domain.  There has been an adverse judgement on whether citizens can be involved in the battle against  Maoism or not.  The list of judicial guidelines which substitute the Executive  or Legislative powers is increasing.
I am flagging this issue  since I do believe  that maintaining the balance is in consonance with the constitutional values enshrined by our founding fathers.  We cannot afford to tinker with them.  Judicial statesmanship and Legislative vision are inherently required for preservation  of this balance.
Court monitored  investigations
There have been cases of corruption  and crime which have shaken the conscience  of the Indian society.  In some matters the investigative agencies  have been reluctant to undertake an honest and independent  investigation.  The Supreme Court therefore devised  a judicial instrument popularly known as “Continuing Mandamus” or a ‘court monitored investigation’ which ensures  that investigations are undertaken in accordance with law.
Do I support the idea of court monitored  investigations?  Yes,  indeed I do.  Investigative agencies  have often displayed lack of independence.  They are under the control of the governments, be it the Central government or  the State governments.  Under normal circumstances it is the duty of the  investigating agency to  undertake investigations.  Aggrieved persons,  be it the accused or the complainant, can approach the trial court for redressal  of the grievances.  But there are some cases where absence of fairness is writ large.  The nature of the offence is such that it shakes the conscience of the society.  It is in such cases that courts  direct the  investigative agency to act in accordance with law.  The courts used  their authority under a “continuing Mandamus” to supervise  the investigations.  This indeed is a welcome step.
However, I  need to put a note of caution.  Judicial activism and restraint are two sides of the same coin.  While putting the process of law into motion the courts  must always be cautious as to when and where stop.  Investigation  is a police function.  Trial and appellate jurisdictions belong to the courts.  If courts  overstep the jurisdiction of supervision even during trials there can be a danger of either the courts doning the hat of supervising and nudging the investigation in a particular direction or alternatively prejudicing a free and fair trial.  It is therefore  necessary that while courts retain the power of monitoring investigation at the initial stages,  the monitoring must stop with the filing of a charge sheet.  The judges hearing the appeals or matters arising out of trials could be different from those who have monitored the investigation.  It is necessary to ensure that cases are investigated in accordance with law and at the same time the right to a free and fair trial is not prejudiced.
I have made the above suggestions really as ‘stray thoughts’ on issues pending before the legal fraternity and society in relation to the judicial institution.  My intention is that aberrations if any need to be corrected and that we must debate the above suggestions along with several others with the intention of ensuring a free, fair and fearless judiciary in this country.