Vishal Sharma
Firing from the across the border has reinforced one point yet again- that India could have all manner of relations it chooses to have with Pakistan, but the latter would not have any scruples in unilaterally rescinding any such covenant, and going back to doing what it does so often, and so best, that is, to open fire from across. The easy explanation for Pakistan is Kashmir; the more complex argument, of course, is the internal unraveling of the situation in Pakistan. Whenever it has either of the two problems on its hands, it looks for solutions at the rugged, undulating and treacherous terrains at the Loc. This time, it has chosen the relatively settled and even ground of the IB, or the working boundary, as it calls it.
This paradox, of a cooperative yet petulant Pakistan, lies at the height of Indo-Pak narrative. The eternal pessimists amongst us believe that talks are still the best bet. They doubtless have a point. For even when guns keep rattling, they, after a point, have to fall silent for the warring factions to evolve a negotiated settlement. But what do you do when one party has a design and imagination that extends way beyond the diplomatic imagination of both? What do you do when one party has played victim for so long that no matter what you do its craving for more wouldn’t satiate? And, finally, what do you do when its existence is sustained by an ideological opposition to your existence?
Even though Pakistan gives an impression of a nation whose ideological core is hollowed out; whose political and existential imagination is grossly out of sync with the times, there is no way India can secure peace without holding talks with Pakistan. Not talking to Pakistan is not even an option. Those who are pushing for no-talks option are in fact harming the long term. Pakistan can’t be militarily forced into submission; those who harbor such thoughts don’t have history on their sides. But the trouble is that you can’t even suggest that for fear of being called a heretic.
Talking to Pakistan doesn’t mean that when it fires at India, India does not fire back or does not shore up its defences for the long term aggressive posturing at the borders. In fact, the trouble has been that India has been reactive. It has failed in reading the mind of Pakistan. And, consequently, when fired at, its response has been limited to firing back with the mind and energy of a zombie that is on a situational autopilot. This is self defeatism. That is why in border skirmishes, Pakistan’s misadventure has not been rendered unaffordable so far. On the other hand, Pakistan, who has conceived these fireworks at the border, has been clever enough to have set up a better security infrastructure for both defensive and offensive tactics like BAT operations.
For India to put it past Pakistan, it would need to shed inertia in its thought process. While allowing talks to meander along as they have done in the past, it would do well to reorient its security architecture at the borders. Talks have never been consequential, albeit on minor issues, so there is no need to be overly uptight as to their success. If anything, India should be more worried about their failure, as it may cause trigger happy Pakistan to up the ante at the borders. In any case, due to Pakistan’s intransigence, India has been reconciled to it being more of a charade put up for the international community. There is no reason why India should not stay invested in this farce.
But it is at the borders that India needs to put is best foot forward. All along the LOC/IB, it can make the radius of five kms free from any habitation. Though, an extremely prohibitive proposition, it is important in that it can give much needed room for strategic maneuver to the border guards. Also, it frees them from the additional burden of ferrying people during border fights to the places of safety, lodging them in tented camps and supplying them with the essentials. This is admittedly an avoidable distraction.
In this large soulless corridor, India can construct concrete bunkers for its guards, which are both above and underground, with all the necessary logistical facilities. Armoury, mess and even recreational facilities can also be located within this corridor, with their tails being well connected with the supply chains linked well inside the hinterland. If such a concrete soil and subsoil corridor could be constructed all along the LOC/IB, our border guards would not only have the added advantage of robust protection and absence of any civilian liability, they would also have the feeling of being well looked after.
Lastly, it is important that the arms they carry are replaced. Armed with SLRs, AKs, INSAS, LMGs, HMGs, etc, they can’t be expected to be potent and precise. These are not new age arms. Israeli and US forces carry modern day arms, and it’s about time that our border guards are given the arms, which are best in the business, as they confront life and death situation on a daily basis. One miss can be deadly; so can be a one hit. In fact, on such a highly militarized border, having a few snipers in these bunkers to occasionally pick off the rogue soldiers across the border can be highly remunerating. This long range picking off personnel would degrade the enemy’s ability to secondguess.
The other bane of Indian forces has been that our special forces (SFs) have not been used as such and as much. Created with an express purpose of stealth, potency and precision, SFs have come to be used as a conventional force over time. But then this is so typical to the Indian way of life; anything or everything that is created as exclusive or special or elite is reduced to ordinary, mundane and common place. They end up becoming ‘the others’ so quickly.
The exclusivity of SF needs to be retained. In fact their numbers need to be enhanced, as is the case with the Marines and Rangers in the US army. If India expects to win wars in future, which will we localized unlike before, it can’t do so with a slow moving leviathan of a conventional army. It is the SFs, which will win us future wars. In the same spirit, SFs need to be stationed at the borders in small batches, and in areas on the border, where effective and localized stealth operations can be launched without any large collateral damage, their expertise should be leveraged. Pakistan has used SSG in its BATs and caused considerable damage on our side. If we could allow for a bit of offensive games at the border, which do not snowball and create noise beyond borders, we will have Pakistan pinned down. It will then know that the costs of border war games have become unaffordable. This may likely cause it to mend its ways.
But all of this has to happen in parallel with the talks. We have too much to do at the borders on our side to be able to enforce costs on Pakistan. We should avoid making a dart towards the ‘no-talks and only-force’ option. It is wise to knock the enemy down when the latter has been lulled into complacence or, at least, a simulacrum of bonhomie.
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