Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Veteran)
In Nov 2013 Pakistan got its 15th Army Chief. The event in that country bears much greater significance than the announcement of an Army Chief in India. General Raheel Sharif, an infantryman and a Fellow of the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) assumed charge and I was quick to write an assessment for his three year period of tutelage of the Pakistan Army. One of the paragraphs of that, published in a daily read as – “The Pakistan defence establishment has been known for its innovations in conflict initiation. Whatever the personality of General Sharif, the dynamics of 2014 will force him to be aggressive on Kashmir. He may be forced by the hardliners to aid and abet the current Kashmir policy”.
Raheel Sharif has actually exceeded my assessment of his capability to handle the difficult job. However, having said that sometimes perceived success in the internal dimension can color one’s vision about capability in the regional and international realm. The term ‘success’, as much as the term ‘victory’ in the strategic realm are extremely relative terms which need careful examination to draw the right deductions.
Currently four things seem to be troubling those who follow Pakistani strategic affairs. Firstly, is Raheel hankering for and preparing the ground for an extension beyond his three year tenure?Secondly, is the projection of his larger than life image by the Pakistan Army’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) creating a hype which is unrealistic? Thirdly, what is the likely effect of his growing self-confidence on the strategytowards India,onJ&K in particular? Lastly, almost two years down the line after his surprise elevation is he going the way of most Pakistani military strongmen? The answers to these if possible will provide greater clarity in a situation which has too many shades of grey.
Power is a heady thing. It hits different personalities differently but the common thread is that none of the personalities are ever watchful of its ill effects or learn from the lessons of others in similar past situations. Raheel seems to be under the guiding hand of his mentor, ParvezMusharaf who is egging him on, singing paeans of his supposed success and demanding a second tenure for him.Musharaf too had deluded himself and his Army into thinking that the Indian Army was tired and would capitulate in Kargil. He took a page from Ayub Khan’s experience but repeated it instead of learning lessons. General Sharif’s Facebook page, a poorly managedone that it is, is full of requests for his extensionvirtually giving him a demi god image. He is obviously in the mold of a Musharaf or even an Ayub Khan much unlike more professional but muted ex-Army Chiefs such as JehangirKaramat. In Pakistan’s typical feudalistic system it is easy to get carried away and misread success. It appears obvious that RaheelSharif is listening to morning briefs by his Military Operations (MO) Directorate and reveling in the statistical comparisons between his first year in the hot chair and the second. Many Armies dealing with insurgencies love to count beans and read statistics every day, week and month. Reduced parameters of violence are taken as success. It has happened many a time with us in the Indian Army too but our long experience has enabled us to start looking at such situations more intellectually and not at face value. The Pakistan Army is relatively new to militancy and its Army is involved in black and white analysis of success and failure. The problem with Raheel Sharif and his supporters is that with the hurry they seem to be in, to project his supposed success, they are actually painting themselves into a corner. Figures indicate that there is a downturn in militancy and Operation Zarb e Azb has achieved fair success in regaining control of areas where the writ of the Pakistani state did not run. Someone as authoritative as Christine Fair, whose knowledge of Pakistan is scorned in Pakistan, differs and accuses Pakistan of creating a sham to project to the world. Pakistan in the last two years has suffered some tragic events such as the terror act at the Army School, Peshawar.I am not so sure whether tactical success in the tribal zones of the western border is marked enough for major deductions of any kind which can lead to strategic changes. There is the specter of Daesh (Islamic State) threats from Afghanistan. The very large numbers of displaced persons from the tribal belt who have gone across the Pak-Afghan border are vulnerable to Daesh influence and could become its first flag bearers into Pakistan. How is General Sharif looking at this? How are Pakistan’s de-radicalization and counter radicalization programs proceeding and how much efforts have gone towards winning over the clergy without whom these programs can hardly succeed. How is the ISPR or any other organization looking at social media to create greater acceptance for tolerance and national unity? General Sharif may take these cues and promote the non-military aspects of the counter militancy campaign instead of harping only on bean count and kinetics.
Understandably kinetic operations send home the first message of intent. The Pakistan Army has undertaken kinetic operations in Karachi and other urban areas to go after power centers something which should have been done years ago. The action against the Lashkar e Jhangvi chief was a bold step and would give some confidence to the minority Shias who it can be seen are leaving Pakistan in hordes. It will also be taken more positively by Iran. However, a year of such success spells no permanence against a threat environment which is rooted deeply in the combined negatives of narcotics, gun running, radicalism and sectarianism besides thriving on differentiation between the good and bad terrorists. Pakistan has many years to go before it can see any major change in its security environment. General Sharif is therefore being forced to trump a false success in the campaign for his extension which is a matter of formality considering that it is he who holds the pistol to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s head and not the other way around. It is important for him that such an extension must be seen as a demand coming from all segments of society and not merely a reluctant gesture by the Prime Minister. That will add to international legitimacy in a situation where the world has largely come to accept Pakistan’s concept of Army controlled democracy; it only assesses what freedom the Army affords to the Prime Minister.
The J&K strategy is being forced upon Nawaz Sharif. I must give General Sharif some credit for reactivating the LoC and choosing a strategy by which Pakistan perceives to be getting some advantage in a situation where it has no joy in J&K. This is colored success at best. The LoC is now an instrument of diplomacy although infiltration is failing in Kashmir and quantum of terrorists is abysmally low. The new militancy is threatening to be outside Pakistani control and the LeT and JeM are losing significance because no credible leadership exists. Actually Pakistan’s one too many sponsored efforts of the Gurdaspur kind could well risk international credibility but it has to probably continue taking that risk to keep the nurtured terror groups under control.
The visit by President Ashraf Ghani to GHQ Rawalpindi to meet General Sharif created hype about the extent of the latter’s influence over Pakistan’s international affairs. Given Pakistan Army’s long standing deep involvement in the affairs of the State it is natural that at a time when it is embattled in internal security and attempting to wrest space in Afghanistan, its stock will be very high. Yet, it is equally true that Pakistan’s precarious economic situation needs international support which will not be coming by if the Army takes over all power. General Sharif realizes that and he also knows that time will add legitimacy just as it did in the case of his mentor, ParvezMusharaf.
The transformation of General Raheel Sharif, from Army Chief to Dictator in Chief is well on the way and the world has somehow legitimized this for convenience. It probably feels that it is easier to deal with stability without a people’s domainrather than chaos through democracy.
(The writer is a former GOC of the Chinar Corps and now a part of two major Delhi think tanks, Vivekanand International Foundation and Delhi Policy Group)
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