Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Late Colonel Santosh Mahadik, SM, CO 41 RR, was martyred fighting infiltrating terrorists in Kupwara sector of Kashmir on 17 Nov 2015. Earlier this year Late Colonel MM Rai, YSM, CO 42 RR was also martyred in Tral, Pulwama. Monitoring social media trends after both events I realized the dearth of understanding of the public about casualties in counter terrorism (CT) operations. Painful were the many comments alluding to the foolhardiness of Commanding Officers (COs) to be in frontlines and with troops; another recent comment stated that seeing the casualties the Indian Army does not appear to have control of J&K in last 30 years; and yet another suggested that COs were strategic assets with deep investment by the government and must not fritter away their lives.
These comments smack of not only complete ignorance of the situation, the type of operations, the constraints of specific terrain and where we are in terms of the J&K proxy war but also of lack of sensitivity. There are many veteran military officers who have not seen long drawn CT campaigns. They continue to view these operations from a conventional angle. There aren’t enough people within the experienced lot to apply themselves to analyses and give adequate repartees, either.
Social media empowers all to make commentaries whether they have any idea about the subject or not. Unfortunately in India the lack of a strategic culture prevents timely commentaries from people with experience and knowledge on the subject. Even more than that, media houses have little idea of what is trending on social media and rarely bring forth information and commentaries of worth. In such circumstances it is the Army’s own PR machinery which should be working overtime, identifying pitfalls in information, sensitizing conventional media and activating contacts on social media.
From a professional angle, let me explain that on the military front in J&K we are nearing Conflict Transformation while on the socio-political front we are at early stages of Conflict Stabilization. I will restrict my comments to the military front only.
With just about 200 terrorists in the Valley and a successful counter infiltration year behind it the Army is making efforts to further control infiltration and simultaneously conduct CT operations to reduce the strength in the hinterland. This will inevitably result in casualties because troops in large numbers in search mode are always more vulnerable. Ratios of own casualties against terrorists killed will rise as strength reduces. This is an inevitable phenomenon which citizens must understand and professionals must work upon.
Once terrorists escape a dragnet and a search extends in duration the vulnerability of first contact increases exponentially. The most difficult of these operations is always nearer the LoC and even more challenging in the second tier of counter infiltration (CI) grid. Our experience shows that the LoC fence is not something impenetrable. Terrorists will be killed, have no doubts but because they are hidden the first bursts will come from them and casualties will be ours, unless you isolate them after locating; that really is the challenge. If we discover them through technological means or intelligence sources, have no doubt they will be eliminated with adequate usage of firepower and tactics before they can fire. These are tricky situations where the soldiers have to risk exposure at times to draw fir and force terrorists to expose themselves.
The one acme of success is patience but with that increase chances of the terrorists melting away. In the hurry to seize initiative multiple small teams comb suspected areas and lay stops to prevent access to villages. It is very manpower intensive but that cannot be helped.
Now about Cos and why they are always vulnerable. The golden rule in all operations about presence of the CO is that if two or more companies are involved the CO leads the show. Even if less the CO’s presence may be necessary to assess reinforcements and widening area of operations. These operations are not about unwieldy companies but small teams in swarming mode. It is a matter of chance which small team will make first contact and it could very well be the CO’s team. If the terrorist have escaped a dragnet and are being searched for long the vulnerability increases because more and more troops are pressed into service. Pressure can be from all kinds of quarters. The media isn’t innocent either. Recall operations of Oct 2013 in the Keran sector of Kupwara when the Army had prematurely declared the elimination of 15 odd terrorists. The media went hammer and tongs after the Army’s leadership for evidence. This in turn led to pressure on operating units at the ground level to hasten up operations.. Mercifully we had no casualties then.
Remember unless the CO is upfront he will never realize the needs of the situation. Besides that, with young company commanders, COs inevitably feel the necessity of being near them; our officer cadre problems still force frontline company commanders to be relatively young and inexperienced.
In CT operations there are no fronts and rears. The frontline at the LoC is as vulnerable and as active as the reception areas of CI well behind. The CO may be moving from one area of search by a company to another and could well hit upon the terrorists in the middle with his CO’s party (best trained troops). The rule of all CT ops in the hinterland has always been that once a contact is established the CO’s party and the Contingency Vehicle reach the spot and he takes charge but only in as far as directing the operations. He will not enter uncleared houses but he remains vulnerable because he is moving and assessing all the time. A static CO, suck to his command post anywhere is not a CO at all.
Casualties will occur; let us have no doubts and let us also be clear that they won’t if our officers and man are not so proactive and dynamic. We need not be apologetic about these and the last thing required is to issue advisories to COs. Their Brigade Commanders have to only caution them from time to time as part of command and control. COs come up through 15-17 years of grind and need little advice.
In this information hungry world the Army’s PR machinery needs to bring such real world information to the public domain to avoid ill-informed speculation. Leave it to the professional; they know what they do; and J&K’s security situation remains in total control of the Indian Army.
(The author is former GOC Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and Delhi Policy Group)
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