Policy on management of borders

Harsha Kakar
India shares its borders with six nations, China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. While the Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan borders have relative peace, the others have issues. With Myanmar, the problem is basically of insurgent groups using Myanmar as a base for their operations in India. Thus the disputed and active borders remain with China and Pakistan.
The Indo- China border has been in the limelight on account of the enhanced standoffs between the two countries. Last year the standoff at Daulat Beg Oldie lasted almost three weeks. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) in J and K is held on the Indian side by the army and the ITBP.It is almost a similar situation in most other areas along the Indo- China border, though in some places the LAC is also held by units of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), alongside the army.The border with Pakistan is active and has seen regular exchange of firing. The LOC with Pakistan is manned mainly by the army, with a few BSF Battalions placed at select locations.
The recent announcement by the home ministry, post the Home Minister’s visit, of establishing a new ITBP command in Leh is likely to create more functional problems than reduce existing issues. Interestingly the responsibility of securing the active borders of India is shared byfour different organizations, the army, ITBP, SFF and theBSF. Though they are all meant to be under the operational control of the army, where deployed along the disputed border, but in reality, the system is flawed asthe BSF, SFF and the ITBP function under the Home Ministry.
We as a nation have no clearly defined policy on management of borders. The present system is adhoc, and functions completely on the ingenuity of the commanders on the ground. The official websites of neither the MOD nor home ministry state that securing the disputed borders falls within their purview and is their responsibility. Though any misadventures by the adversary in areas where the army is deployed, the responsibility of dealing with the same remains with the army. The same is the case with the BSF along the IB.
Operational control, the term given for employment of paramilitary forces under the army, no way ensures seamless functioning. It implies just control over operational issues and leaves immense gaps in daily functioning. The different channels of reporting followed by the multitude of forces trying to operate together only create confusion and lack of accountability, responsibility and intelligence sharing. There is mistrust and misconceptions on the role and employment of different forces under differing scenarios. This thus makes each force function in isolation, with minimum interaction with the others. Even operational plans are not shared due to distrust. The more headquarters a force has, the more are the layers of control and the greater are the problems of coordination between the troops on the ground and the local army headquarters in the area. This is what would now happen when dealing with the new force headquarter being raised in Leh. In simple terms the battalions would have two bosses, the army under whom it is for operations and its own headquarters.This is solely due to the home ministry’s desire to hold onto its personal fiefdom.
The forces responsible for border management along the entire variety of our borders include the SSB (Sashastra Seema Bal) along the Nepal and Bhutan Borders, BSF, ITBP, SFF and  Assam Rifles (along the borderwith Myanmar), in addition to the army. All of them less the army function under the ministry of home, though the Assam Rifles, which is officered by the army is the best integrated.
For a nation,after almost seven decades, we have yet to grow out of our shells and create clear responsibilities for border management. Ideally for India, one border should be the responsibility of one force. This would automatically imply that the ministry to whom that force belongs would be the one responsible for ensuring national security in that sector. If this was to be considered as a logical basic framework for border management, then the entire frontier needs to be divided into disputed and IB. The Home Ministry would therefore be responsible for the IB portion of the border with Pakistan, the complete borders of Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The LAC with China and the LOC and AGPL (which defines the border in Siachen) with Pakistan would remain with the army and the MOD. The border with Myanmar, presently the responsibility of the Assam Rifles should be status quo, due to theexisting insurgency. This would thus make respective ministries accountable to parliament and thence to the nation for ensuring national security.
In the entire stretch of borders, it is only the army which has a mix of forces deployed under them for only operational control. To ensure ease of coordination all these multiple forces deployed in different terrains must be placed under army command and control thus making the army responsible for all aspects, including operational plans, deployment, training, supplies, ammunition and stores. This would also enable mixing their deployment with army units, thus enhancing the joint fighting capabilities and camaraderie between soldiers owing allegiance to different departments.
It would also benefit the system by making one organization responsible for seamless support and all troops deployed for a common cause against a common enemy, in a common area and terrain get common logistical backing. This would bring cohesiveness in national security, enabling better management of resources, reducing the increasing number of headquarters and logistic units being created and ultimately better camaraderie and understanding. It would ultimately lead to efficiency and better financial management. The government needs to consider this rather than raising more headquarters and creating road blocks to smooth functioning in critical border areas.
(The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army )
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