Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
In Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) hard decisions are usually difficult to take because of the spin offs and complicated second and third order effects which are never decipherable at the moment of decision. Kashmir is all about decisions, taking them in time and keeping all imponderables in mind. Right or wrong, at least they are decisions and no one is left to function in a vacuum. The current run of terrorist activities targeting personnel of the Jammu & Kashmir Police (JKP) culminating in the lynching of Deputy SP Mohammed AyubPandit appears to push for all those decisions with the latter being the trigger. A mob of 200 (in fact more) at the Jamia Mosque in Srinagar where the brave heart officer was deployed in civilian clothes for security of all people, Mirwaiz Umar Farook, was apparently perceived to be an Indian intelligence operative. There will be versions and versions but none can hide the fact that JKP personnel irrespective of faith, region or caste are active objectives of instigated wrath in Kashmir. Srinagar is perhaps the worst for this as policing of the densely populated city is always a challenge. Offensive counter insurgency operations in the urban environs of the city have not been conducted for over a decade except for the odd intelligence based surgical strike. The JKP and CRPF who control the security of the city are both in defensive mode trying to prevent terror strikes and that isn’t an easy job either.
There has been deterioration of control over Srinagar just as much as other areas. A few months ago an unarmed traffic policeman who is essentially on a social not security duty was targeted. I have been witness to the suspicion with which non Kashmiri appearing persons are subjected at Hurriyat related events. An intelligence operative in my time as Corps Commander was disarmed by some persons at such a meeting and handed over to the local police but none dared to even think of lynching or taking law into their own hands as far as a person of the security forces was concerned. Thus Dy SP Mohammed AyubPandith’s lynching is actually a game changer in the murky world of Kashmir’s badlands. This change of attitude comes from two things. First, a creeping and now steadily marching emboldened approach towards targeting those who are in service with the Indian establishment. It aims at discouraging the youth of Kashmir towards aspiring to be partners in India’s aspirational growth. This is exemplified by the criminal terrorist assault on Lt Umar Fayaz, the young Kashmiri Army officer from Kulgam who dared to enter the officer ranks of the Indian Army and the string of terrorist actions including the killing of Feroz Dar, SHO Achabal and his five policemen. Stung by the long lines of youth at the recruiting centres the likes of the Hurriyat, have unleashed a campaign to physically intimidate them. Policemen form an easy target because their deployment is never like the Army or the CRPF which is in sub units with due command and control.
The second reason for the change in attitude is the other steadily mounting characteristic of the movement in Kashmir, the radicalization process. Zakir Musa is the latest symbol of this, urging all towards the proverbial Caliphate. Not too many have any idea what this is all about except to relate to something novel which will in their eyes promote Islam. They have no idea of the intensity and degree of crimes of the proponents of the Caliphate where ever they are attempting the same in different parts of the world. It is easy to spread radicalism in an environment where there already exists a proxy conflict and social media helps in this to no end. This is what is increasing the confidence of the anti-national elements; the Pan Islamic links are considered as fasteners and strengtheners.
Intimidating the Army is quite different. It has no social effects. However, intimidating the local police force which is composed of personnel from all three regions and all major faiths can be a disastrous decision for the Separatists and their masters. Little do they realize this for indirectly they have unleashed a force chastened by the intimidation. It is up to the JKP leadership to harness the emotions and passion of the force towards tactical gains and domination of the environment. The Army and CRPF can quietly assist in this. The passion generated within JKP ranks by the dastardly act of targeting its Dy SP on Shab e Qadr must be focused through astute leadership and engagement with all ranks within the force. I continue to remain an admirer of the JKP for its resilience and professionalism; time to display these is good measure is now.
The Hurriyat otherwise progressively less important is attempting to return on the back of this new alienation. This is dangerous and that is why decisions are needed and needed quickly. An energizing of the grid within Srinagar and its suburbs is immediately called for. The defensive grid aimed to prevent terror strikes needs to go back in time and become an offensive one. Now one can recall all the arguments we made for retaining the Army’s landed properties at Haft Chinar and Tatoo Ground. Islands of the Army within Srinagar will always assist the police forces and that’s the reason why the Separatists wanted the Army out from Srinagar. Politicians also lined up behind the Separatist demands. Conflict stabilization never means automatic conflict resolution; it’s a slow creep forward from that stage with many setbacks and that’s the reason why we are suffering today. I can recall that soldier par excellence Lt Gen Mohammed Zaki, as Adviser to Government of J&K, directing operations in the by lanes of Srinagar in the early Nineties with a platoon of Garhwali soldiers. No one is saying the situation is anywhere akin to that time but it could deteriorate to it if we remain defensive. With waterways, wetlands, nearby mountains and densely built old town areas Srinagar is a haven for terrorists which is why the policing needed in such situations needs to be far more robust. Mobility of small teams is needed and traditional policing methods of neighborhood watch, surveillance and reporting with due rewards will add to effectiveness. When people speak of the KPS Gill strategy in Punjab they incorrectly interpret it as intimidation of the public; it actually was a system of much more robust and empowered policing with complete backing.
I have often been told stories of the Srinagar Central Jail. There it is the rule of the terrorists. Once I complained to the DG Police of the amount of communication activity emanating from the jail and that’s when I learnt of his helplessness to do much about it. There is a need to relook at the entire policy of detention and the ability of the jail system in Kashmir to remain effective. In an environment where threat to the integrity of the nation exists we can ill afford a prison system which does not support the overall national strategy of fighting separatism.
That brings us to the issue of leadership. The Hurriyat, as stated earlier, is attempting a comeback. Government of India (GOI) may be tempted to continue treating it with kid gloves in the absence of identified alternatives. This may be naïve because patience is on strain and the Hurriyat shows no propensity to ever work towards mainstreaming itself from the separatist line it has followed. Cutting the financial conduits to its coffers, which hopefully is underway with operations of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), will have a salutary effect.
The most effective way of throttling a resurging terror movement besides choking its numbers and finances is to target the leadership. One of the reasons for the 2011 success in paralyzing the effectiveness of the movement was the studied focus on the terrorist leadership in the major centers which today and potentially in the future are – Kulgam, Shupiyan, Pulwama, Pampore, Anantnag, Sopore and Handwara. Multi force teams of terrorist leadership hunters with award dividends must be formed. The Army, JKP, IB, State CID and elements of the CRPF should constitute these to shun all competition and share credit. Army’s Para SF can also form a part of such teams besides the RR.
Finally what is happening was entirely expected this summer and we have to face even greater threats. The counter terror and counter infiltration grid has scored good results but need further improvement. With induction of additional army units in South Kashmir and the presence of many more troops in anticipation of the Sri AmarnathYatra the leeway available to terrorists will reduce. The SF must also ensure that they do not offer targets through undisciplined movement without adequate security.
It is not the time for any strategic initiatives; just regain tactical and operational balance. The order of effects of these will give the government better alternatives in the future. Simultaneously, if initiatives are needed anywhere it is to resume outreach and engagement to the public in rural areas where movement of government officials is once again becoming a problem. The Army must do this in good measure; it’s a legitimate operational responsibility to restore the writ of the state.
(Adapted from a piece first published by the author in Swarajya.com)
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