Patial RC
Book Review: “Kashmir Insurgency”
by Yoginder Kandhari
Why do I settle down to review “Kashmir Insurgency: Deconstructing the State Response Revisiting 1989-90” by Yoginder Kandhari, especially over 30 years after that historically turbulent time? Particularly now, when India has moved ahead with assertiveness, as seen post the Pahalgam 22nd April barbaric attack on innocent Hindu tourists-paraded, identified, and shot at point blank range in front of their families. I happened to be in the Valley during that period, doing ‘Jungle Bashing’ based on intelligence inputs rooted in the past rather than forecasting the future. Reading Kandhari’s detailed study took me back down my memory lane.
The author, Yoginder Kandhari a retired Indian Army officer and a Kashmiri Pandit offers a deeply informed view of the 1989-90 insurgency in Kashmir, when Kashmir believed “Azadi was round the corner.” The book captures the confused ground situation during that time from a security and administrative perspective. Drawing on his extensive Counter Insurgency (CI) experience, Kandhari delivers an in-depth analysis of the events surrounding the forced exodus of the Kashmiri Pandit community and the state’s faltering response-a subject close to every Kashmiri Pandit’s heart.
The book is organized into four main chapters-Looking the Other Way, Subversion Within, Blindfolded, Army Pushed into Crucible, and The Kashmiri Pandits-the latter occupying a significant portion in terms of volume and importance.
Col Bhanwar Singh, a commanding officer at the time of a Gorkha Battalion, laments: “We were silent spectators to the Pandit’s departure from the valley. We heard Masjid loudspeakers blurting out threats to them. We had no time for the Pandits.” That single statement encapsulates institutional indifference. He further recalled that “by the end of 1989, the State police had given upon countering the insurgents and almost abandoning their posts”.
Brigadier Mahalingam the Commander of the newly inducted Brigade from Nagaland recalls that “No one at the Helm knew What was Happening!” The first task allotted to this Brigade by the Corps Commander was to remove loudspeakers and anti-India banners under ‘Op Banner’.
The Govt of India handled the Rubaiya’s kidnapping case in a very meek way which led to an avalanche of abductions and Farooq had forewarned of the consequences. JeI had published a booklet in Urdu ‘Hizbe Islam’ (Virtues of Islam) a near outline plan of Pakistan’s ‘Op Topac’.
Sharing from personal experience-on de-induction from Sri Lanka aboard a military special train to Nagaland, we expected the battalion would be diverted to J&K given the brewing crisis in the Valley. That didn’t happen immediately, but three months later, the Brigade rushed to Kashmir. General VN Sharma, at the Badami Bagh Corps HQ Helipad in early 1990, briefed us to “Train and Prepare for an Offensive to Go Across!” (Pg 126). What followed is well documented in the book-never part of a permanent CI grid, we operated as floaters in the Valley. Two future Army Chiefs were commanding formations then.
The Author examines the administrative and security failures in detail, highlighting flawed response mechanisms during a period of escalating internal collapse. The narrative is enriched with firsthand accounts, official documents, and ground-level observations, offering a multifaceted perspective of the insurgency’s early days and the sociopolitical factors that fed it.
The ideological backdrop is stark. Pakistan’s deep-seated belief that India seeks ‘Akhand Bharat’ (Greater India) was countered by General Zia-ul-Haq, who declared: “Islam is our goal. Quran is our constitution. Jihad is our path. War till victory-God is great.” He further outlined Pakistan’s intent to liberate Kashmir and subvert India through political intrigue and religious radicalisation.
The book delivers an unflinching account of how Pakistan-backed Jihadism, aided by growing radicalisation, collided with an Indian state caught flat-footed. Yet, beyond the cross-border terrorism narrative lies a harsher truth-of political apathy, collapsed intelligence networks, and moral failure during a humanitarian crisis. All of it happened in plain sight, as a “Lackadaisical Ostrich Approach” prevailed-open borders Highway enabled Kashmir’s youth to be converted into so-called Jihadis by the proxy war machinery operating from POK.
Today, India has shed much of the strategic confusion that marked the 1989-90 period. The silver lining is clear: Contemporary India is assertive, not expansionist. Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Operation Sindoor’ marked a shift in doctrine. No longer will India tolerate cross-border provocations without a decisive and proportionate response. The operation signaled India’s commitment to regional stability and national honor. Yet, while this new assertiveness is welcome, we must remain vigilant-‘Pakistan’s Proxy War’ has not ended with Operation Sindoor.
“The Proxy War against India by Pakistan has No Fronts,
No Rules of the Game and is Not Time Bound Anymore!”
The work “Kashmir Insurgency: Deconstructing the State Response Revisiting 1989-90” with detailed historical background stands out. Based on three years of meticulous research and built on firsthand interviews with officials, politicians, civil society, and common Kashmiris, it paints a comprehensive picture of the covert Jihadist crusade enabled by Pakistan and abetted by Indian institutional inertia. Courageous, unbiased, and compassionate, this is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the Kashmir conundrum-a land betrayed and a people abandoned.
A must-read for those who lived through the insurgency, Security Forces who fought aimlessly, the Kashmiri Pandit community across generations, and all serious Kashmir watchers.
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