Bhavna Singh
60 years earlier, Prime Minister Nehru disclosed in Parliament that “on 25 August, a strong Chinese detachment crossed into our territory in the Subansiri Frontier Division at a place south of Migyitun and opened fire… they were in some hundreds, 200 0r 300, or may be even more, they surrounded a forward Indian picket consisting of twelve men and captured them. Eight of them escaped and returned to the out-post at Longju (NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh)” Sino-Indian relations were never the same again.
The Galwan Faceoff has brought back similar memories and the fear that bilateral relations may spiral down again. However the reaction from the leadership on both sides has been extremely different this time with statements from Modi being lauded in the Chinese media and the Chinese restraining from transgression after losing a high level officer. In his recent statements, Prime Minister Modi mentioned the Wuhan spirit and highlighted the need to avoid escalation. Offcourse this is not as high on dramatics as 1965 when Atal Bihari Vajpayee drove 800 sheep and 59 yaks to the Chinese embassy in retaliation to their claim that Indian soldiers had stolen its sheep and yaks. But certainly the border clash both at Naku La and Galwan valley calls for a rethink in our policies of engagement and disengagement on border talks with our not so friendly neighbour.
In a rare gesture by the Chinese side, the leadership has accepted the number of casualties on the Chinese side though the figure remains dubious. The two sides have decided to disengage after the initial skirmishes but the process, as can be envisaged, is going to be a long drawn process. Both India and China will begin a 72-hour verification process to make sure each side has fulfilled the commitment before disengagement is initiated in continuation of the agreement between the special representatives of India and China, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, respectively.The two sides have agreed “earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility”. BJP general secretary Ram Madhav’s statement that India must show the same assertiveness on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China as it has shown on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, simply to protect its “self-respect” and defend its land “till the last inch” (25, June in The Statesman) well encapsulates the government stand.
The nature of India’s response has been changing over the last few years due to repeated incursions on the border in all three sectors and also along international borders for instance Bhutan. This is also evident in India’s response to Uri as well as Balakot. In a significant departure from its position of restraint, post the September 2016 attack on the army base in Uri, India decided to shed its first limitation. It took the war across the Line of Control to strike at some forward launch pads used for infiltrating terrorists by their handlers in Pakistan. In responding to the Pulwama attack, India chose to shed the second limitation on the type of force. India retaliated on February 26 with surgical air strikes at the sprawling Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) training camp in Balakot.These gestures combined with their relative silence on the Depsang Plains have apparently sent a signal that India is trying to incentivise China to restore the status quo ante in Ladakh. But is the restoration of status quo ante enough?
While many have often ranted about the proxy wars and the two-front war, it has been observed that over the past few years the state has employed weapons of only a certain calibre, choosing most of the times to avoid complete escalation. At present there seems to be what can be termed as “controlled war” and with some possibilities of an all-out war. India has already declared a boycott on Chinese goods endorsing its policy of economic blockade and even begun high octane propaganda on how the Indian festivals will be the prime relic of cultural contestation between India and China. And though, because of the COVID-19 pandemic the outbreak of war has been sensibly screened out, distrust in policy remains because of the recurring nature of the dispute. What might then be the solution?
The Solution
While the officialsat the high level continue to discuss the possibilities of disengagement from war, a bite from history might provide a possible solution to the current imbroglio. Considering the documents over the last few centuries, especially an account from A G Noorani in his book the ‘India-China Boundary Problem’ (2011), it can be observed that most references to Tibet and Mongolia as a protectorate in various different languages were conceded as relatively independent. The problem started when China refused to sign the Simla agreement which wanted to put Tibet in a completely independent category which was not palatable to China. The solution however lies in a contemporary set of events where Mongolia gained a permanent solution to its sticky situation between Russia and China, whereby the division of Mongolia into Outer and Inner solved the boundary issue once and for all.
A similar division of the Tibetan territory into an Inner Tibet which would lie within the permanent jurisdiction of China and an outer one which would act as a buffer may provide a permanent solution to the territorial issue. Though an uphill task for the diplomatic plenipotentiaries, even a small step towards this arrangement could be of huge benefit to both nations instead of using economic blockade to immobilize each other. It is indeed time to materialise these ambitions rather than just simply letting the Chinese write another 1962.
(The author is a Researcher at McKinsey & Company and the author of China’s Discursive Nationalism (2012).
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