Pakistani suicide bombers generally called fidayeen struck twice in two days after crossing the International Border somewhere in Kathua and Samba districts. 5 persons including 2 CRPF personnel besides one civilian were killed and 12 are wounded. Why has the focus of fidayeen shifted to International Border. However, in the second attack on Army camp in Samba, both militants were killed in a precise operation. This is not the first successful attempt of Pakistani terrorists to cross the international border and lead attacks on police and army camps close to the National Highway. Chronology of major attacks after crossing the International Border could be listed as follows:
*On September 26, 2013 three heavily armed ultras killed 10 persons including Lt Col Bikramjeet Singh, three soldiers, four cops and two civilians in twin terror attacks on Hiranagar police station in Kathua and camp of 16 Cavalry of Army at Mahesar in Samba. All three militants were gunned down by the Army commandos. On March 28, 2014 three ultras staged twin attacks in Janglote in Kathua killing two civilians and a trooper in a day long encounter. All three were killed by the Army. On November 27, 2014, three militants struck in Arnia killing five civilians and three Army soldiers before being eliminated by the troops. Actually from September till today, this is the fourth and the fifth attack led by the Pakistani terrorists on our police or military establishment after crossing the International Border.
The simple inference one can draw is that there is some specific purpose in repeatedly crossing the IB and attacking police posts close to the National Highway. Is it to scare the police force and demoralize their will to resist the attacks? Or is it to send a message to the Indian security forces and administrators that Pakistani terrorist organizations have the ability and audacity to launch attacks on police stations in their premises and their compounds and hereby discredit them? We can make a host of surmises. After all it is a matter of strategy. These fidayeen attacks are part and parcel of that strategy. It is for our policy planners and security staff and think tanks first to debate extensively the objective of the fidayeen in carrying out these lethal attacks and second to consider what precautionary measures can be taken. It is not correct to say that our side is not debating this issue with determination and that new ideas are not inducted into preventing attacks from terrorists. Our security experts are certainly debating the situation with all the seriousness at their command. But most probably, some lacunae remain even after thorough discussions and policy planning. That is part of the game. The truth is that no planning of stonewalling the terrorist incursions or violations of the IB can be foolproof. The reason is that we have a long border and supervision of every inch and every foot of this border is not physically possible even if we have the most sophisticated cross border control mechanism. Therefore while we are intermittently upgrading the surveillance of the IB, we have to upgrade the defensive as well as offensive practice.
This being said, the question arises why our security arrangements have failed not once not twice but four times in short span of 12 months to detect infiltration bids by the enemy? Undoubtedly there is serious short coming somewhere and who but the security echelons are supposed to identify these shortcomings and plug them. If the fidayeen can find innovative ways of crossing the border clandestinely and then attack the targets, why should not our security forces have the capability of detecting the possible attempts and forestalling these before harm is done? Therefore we have to accept that our security needs to upgrade its operational mechanism. This does not mean that those who have sacrificed their precious lives did so to no purpose. After all, the intruding terrorists have been liquidated. Our woes are that this liquidation has taken place at a high price. We should not be prepared to pay any price as far as we can. It means we need very superior defence as well as offence strategy of border safety. The strategy has to conform to the intentions, philosophy and methodology of our adversary.
One significant thing to be noted is that two fidayeen attacks have happened within two days in almost the same sector. This means that while on Pakistani soil they must have been making thorough preparation. Included in these preparations is pre-attack surveillance. In other words it is now clear that the attackers were very clear and decisive in selecting the target which was the police station of Rajbagh on Jammu-Pathankot highway, which is close to the Highway. The fidayeen travelled about 24 kilometres pressing into service a bicycle, three-wheeler and a truck till they reached the gate. Importantly, after previous three incidents of fidayeen attack, the Rajbagh Police Station authorities should have understood that they need high level security and fencing and walling to deny any miscreant easy entry into the station premises. Moreover there needed to be the unfailing night vigil and detection of intruders in dark. After all this was a post at a sensitive location. None of the essential protective and safety measures were taken and the police station was left for anybody to make it a target of his attack.
Finally we pray for peace to the jawans of our security forces who fell victims to the bullets of the enemy. They have sacrificed their lives in service to the country and the country will remember them as heroes.
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