Harsha Kakar
The recent terrorist strike in Paris and its subsequent investigation revealed the level of planning and coordination which was involved. The movement of the terrorists was so secretive, that western security agencies were unaware. They managed to infiltrate into Europe by multiple means and even bypassed immigration and other systematic security checks on borders. Investigation also reveals that sympathizers of ISIS have travelled to and fro, without hindrances or serious risks. This indicates the organizational capacity of ISIS and deep involvement of those forming part of it. It also brings forth gaps in the security and intelligence network of European nations.
EU and NATO have been supporters of US involvement in operations against terrorist organizations, as also participated in a few. At the same time, due to internal racial and religious divides a fairly reasonable number of Moslems in Europe are supporters of ISIS. While intelligence agencies would continue to seek information on future strikes as also monitor suspects and clerics with militant leanings, externally they need to develop a strategy to restrict the capability and power of ISIS.
ISIS is currently spread over large swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria, where it has formed a caliphate. It has sizeable footprints in Yemen, Egypt and Nigeria. It is also known to have cells spread across Morocco, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ISIS has been obtaining followers and funds from across the globe. Recent investigations show ISIS does not lack funds to support its operations.
The source of funding for ISIS flows from money taken from banks in territories it has captured ($ 429 million from the Mosul central bank in Iraq alone), sale of stolen ancient artefacts (blood antiquities) from sites under its control, taxation, kidnapping,extortion and sale of oil. The above is in addition to money flowing in from sympathizers through multiple electronic means. It is estimated to earn upto $2 Billion annually.
ISIS supporters travel from far and wide to join them in their campaign, some evencoming from Europe. The funds that it collects are expended on payment of salaries to its fighters as also for purchase of weapons and services to maintain a police state. Presently ISIS does not appear to lack equipment,dedicated manpower or funds.
The present international strategy of employing air power in isolation may cause limited casualties but can neither stall nor contain ISIS. This is due to the presence of civilian population in the areas where it operates. Mosul and Raqqait self are heavily populated, with only a limitednumber of jihadists. Therefore the impact of aerial strikes could at best be restrictive.
The troops whom the air strikes support are soldiers from Iraq, Syria and the Kurds from Turkey. These are mostly volunteers, with limited training, ill equipped and lack motivation. Therefore, launching air strikes in support of uncoordinated operations under existing limitations would not be successful. Most strikes are in populated areas under ISIS control, hence true extent of ISIS and civilian casualties would never emerge.
There are other avenues which need to be simultaneously considered if a genuine desire to restrict or degrade ISIS exists. These include creating capacity and capability of ground forcesfighting ISIS, cutting off ISIS supply lines as also blocking its source of funding and recruitment. This can only be possible if nations join together and form a common strategy. The existingstrategywould result in a long drawn campaign.
Western nations, actively involved in battling ISIS are wary of employing boots on the ground. While this fear is partially justified, there should however be no embargo on building the capacity and capability of those battling ISIS on the ground. This should involve training, motivation and providing wherewithal to effectively counter ISIS.
A common command centre should be established to coordinate actions on the ground with air strikes, thus ensuring both are in sync and the ground offensive gains post air strikes. Ideally initial operations should be launched in support of Iraqi and Kurdish troops. Once this begins to produce success, then operations should move into Syria.Systematic progress of air operations coordinated with ground action would give better dividends.
The next avenue is to isolate the battle field. This implies preventing supporters from joiningISIS as also cutting off supply lines. While complete blockade may not be possible, selective could be effective and would slowly dry ISIS of fresh troops and equipment. Thus isolating the battlefield has to be given priority. This could be possible as new incumbents move by air to neighbouring countries before they vanish underground. Recruitment is generally done via social media, therefore it is feasible to control and restrict this activity, while simultaneously arresting those involved. Movement of local supporters and logistics cannot easily be stopped, but restricted.
Blocking flow of funds is essential to prevent expansion and purchase of equipment and supplies. While what it already possesses may continue for some time, further income could be reduced. The source of money transfers can be restricted and controlled, oil fields partially destroyed to prevent sale of oil, restrictions on movement would also reduce sale of blood antiquities. Taxation, extortion and kidnapping in the local areas would continue.
As ISIS gains notoriety, it could continue to attract supporters. However, when it starts losing ground to a coordinated offensive, more than just military, it would also start losing support. Therefore, in the overall context, it is essential that military action as part of a common strategy is put in place and operations progressed in a systematic and coordinated manner.
(The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army)
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