Chinese downsizing of the army has a reason

Harsha Kakar
Press reports of last week stated that China is reducing the size of its army by half while increasing the strength of their navy, air force and strategic forces. The Chinese armed forces have a strength of 2 million and are the largest in the world. The Hong Kong based South China Morning post quoting a state-run Xinhua report mentioned, ‘the army now accounts for less than 50 per cent of the total number of PLA troops; almost half of our non-combatant units have been made redundant, and the number of officers in the PLA has been reduced by 30 per cent.”
The report added that the other branches of the armed forces including navy, air force and strategic forces including their support force, responsible for cyber warfare, now make up more than half of the Chinese armed forces. The expansion of the Chinese navy has been ongoing for some time. Its first aircraft carrier has been inducted, trials are on for the second and the third is under construction.
The Chinese officer cadre was always lopsided and comprised of a third of all personnel, which was far higher than all other nations. The cadre had both civilian and uniformed officers. This cadre strength has been steadily reduced in every manpower review of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Every nation maintains its armed forces based on threat perception and possible areas of employment. Their structuring too follows a similar model. As threat perceptions change, technology upgrades are introduced and nature of warfare undergoes a rethink, organizations would also change. This has been the case with China.
The Chinese recently restructured their armed forces by adopting the theatre command concept. This change enhanced the capability of the force by amalgamating all elements of the military for a specific mission or task envisaged in a region. Thus, it has one theatre command facing India and another suitably poised for Taiwan, its two major immediate concerns. By adopting this restructuring, China has been able to reduce single service logistic echelons by combining them under a single command.
Chinese land border disputes do not involve other nations seeking Chinese territory but China seeking theirs. Hence, its adversaries must ensure security of their borders from China, rather than China securing its own. This implies that it would be China which would undertake offensive operations, rather than other nations into Chinese territory.
The Chinese have also begun concentrating on non-contact warfare for which it has enhanced the capabilities and size of its strategic support forces. China has claimed most of the South China Sea and created military bases on them in contravention to claims of other nations. This offensive stance of China has been objected to, for which China must ensure their security. China’s growing economic power provides it with the wherewithal for enhancing its military potential.
For China, naval power has greater importance, as it needs to ensure security of its maritime trade, which remains vulnerable during hostilities. It also needs to expand its naval power to protect its investments in South Asia and Africa.It therefore shifted focus to the navy inducting over 150 ships and fifty submarines in the last two decades. It must also ensure security of the ports which it has begun taking over on the pretext of its ‘belt and road initiative’. It is simultaneously a means of countering increased US threat in the region.
For China futuristic challenge is not India but the US, whom it seeks to replace as the next superpower. For this it needs to enhance all its elements of the military other than the army. The increased presence of the US navy in the region, the threat of Taiwan pursuing its own path, which would be a setback to the one China dream and its support from the US, determine the need to have a strong missile and naval power.
India on the other hand must ensure protection of its land frontiers as it has hostile nations on both its borders. It cannot employ technology to reduce deployment of manpower on borders, unless it has adequately developed road and air communications to enable swift deployment of troops. Further, its forces are spread across different altitudes, requiring acclimatization, whereas Chinese troops deployed in Tibet, are already acclimatized.
The difference in nature of threat perception is evident when the deployment of both nations along the watershed is assessed. Since India has no claims on Tibet, China has hardly any prepared defences on their side. India, always expecting a Chinese onslaught has troops deployed in well-constructed bunkers all through the year. India has not resorted to any incursions beyond its perceived boundaries, whereas China regularly does it on Indian side.
China has not downsized its forces but enhanced the capability of those forces which would present a greater threat to the region. The army was not an international threat, solely meant for immediate neighbours. The navy and strategic force expansion implies China pushing its weight in the regional and global arena. For India, it would imply enhanced Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and greater emphasis on non-contact operations.
The one lesson that India must draw from China is adopting the concept of theatre commands to enhance the capabilities of its armed forces. In the present context India has multiple single service commands facing China, while China has one theatre command responsible for operations against India. The reduction of individual service logistics chains leading to mass savings of manpower would automatically flow once this concept takes root.
In the overall context, the Chinese reducing their army strength is based on its changing threat perceptions and meeting future challenges. It does not visualize any land threat while India concentrates on the same. It seeks to challenge US military power, hence must enhance force capability accordingly, while India seeks to create a deterrence from Chinese military threats. China can therefore alter its force ratio’s while India cannot.
(The author is former Major General)
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