The changing scenario in the Valley

Harsha Kakar
Two recent events have indicated a change in the valley. The first has been the demonetization drive launched by the government and the second has been the state board secondary school exams. The demonetization drive pushed all fake and black currency in circulation in the valley, produced or sent via militants or Hawala transactions from Pakistan, into the dustbin. Stone throwing and agitations reduced. Surprisingly, there were no long queues at banks or ATMs in the valley, as compared to the rest of the nation, since most locals prefer banks due to regular agitations. The state board secondary school exams, conducted even after schools were shut for about four months,amid cries of azadi and joining Pakistan, had almost 100 percent participation. When we link the two, a different picture emerges.
The first inference which can be drawn is that incidents of stone throwing were not spontaneous. It was a paid agitation, with the Hurriyat only gaining supporters by means of money and not ideology. It was money which purchased ideology. Pakistan and IS flags being flown in the valley, were signs of frustration of the youth on lack of avenues and funded by the Hurriyat. Though this had been claimed by those who had close ties with the valley, however supporters of the agitation and some political parties disagree. Even at the peak of the agitation, the locals were aware at which time stone throwers would emerge as also where and when they would retreat, hence timed their daily activities accordingly. Further, those very students indulging in stone throwing or injured because of it, are now appearing for their state board exams.
The second inference is that students do not seek agitations and challenging the state as a means of earning their livelihood. Like their counterparts across the nation, they seek a better life with a variety of career options, something the valley fails to provide. The recent burning of schools by anti-nationals was a means of compelling those studying in government schools, in remote areas, to shift to the madrassas system of education, thus changing their mindset and benefitting Pakistan. This should never be allowed to succeed. Temporary schools under security should be opened at the earliest. It is essential that the state and centre understand  this message and enhance facilities as also employment opportunities for the population. Ideally, this is the moment, when large scale recruitment into various government jobs including para military forces and PSUs should be implemented.
The next inference is that militants already inducted would begin facing hardship since being in possession of currency which is presently valueless. As per reports, each militant is provided with forty thousand rupees worth of fake currency (mainly thousands and five hundred notes), to survive once he crosses over. Even their ardent supporters would be unable to provide them adequate alternative financial support, as supply of legal currency is limited. This would compel militants to obtain their daily supplies by threatening locals, leading to altercation and alienation resulting in faster flow of information to security forces.Financial compensation to those who join locally would also become a problem, thereby slowly compelling them to re-join the mainstream.
The fourth inference is that support from Pakistan towards militancy would reduce for the present. This is because Pakistan neither possesses new Indian currency nor can it produce it in fake form as it was doing till recently. Hence, without availability of money, pushing in militants would be of no avail, since their chances of survival would be dim. With winter’s fast approaching, further induction of militants is unlikely, unless Pakistan contemplates to push in ill-informed militants with fake currency only to keep their well-oiled infiltration machine running. These militants are cattle fodder, loss of whose lives means little to the state. This sudden drawback could compel Pakistan to resort to one of only two options available to continue to keep the Kashmir issue alive in international eyes.
The first is to increase the tempo of firing along the LOC and the IB and keep blaming India for the escalation. This is easy as there is no monitoring mechanism. For the world, an increased tempo of firing on the Indo-Pak border, would indicate a volatile situation between two nuclear armed neighbours, thereby drawing international concern, as is happening presently. Such an action would also benefit Pak internally as it would divert local attention from the ongoing political turmoil. The second would be to plan and executea major terror operation on the lines of Mumbai, Pathankot or Uri. Such an operation, if executed on a military or civil installation in J and K, could then be attributed by them to local militants created due to the agitation, rather than to Pak supported groups.
The Government at the centre and state, should understand the changing scenario as also the message flowing from the valley, requesting for provision of better education and employment opportunities. It should usher in changes which would benefit the population, mainly the youth.Ignoring or delaying implementation would be missing the bus, which would not only be harmful but would pass the initiative to anti-national elements.The opening of temporary schools is an essential step from preventing students to adopt the Madrassa system of education. Monitoring inflow of funds through hawala is equally important for long term measures. The security forces meanwhile, should continue to apply pressure on Pak along the LOCand IB, making them pay heavily for violations, while ensuring adequate security to major installations to prevent a recurrence of another Uri or Pampore. Anti-militant operations should continue with full vigour as militants are now at a major disadvantage.
(The author is a retired Major                  General of the Indian Army)
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