Trump’s new world order

US’s National Security Strategy-2025
Vishal Sharma

The US’s penchant to increasingly walk away from global engagements or engage or commit to engage with the world only when optics around it are just right, or when there is something in it for America is beginning to change the global landscape quite significantly. America under Trump 2.0 presidency has been on the retreat for some time, but it was felt that it would not last, and that this trajectory will be corrected sooner than later. National Security Strategy, 2025 unveiled by the US recently has, however, belied all expectations in this regard. Trump has written down into the national strategy what he has said and done all this while with the usual Trumpian clarity that left no room for misunderstanding. But most of us misunderstood it anyway.
During past six decades, nations all across the world have always looked up to the US as an honest broker or a dependable mediator. But no more. The US today has officially chosen to be a nation driven by its own self-interests. Unlike in the past, it would not even now bother itself with what political systems countries have, as it decidedly retreats to its own backyard- the western hemisphere. It may have been made official now, but the finger prints of this hand-off policy were already visible on all important conflicts in one form or the other. Be it Israel-Hamas conflict or Russia- Ukraine war, the US’s intervention in these two wars has been at best performative. We now know why it was so.
No wonder, Trump’s economic protectionism is deeply rooted in its new security policy too. The US will not any longer spend tax dollars where returns on investments are moderate or unsatisfactory, as its trade focus shifts from aid driven relations to investment based alliances with the countries. When Trump unleashed tariffs on the world, many commentators thought it was a temporary phenomenon and will soon end when supply side issues raise inflation in the US. They were wrong. Trump’s tacked ideologically far right; and it is a much serious rightward lurch by Trump than ever thought.
NSS has treated Europe, the US’s staunchest ally post WWII, badly as it sees it in throes of civilizational ‘erasure’ a far deeper problem than its continual economic decline typified by reduction in its share in global GDP from 25 per cent in 1990 to 14 per cent today. At the core of Europe’s civilizational decline is seen to be unchecked illegal migration and persistent undermining of political liberty and sovereignty that NSS says has led to strife, free speech restraints, loss of self confidence and national identities. The report goes on to say that if the present trends continue, ‘the continent will be unrecognizable in twenty years or less’. It has given shout out to the right and far right parties in Europe and called out the progressive parties currently in power in most of the Europe for being unrepresentative of their populace. Transatlantic alliance already under strain after 28 point peace plan announced by Trump on Ukraine conflict was met by Europeans with 19 point plan of their own now stands precariously on precipice.
NSS sees China as an economic and not a military threat. China’s response to 2017 US’s tariff policy of strengthening its hold on supply chains in low and middle income countries to blow the American tariff action out of water finds a special mention in the report. Despite its best efforts, the US has not been able to completely stall exports from China through its proxies although Chinese exports to the US have reduced to 2 per cent of its GDP from earlier 4 percent. Therefore, NSS seeks to rebalance the US’s economic relationship with China on the principle of ‘reciprocity and fairness’. In the NSS, US has not pushed back on the Chinese policies of predatory, state sponsored industrial strategies and subsidies, unfair trading practices, IPR theft and rare earths blackmail because the latter has many leverages vis-à-vis the US, one of which is its monopoly over the manufacturing of rare earth magnets (which are required in the manufacturing of mobile phones, automobiles, missiles, fighter jets etc.). Will China continue to have these leverages in future too or the US will erode some or all of them in the next few years as America seeks to re-industrialize itself? Will the US accept being forced out of Indo -Pacific? Will China then set itself up as a hegemon in Indo-Pacific? There is no way of answering these questions at this moment.
In NSS, the US has not committed to protecting Taiwan any more than it has sought to do in the past. Does it mean that if President XI Jinping disturbs the status quo on Taiwan anytime in future, will the US intervene militarily? Will the US do so especially, as the tonality of NSS leaves no one in any doubt that the US does not expect to do war fighting on behalf of its allies or partners in future?
India, a middle power, which nurses an ambition to become a major power in not too distant future, has not been given any serious space in NSS. The reference on India is limited to encouraging it to contribute to Indo Pacific security, including through QUAD. The reason is simple: In the Trumpian economic calculus, India is not seen as a counterbalancing power against China.
The obvious inference from NSS is that the US and China may form a duopoly by striking some sort of a grand deal, leaving other countries like India in the cold. India, which has largely been frozen out of NSS, would, therefore, have to find a way to remain relevant in the global politics, especially as it expects to become the world’s leading player in its own right within couple of decades.
Given India’s comparative advantages ( as a rising economic and strong military power), it should seriously start treating Indian Ocean as its backyard. This would require it to strengthen its armed forces, especially navy to be able to enforce its writ in the entire oceanic waters. If New Delhi controls Indian Ocean, the world will automatically get divided into three oceanic powers- the US in the Atlantic, China in the Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean. But will the US and China allow India to rise peacefully and challenge Sino-US duopoly in future? Does this mean that conflicts or strife could be touched off in and around Indian subcontinent (South Asia) to keep India bogged down so that its economy, which is forecast to be the fastest growing economy amongst the large economies going forward, crashes and all this talk of India becoming a 10 or 20 trillion dollar economy in next few years turns out to be an empty boast?
Strategic commentators can’t answer these questions as they don’t practice clairvoyance. Much of India’s rise though will depend on the policy choices it chooses to exercise. The seat on the international high table is for the taking, if India is so minded. China, on the other hand, is destined to keep growing as it has over the last three decades given the steady headstart it has over India and Europe. Even a slight fumble on the way will not dent its already achieved great power status.
The rise of the European continent ( as a block) on the other hand will depend on current Russia-Ukraine war. If the war on the continent takes a turn for the worse and drags on for years and the main continental powers are drawn into it, the continent may possibly end up being scarred so much economically and militarily that its evolution as fourth power centre in future may be in jeopardy. The shape of a new global order in future will doubtless be impacted by the myriad of security and economic challenges facing these countries today. Which one country or a group of countries will handle the security and economic challenges better than the others going forward is difficult to predict with any measure of certainty? But whoever does it well enough will surely grab a seat on the high table of global power politics.