The Indus Water Treaty

Gautam Sen
The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) concluded on 19th September, 1960,  is a unique example of cooperative India-Pakistan relations. The treaty affects the Indian states of Jammu & Kashmir (J & K),  Punjab and Rajasthan, with J & K affected the most.  Unlike in Punjab which is impacted by the IWT`s stipulations on permissible water-flows in the three eastern rivers of the Indus system viz. Ravi, Beas and Sutlej , there is a long-standing perception in J & K  that it has been deprived of opportunities of exploiting its hydro-electric power potential of nearly 15000 MW apart from limitation on other economic usage of the waters of River Indus and two of its tributaries – the western rivers – Jhelum and Chenab.  All State Govts. of J & K, have some time or the other, voiced their grievance on this score. The present State Govt. has even considered engaging a UK-based multinational consultancy firm, M/S Halcrow, to assess the opportunity cost foregone by J & K, owing to the impact of the IWT and consequent failure to develop its power potential. Notwithstanding such a stance of J & K Govts. of different political hue, Govt. of India has been implementing the IWT in letter and spirit, and had also attempted to develop the hydro-electric potential of the State by using India`s engineering capabilities  without violating the intrinsic rights of Pakistan flowing from  the IWT.
As part of its efforts to augment the electricity generating capacity of J & K,  in the backdrop of the State`s  huge  deficit of nearly 50%  against its peak power demand of approximately 2500 MW ( as per the latest  All-India Power Survey ), Govt.  of India had included some major power projects like Dulhasti, Baglihar and Sewa-II in the Prime Minister`s Reconstruction Programme (PMRP)  of 2004. The Union Govt. has also supported administratively and financially  seven projects  covered in a MOU between Govt. of India and the then J & K Govt. in 2000, for implementation by National Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) initially on `built-own-operate-transfer` basis, and subsequent handing over to the State Govt. While benefits from Baglihar have started accruing, the prevailing status regarding the  seven MOU-covered hydro projects viz. Kishenganga ( 330 MW : Bandipora); Uri-II (280 MW : Baramula);  Bursar (1020 MW : Kistwar); Sewa-II (also part of PMRP) (120 MW : Kathua); Pakal Dul (1000 MW : Doda); Nimoo Bazgo (44 MW : Leh) and Chutak (45 MW : Kargil), is not encouraging because, only Uri-II, Sewa-II, Nimoo-Bazgo and Chutak  have been broadly completed. All these projects are in the Indus Basin, and would necessarily have to be IWT compliant.
Though  water scarcity in the lean season has been politicized domestically in  Pakistan, particularly in its  Punjab province, a careful analysis shows that, the past objections raised by the Pakistan Federal Govt. and its Commissioner in the Joint Indus Rivers Commission against India`s  projects  in J & K- primarily the Baglihar on the Chenab and, Wular  and Kishenganga on the Jhelum, respectively, has been more in the nature of nit-picking, rather than  a strong concerted attempt to place obstacles in implementation of india`s  projects and jeopardising the IWT in the overall sense. This is  notwithstanding that, Pakistan`s objections are based on engineering issues apparently intended to alleviate Pakistan`s fears on unpredictability of water-flow and reduction of downstream supply  affecting the latter`s  consumptive usage. Pakistan has a dilemma to the extent that it cannot afford to render the IWT ineffective, reckoning India`s dominant position as the upper riparian with attendant implications for its economy and security.
Appreciating the implications of political discontent in J & K apropos the limitations imposed by the IWT and  need for sensitivity in the matter, and also considering the responsibility of the Centre as `power` is a subject  in the Concurrent List of India`s Constitution, the Union Govt. should  work out  plans for implementing the projects conceived for J & K , exclusively as part of a Central initiative ie. within the ambit of the Central Plan with the expertise available with NHPC and special purpose vehicles constituted for the purpose, rather than leaving them to be executed by the State Govt. reckoning its capability and resource constraints. The objective of the MOU of 2000, therefore needs to be re-visited.
As per existing policy on hydro-electric power projects, hill states like J & K, are entitled to a quantum of free power (13%) generated from projects set up by Central power utilities in such states.  Substantial free power would be available when all these seven projects from the MOU package are functional, and are deemed as Central utilities. Even if these projects generate power at 50% of their total installed capacity of 1899 MW, the quantum of free power available to the State will be a significant financial gain. This will be a great relief to the State, considering the existing  power deficit of nearly 1000 MW and the  expenditure being incurred by the State Govt. on purchase of power from the national  pool. The benefit from the PMRP projects and those within the ambit of the MOU, if implemented  vigorously as suggested above, will help  countervail  the negative perceptions regarding the IWT.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as India`s Prime Minister, had stated in one of his letters ( of 18th May, 1959) to the Chief Ministers just before the IWT was signed that, “– Canal Waters issue was and is essentially a problem of engineering and human welfare.“ While the IWT has broadly taken care of the water sharing aspect prima facie equitably through engineering means, with the bilateral differences in the engineering-technical realm resolved by deliberations in the Indus Commission, discussions at  inter-ministerial levels and through  mechanisms of neutral expert recommendations and arbitration – in that order-within the aegis of the treaty, time has come to consider a mutually agreed Indus Basin water management endeavour between India and Pakistan. The geo-physical and ecological conditions in the Indus Basin today is substantially different vis-à-vis that of the early 1950s and 1960 when the landmark treaty was concluded. It will be unfair to ignore the present water needs of the riparian provinces of both the countries, which basically implies those of J & K, Punjab provinces of India and Pakistan,  Sind  and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir ( and also of Rajasthan as a subsequent beneficiary province). Such an approach will also help de-politicise  the  political-cum-public grievance in  J & K on the constraining impact of the IWT on economic development of the State. A water management inter-river basin approach within the Indus system, may not involve a re-drafting of the IWT. Additional protocols only will be required, in a step-by-step manner, to augment  the water-generation in the catchment areas and optimally organize the resultant flows. A level of mutual confidence and down-playing the security perceptions between India and Pakistan, will be a sine qua non, for above-referred impetus to succeed. It may be worthwhile to recall observations of David Lilienthal, former Chief of Tennessee Valley Authority, in February 1951 that India and Pakistan should work out a programme  jointly to develop and augment the Indus River Basin System.
The State Govt. of J & K, may also consider projecting to the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FFC) a demand for compensating the State, commensurate with the extent  of `power disability` faced owing to the limitations arising from the IWT. This however, will be an ad-hoc  or short-term compensation (for the FFC award period : 2015-16 to 2019-20), and may be assessed based on the power purchase expenditure of the State Govt. during the past five years,  suitably deflated to the level of notional free power which would have been   obtainable had the technically feasible power projects in the Indus basin in its territory, become functional. As practical necessity,  in the interest of peace and security of the sub-continent and welfare of the people of India and Pakistan, both the  Govt. of India  and  the State Govt. of J & K should work with a larger perspective of inter-Indus Basin management, while compensating the State for the  power constraint suffered, for a specified period in the immediate future.
(The author is a former Special Secretary-level officer of Govt. of India, presently serving as Adviser (Finance) of Govt. of Nagaland. The views expressed are the author`s own.)

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