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Pakistan’s sudden entry into the global spotlight through billion dollar arms deals has raised a question that now reaches far beyond South Asia. Can weapons exports rescue an economy long associated with IMF bailouts, currency instability, rising food prices, and repeated fiscal crises. For years the country has been viewed as trapped in a cycle of debt dependence, struggling to stabilise its finances. Now Islamabad is negotiating major defence agreements with Sudan, Libya, and Indonesia, while Saudi Arabia is reportedly considering the conversion of loans into fighter jet purchases. Bangladesh has also expressed interest in Pakistani aircraft, and officials in Islamabad increasingly describe arms exports as a potential economic lifeline. The scale of these developments appears striking, yet a closer examination points toward a far more complex reality beneath the headlines.
Pakistan’s economic fundamentals remain weak, with modest growth, strained foreign exchange reserves, rising public debt, and persistent inflation that continues to erode household purchasing power. The state still struggles to finance essential imports such as fuel and wheat, while none of these structural challenges has receded. Pakistan has neither discovered new energy reserves nor transformed into a major industrial manufacturing hub, which makes the sudden emergence of billion dollar weapons contracts a source of both curiosity and skepticism.
Pakistan’s defence production capacity has expanded significantly over the past two decades, with Islamabad steadily building a domestic arms industry. Its flagship product, the JF 17 Thunder fighter jet, developed jointly with China and assembled locally, has become central to this effort. The aircraft does not match fifth generation stealth fighters in technology, yet it presents an appealing option for many developing air forces due to its affordability, easier maintenance requirements, and flexible weapons integration. For countries operating under tight budget constraints, these practical advantages carry greater importance than cutting edge performance. A major boost to its profile followed the India Pakistan aerial clashes of May 2025, after which Islamabad claimed operational success. While the details remain disputed, one outcome became evident within the global defence market as Pakistan’s aircraft acquired a combat reputation. In arms sales, operational credibility carries significant weight, and battlefield exposure strengthened the appeal of Pakistani systems in a manner that no marketing campaign could replicate.
Interest followed quickly. Sudan is reportedly close to finalising a deal worth around one and a half billion dollars for jets and drones. Libya has already signed a multi billion dollar agreement that includes fighter aircraft and training platforms. Indonesia has entered talks for combat jets and armed drones. Saudi Arabia is exploring converting two billion dollars in loans into a jet purchase arrangement. Bangladesh has expressed interest in both fighters and trainer aircraft. Nigeria, Myanmar and Azerbaijan already operate the JF 17. Within a short period Pakistan has positioned itself as an emerging supplier in the global arms market.
This success, however, should not be overstated. Defence contracts differ from conventional trade. Pakistan is not receiving large cash payments upfront. Most deals involve long term instalments. Some rely on debt conversion. Others depend on deferred payments stretched over several years. In certain cases partner governments help underwrite financing. Revenue arrives gradually and often indirectly. Take the Saudi discussions. Converting loans into jets does not generate fresh cash for Islamabad. It simply changes the form of existing obligations. The debt remains. On paper the transaction appears impressive, but it does not immediately strengthen Pakistan’s fiscal position.
Arms exports carry a strong political dimension, influenced by the strategic constraints many buyers face. Several countries operate under Western sanctions and have limited access to United States and European defence markets, leading them to seek suppliers who impose fewer political conditions. Pakistan has positioned itself effectively within this space by offering relatively affordable systems along with integrated training and maintenance support. It also refrains from attaching governance and human rights requirements to its contracts, a factor that appeals to governments such as those in Sudan and Libya. This flexibility has increased Islamabad’s attractiveness as a defence partner, with demand driven largely by geopolitical realities rather than open market competition.
Pakistani leaders have responded with optimism. The defence minister recently suggested arms exports could reduce dependence on IMF assistance within months. Such claims deserve caution. Even if Pakistan secures several billion dollars in contracts, revenue flows slowly. Production costs absorb a large share. Defence exports cannot cover Pakistan’s massive import bill. They cannot fix energy shortages. They cannot repair weak tax collection systems. They cannot contain inflation. Arms sales provide support, but they do not substitute for comprehensive economic reform. The domestic benefits are also limited. Defence manufacturing is capital intensive and highly specialised. It does not generate large scale employment. Most gains accrue to the military establishment and defence firms. Meanwhile ordinary Pakistanis continue to face high living costs, limited job opportunities and strained public services. Weapons exports do not automatically translate into improved living standards.
Thre are strategic risks as well. Supplying arms to countries embroiled in civil war, such as Sudan, exposes Pakistan to reputational costs. It ties Islamabad to conflicts marked by severe humanitarian suffering. There is also the risk of dependence on unstable political environments. Today contracts are signed. Tomorrow governments collapse. Payments stall, agreements unravel. The global arms trade is full of such examples. Another danger lies in misplaced confidence. Political leaders may delay necessary reforms, assuming defence revenue offers a safety net. History suggests otherwise. No country has built sustained prosperity through weapons exports alone. Even the world’s largest arms exporters rely overwhelmingly on civilian industries for growth.
International observers are paying close attention to Pakistan’s recent moves. Many see the defence deals as part of a broader strategic shift, while questions remain about how sustainable this approach can be over time. Pakistan has invested heavily in military capacity for decades and is now trying to turn that investment into revenue. The wider economic picture, however, has not changed in any meaningful way. The economy remains fragile, political uncertainty continues, and reliance on financial support from China and Gulf partners persists. Arms exports do little to address these deeper structural challenges. Pakistan’s arms exports offer limited foreign exchange and diplomatic leverage, but they are not a cure for structural economic weakness. Weapons can influence battlefields, but they cannot rebuild institutions and lift living standards.
From a global perspective, this episode carries a wider lesson. National strength rests on governance, institutions, and human development rather than weapons sales. Fighter jets play little role in influencing durable stability. The widespread misconception around Pakistan’s arms deals finds its sharpest expression in Habib Jalib’s timeless lament, where he rejects hollow systems built on false promises,
Aisay dastoor ko, subh-e-be-noor ko
Main nahi maanta, main nahi jaanta
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