K B Jandial
kbjandial@gmail.com
On the evening of 10th November, the nation was shocked by ‘breaking news’ across every TV channel that a car bomb exploded at a traffic signal near the Red Fort metro station killing 13 persons and injuring over 20 others. This was a major terror strike in the national capital after a long time, raising troubling questions about intelligence failure despite the J&K Police earlier had unravelled an interstate conspiracy for a major terror strike.
A week later, all TV channels prominently aired a pre-recorded (likely done in April-May) video of Dr. Umar-Ul- Nabi, by then zeroed as the car bomber, justifying the fedayeen attacks or suicide bombings. This ‘scoop” in all channels was the pre-recorded video in every channel which was shared by investigating and intelligence agencies. This too was another breaking news which quickly became another headline-grabbing broadcast.
The aftermath of this major terrorist strike presents a defining moment, not just for security forces, but also for the nation, the Government media strategists, and the media. Having successfully turned the tide of anti-India propaganda in Kashmir media during the peak of terrorism in the 1990s when nothing about India was allowed to be printed in local newspapers, I was shocked to see this video on Indian TV channels. It was deeply saddening.
Straight Talk
The “Confessional” Video
The handling of the Red Fort suicide bomber, Dr. Umar-un-Nabi’s, pre-blast propaganda video-a chilling monologue portraying his act as a “martyrdom operation”-demonstrates a profound and costly failure in media management. It unwittingly fulfilled the terrorist organization’s core objective of disseminating its unacceptable ideology and motivating educated Muslim youth including professionals to join a new class of “Islamic” white-collar terrorists. Ironically, those who failed in gathering the required intelligence inputs of the module, already exposed by the J&K Police, seemed to take ‘pride’ in unwittingly amplifying its radical messaging.
In the undated and unedited video, the “White-coat” terrorist, Dr. Umar is seen sitting in a dimly lit room, calmly justifying suicide bombing. He argues against the term “suicide,” instead called it a “martyrdom operation”, claiming it is a misunderstood concept in Islam. He states that it is a “deliberate operation” where a person knows they will die at a specific time and place. While it was strategical blunder, the investigators believed the recorded video to justify his upcoming actions and potential to radicalize others in his “doctor module.” This “confessional” footage which was recovered during investigation and released to the media, validated the attack.
No serious public relations professional can dismiss this blunder as a routine PR misstep; it was a disastrous tactical mistake that ran counter to every principle of effective counter-extremism communication. By providing a global platform to the very message the terrorist intended to spread, the Government and media inadvertently became unwittingly force multipliers for their radical agenda.
The Symbiotic Nature of Terrorism and Media
Terrorism is fundamentally a form of violent political communication. The actual act of violence is often secondary to the terror and publicity it generates. As security analysts have noted for decades, terrorists seek to use the media as a “megaphone” to broadcast their radical messages, demands, and, most crucially, their ideology to the widest possible audience.
The suicide bomber’s video was a carefully crafted piece of propaganda. It was not a private confession, but a public statement designed by motivators for release posthumously. And what they wanted was simply done by the Police and ‘breaking news’ hungry media.
The video’s deliberate used articulate English and its attempts to reframe “suicide bombing” as a “misunderstood martyrdom operation” which targeted specifically at an educated, digitally-savvy audience to create white-collar recruitment pool of terrorists.
Dr. Umar-un-Nabi, an educated professional, gave the terrorist module a dangerous white-collar face , potentially lowering the psychological barriers for similarly placed educated, alienated youth contemplating radicalisation. The aim was unmistakable: legitimise violence, glorify the bomber, and trigger imitation-a core objective of groups like the Jaish module he was linked to.
The purpose was clear: to legitimise the violence, glorify the bomber as a martyr, and inspire a “social contagion” or “imitation” effect among like-minded individuals-a key goal of terrorist organisations like the Jaish module he was linked to.
By airing the video nationwide, the very institutions meant to condemn the attack instead became distributors of the terrorist’s most potent message.
Counter-Extremism: Deny the Oxygen
The Global counter-terrorism wisdom is captured in one principle: deny them the oxygen of publicity. This principle mandates the Governments and media to actively work in tandem to minimise the propaganda value of terrorist attacks.
The key strategies include: Withholding Unnecessary Details; limiting the publication of the bomber’s manifesto, detailed operational methods, or, crucially, their pre-recorded propaganda video; shifting the narrative focus from the terrorist’s warped ideology to the humanity of the victims, the competence of the investigating agencies, and the unity of the community; De-glorifying the perpetrator by treating him as a criminal and murderer, rather than indulging in the terrorist-preferred term “martyr.”
In the Red Fort case, the media managers did the opposite. They shared the video with the press, who then predictably broadcasted it, doing the exact opposite. It provided unfiltered, high-quality, high-impact propaganda-created by the terrorist himself-to a massive national and international audience. The Government effectively paid for the distribution of the enemy’s most vital asset.
This incident highlights a critical failure in the strategic communication cell of the Government. In an age of sophisticated information warfare, security agencies must possess the expertise not just to intercept a bomb, but to defuse the narrative.
In the Red Fort case, Government media managers did the opposite. By sharing the video with the press-and the press predictably airing it-they delivered high-quality, unfiltered propaganda to national and international audiences. The State itself financed the dissemination of the enemy’s most valuable asset. This represents a critical breakdown in strategic communication. In an age of information warfare, agencies must be capable not only of intercepting bombs but also of neutralising destructive narratives.
The argument that the public has a “right to know” the bomber’s mindset is a journalistic priority, but it must be balanced against the overriding national security interest of preventing further radicalisation.
Media Management Strategy
A responsible and competent media management strategy should include:
1.A Text-based briefing: It should only be the video’s contents -confirming the bomber’s radicalisation and extremist links-while strictly withholding the visual footage. This meets the public’s need for information without promoting the visual and auditory spectacle of the propaganda. 2. Controlled Counter-Narrative: Immediately releasing a strong, fact-based counter-narrative, leveraging experts to debunk the extremist ideology articulated in the video, rather than allowing the terrorist’s own words to lead the news cycle. 3. Inter-Agency Protocol: Establishing clear, non-negotiable protocols with media houses about the handling of such recovered materials, similar to the guidelines often followed in Western countries to prevent the sensationalisation and glorification of terror suspects.
Indian media “spread the video across the globe” and thus the militants achieved their communication objective effortlessly. The terror attack was executed, and its ideological payload delivered-courtesy of India’s own media management lapse.
Lessons from Global Experience
There are lessons from Global Case Studies. The need for careful handling of terrorist propaganda is not a new lesson. The United Kingdom (Northern Ireland): For years, the UK Government enforced an unofficial policy where statements by militant groups were heavily restricted or broadcast by actors, not the terrorists themselves, to reduce their perceived legitimacy. The US (Post 9/11): While the US often released summaries of captured Al-Qaeda videos, there was a conscious effort to minimise the live, unedited broadcast of Osama bin Laden’s speeches to deny him the status of a global statesman. The focus was consistently on the brutality of the act, not the ideology that motivated it.
These examples underscore that media restraint is not censorship; it is a vital component of national security. The Red Fort media fiasco serves as a stark reminder that in the war against extremism, the battle for the narrative is as critical as the battle against the network. The poor media management did not merely show coordination lapse; it was a strategic surrender to the enemy, allowing the toxic seed of radical ideology to be planted directly into the public consciousness under the guise of “breaking news.” The long-term cost of this amplification-in terms of inspiring the next ‘Dr. Terror’-may far outweigh the immediate investigative value of the footage offered.
(feedback:- kbjandial@gmail.com)
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