Janusz Bylinski
Since December last, Somaliland has been at the centre of a cyclone that has gripped the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Israel’s recognition of its sovereignty sent ripples from Turkey across Africa. Was this a catalyst for the crystallization of a new balance of power, or was it part of a planned regional reorganisation?
On 26 December, Israel formally recognised Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, arguing it meets “the objective criteria for statehood under customary international law, as reflected in the Montevideo Convention.” As per 1933 Convention, a state must possess following characteristics: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter relations with other states.
In return, Somaliland declared it would join the Abraham Accords. In early January, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sar visited Somaliland, and the official signing of the accession agreement was expected during the visit of the country’s prime minister to Israel in March this year, which will probably be postponed due to the ongoing war with Iran.
Israel has pledged to cooperate with Somaliland in agriculture, health, technology and economy, while unofficially there is talk of establishing an Israeli intelligence base capable of observing and pre-emptively responding to threats from Iran and Yemeni Houthis. On the Somaliland side, Minister of Presidential Affairs Khadar Hussein Abdi, mentioned such a possibility. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi suggested granting Israel privileged access to his country’s mineral resources.
The recognition is not an ad hoc decision, taken in isolation from broader plans. It coincides with the new President striving to improve the country’s international standing, and, on the other hand, with plans being developed in Israel to rebuild the regional security architecture.
Throughout 2025, media platforms propagating Israeli propaganda (and, by extension, the United Arab Emirates) have been actively campaigning in support of Somaliland as a potential Western defence outpost in Horn of Africa. Since early 2026, dozens of AI-generated podcasts have continued to appeal to selected countries—Greece, Morocco, and Germany—to recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty, presenting benefits of doing so.
There is also sympathy for such a move in the US. In June 2025, influential Republicans introduced a draft resolution calling on the government to recognise Somaliland “as a separate [and] independent state.” This would be a major victory for the country and its government is offering the US access to territory for construction of a military base and exclusive access to mineral resources. These efforts remain more in realm of political rhetoric than reality. President Trump’s administration is uninterested in these proposals, likely due to complex interplay of interests in the region and its preoccupation with other important matters, such as the conflict with Iran. Trump himself is reported to have said: “Somaliland? What is it?”
Somalia still considers Somaliland part of its territory. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reacted with outrage, stating that Israel’s declaration constituted “illegal aggression” and was “contrary to established legal and diplomatic principles.” Other countries and regional organisations, including Arab League Council, OIC, EU, and African Union, responded to Israel’s decision by reaffirming Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while some entities strongly rejected or even condemned Israel’s move.
The UAE refused to sign the joint statement of Arab League and OIC condemning Israel’s recognition, as did Morocco and Bahrain, but in January 2026 it issued a joint statement with the AU defending “the sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability of Somalia”, demonstrating flexibility also evident in its withdrawal from South Yemen in December 2025. Kenya also didn’t join the AU’s position. Yemen’s Houthis have warned that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as a “military target” for their armed forces.
In response to Israel’s move, Saudi Arabia took a firm stance, insisting on maintaining Somalia’s unity. Turkey strengthened its military presence in Mogadishu, and during a visit to Ethiopia, Prime Minister Erdogan warned Somaliland’s secession could pose a threat to the unstable region. In January, Somalia and Qatar signed a defence cooperation agreement in Doha. In February, Somalia and Saudi Arabia signed a Military Cooperation Agreement in Riyadh to strengthen bilateral defence relations, improve military training, provide technical assistance, and support Somali Armed Forces.
In early 2026 Egypt significantly increased its military presence in Somalia, sending around 1,100 troops as part of the new AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia. Saudi Arabia stands for unity and integrity of existing state entities and opposes plans to dismember and reshape Middle East political structure, which could ultimately threaten its statehood.
Somaliland is a quasi-state with a functioning democratic system, government, military, and currency. Since its proclamation of independence in 1991, it has operated in a political grey zone, unrecognised but also undisturbed by its neighbours, including Somalia, which formally considers it part of a federation. Somalia itself is close to failed state status, threatened by further disintegration. Despite its lack of international recognition, it maintains representations in several countries on a reciprocal basis such as diplomatic relations with Taiwan and cooperation agreements with China.
Somaliland is world’s fourth poorest country. Livestock exports (sheep, cows, and camels), primarily to Saudi Arabia, account for majority of its GDP. Its only remaining military base, near port of Berbera, has been owned by UAE since 2017 and the naval base has been transformed into a nearly complete facility, equipped with advanced infrastructure, including a modern military port, a deep-water dock, and a runway with hangars and support facilities.
Of all European countries, Great Britain is most involved in economic development in its former colony. British entities hold concessions for resource exploration, while others establish themselves in the port area to provide logistical services. For UAE, Berbera is both a link in an extensive network of ports and airports stretching across Africa, and a strategic outpost whose control creates power projection and allows it to influence the vital geopolitical environment.
The synergy between Israel and UAE, been strengthening in recent years, means their interests in Somaliland are largely aligned. For both, control of the crucial chokepoint between Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean is a stake worth playing for. Identifying and blocking threats from Iran, being able to influence maritime transport, building new logistics routes that bypass or diminish the importance of existing ones, offering transshipment and maintenance services to shipowners, and taking over the transport channels for critical raw materials all represent significant gains in themselves.
Acquiring Somaliland as a client and protégé is part of a broader strategy to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East to Israel’s advantage. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently announced a plan for a “hexagon of alliances” that would encompass Israel, Greece, Cyprus, India, and unnamed countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This hexagon would encompass a security zone on Israel’s periphery and be capable of countering two axes: a Shiite axis led by Iran and a Sunni axis of states supporting radical Islam.
Modi’s visit to Israel, two days before the launch of the attack on Iran, confirms the increasingly strong India-Israel ties and synergies of interests. India is the largest recipient of Israeli defence products. It shares with Israel Muslim extremism threat and terrorism. Both countries are vitally interested in maritime security, with India seeking to play an increasingly important role in its security architecture and build alternatives to China’s BRI connecting Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean.
However, the new balance of power in Middle East following the war with Iran will be crucial. It’s impossible to predict whether the Arab states of the Peninsula will reassess their security situation and seek alternative sources of weapons and alliances. Whether they will close ranks to oppose Israel’s absolute hegemony, or whether their rivalry will deepen. And whether a victorious Israel will unimpededly pursue its future plans?—INFA
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