NEW DELHI, Apr 9 : On the third day of the hearing in the Sabarimala reference, the Centre on Thursday reiterated before the Supreme Court that constitutional courts are not competent to adjudicate contentious issues arising from religious beliefs, practices and faith under Articles 25 and 26, especially when such questions intersect with Article 14 on equality.
The Centre emphasised that judges lack the necessary theological grounding to decide such matters, a position consistently stressed by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta during the course of the hearing in the first two days.
At the outset today, Mehta placed additional examples before the court to underline the diversity of religious practices. He referred to temples where men are not allowed, temples where male priests wash the feet of women devotees, and even a temple in Kerala where men are required to enter dressed as women.
He also cited the Brahma temple at Pushkar, where married men are not permitted. “It is not a question of male-centric or female-centric practices. In some cases, the practice may be women-centric,” Mehta submitted, indicating that such diversity must be respected.
The nine-judge Constitution Bench, comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan and Joymalya Bagchi, is examining a 2019 reference on the scope of essential religious practices and the interplay between Articles 25, 26 and 14.
The reference arises from the review of the September 28, 2018 judgment that allowed entry of women aged 10 to 50 into the Sabarimala Ayyappa temple. The verdict in the present proceedings is expected to impact several pending cases involving religious practices.
Arguing for the Centre, Additional Solicitor General K.M. Nataraj said Articles 25 and 26 are interconnected and must be read together.
He explained that Article 25(1) protects both internal belief and its external manifestation through practice and propagation, while Article 25(2) enables the State to regulate certain aspects of religious activities for public order, morality and health. Article 26, he said, relates to institutional rights of religious denominations.
“Article 26 is embedded in Article 25, and vice versa,” Nataraj submitted.
He further argued that determining what constitutes an “essential religious practice” is impractical in a diverse country like India, as what is essential for one denomination may not be so for another.
During the hearing, the Bench raised concerns over the extent of protection available to religious practices.
Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed that the submissions appeared to suggest a broader definition of religion.
Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah questioned whether external manifestations of belief could be protected without limits.
“If the external manifestation affects the rights of others, how can it be protected ” he asked, indicating that such practices would have to be tested on constitutional grounds.
Nataraj responded that such protection would always remain subject to Part III of the Constitution.
Justice Amanullah, however, pointed out that not every internal belief, once externalised, can automatically claim protection.
Continuing the arguments on the issue of “constitutional morality” that was questioned by the Solicitor General yesterday, Nataraj submitted that public morality, and not constitutional morality as interpreted in earlier judgments, should be the guiding standard.
The Centre has consistently argued that reliance on constitutional morality in earlier rulings, including the 2018 Sabarimala and LGBT judgments, was misplaced.
The Bench will also consider the broader constitutional questions arising from earlier judgments, including the apparent divergence between the Shirur Mutt (1954) and Durgah Committee (1961) rulings on essential religious practices.
The hearing will continue on April 14, 2026.
(UNI)
Follow our WhatsApp channel
