Brig Sushil Tanwar
Last week,Turkiye’s Intelligence agency MIT along with Pakistan’s ISI conducted a special operation in Balochistan and apprehended Mehmet Goren,one of the senior figures of ISKP, an offshoot terrorist organisation of IS Daesh.
Earlier in June 25, Ozgur Altun @ “Abu Yasir Al Turki”, a key figure of Turkish origin in ISKP’s media and logistics branch was also captured in a joint intelligence operation by ISI and MIT while he was attempting to cross into Afghanistan from Pakistan. In May 25, Pakistani authorities arrested Sultan Aziz Azzam, the head of ISKP’s media outlet while in March 25, US President Donald Trump publicly thanked Pakistan for arresting and handing over ISKP member Sharifullah , a prime suspect in the Abbey Gate attack.
The series of high profile arrests has established the centrality of Pakistan in the global campaign against IS though it also raises a troubling question about the presence of terror sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Many analysts also suspect that Pakistan is playing a double game of selective arrests thus giving it a strategic leverage.
It is also being speculated that Pakistan has established ISIS centers in Mastung & other areas of Balochistan for use against the Afghan Taliban.
According to the confessions of several arrested ISIS members, the group’s fighters were not only being dispatched into Afghanistan from Pakistan, but were also receiving training ,logistics support & directions under the supervision of elements within the Pakistani military and the ISI prior to crossing into Afghanistan.
Shifting Bases – ISKP’s Journey So Far
Soon after its formation in 2015, ISKP established control over large tracts of territory in the eastern Afghan provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar, but a sustained campaign by US and Taliban resulted in its loss of physical territory.
By mid May 2023, in a series of operations by the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), the intelligence agency of Afghanistan, most of ISKP leadership was eliminated and most of their hideouts in Afghanistan were destroyed, forcing them to relocate.
Thereafter, the reports of ISKP sanctuaries in Balochistan began to emerge in September 2023 . At that time, most observers dismissed these reports as Afghan propaganda against Pakistan. The situation however escalated when ISKP carried out multiple attacks across Afghanistan in the following months, all of which were eventually traced back to ISKP’s training camps located in Balochistan.
Apart from Pakistan, the Central Asians, particularly Tajik nationals, also emerged as frontline actors in ISKP’s global attacks. Three major attacks in 2024 i.e. Crocus Hall massacre in Russia, Istanbul Church attack, and Iran’s twin bombing highlighted the same as the Tajik cadres were primarily involved in these high profile attacks.
Many security analysts initially attributed these attacks to ISKP’s ‘Global Operations’ campaign and held Afghanistan responsible for enabling the expansion of ISKP’s global footprint.
However evidence gathered by Iran and Russia during their investigations into the Kerman and Moscow attacks eventually confirmed that the epicenter of ISKP’s global terror ops was not Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Eventually, the masterminds of these attacks were also found in Balochistan.
An extremely fragile security situation in Balochistan, it’s favourable terrain and the porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran also provides ISKP with significant opportunities to form alliances and establish a stronghold in the area. The opium poppy cultivation in Balochistan also helped the group to raise funds with the revenues of the narcotics trade.
The activities of ISKP in Balochistan however suffered an unexpected disruption in March 25 when Baloch separatists reportedly launched a sudden attack on multiple ISKP training camps in the Mastung area which resulted in the killing of over thirty ISKP cadres, including Turkish, Tajik, and Uzbek nationals.
Afghan Intelligence GDI was also suspected to have played a vital role in the Mastung attack as despite the repeated requests from the Afghan government, Pakistan did not take any corrective action and allowed Balochistan-based ISKP networks to continue launching attacks into Afghanistan.
The Mastung attack thus came as a surprise not only to ISKP but also to Pakistan, which had earlier refuted Afghan government’s claims regarding ISKP sanctuaries in Balochistan, calling them “baseless allegations”.
The killing of foreign nationals within ISKP’s ranks was also a major blow to the group, as these foreign rects were used to carry out global attacks due to factors such as the ease of travel with their passports and good communication skills.
On 25 May 25, ISKP , through its media wing, Al-Azaim Foundation, released a 36 minute video in which it accused Baloch Insurgent groups of unprovoked attacks and declared war on them even though it had previously maintained a “non-aggression policy” towards Baloch groups. ISKP’s public admission of such an agreement is also significant as it reflects the group’s survival strategy where short term truce with ideological rivals is deemed acceptable.
Following the Mastung attack, many seniors commanders of ISKP moved out of Balochistan and took refuge in the tribal region of KP where ISKP has traditionally enjoyed local support. Senior leaders like Sanaullah Ghaffari & Sultan Aziz Ezzam were reportedly seen in the Tirah valley of Khyber dist. Several locals in Khyber district also reported presence of ISKP cadres in the region and a senior ISKP commander, Abdul Malik Afridi, was assassinated in the same area few weeks earlier.
Pakistan’s Complicity – A Tight Rope Walk
The Pakistani military establishment is certainly aware of the growing ISKP presence in Balochistan province, and the ISI is suspected to have even provided safe sanctuaries to the ISKP.
In Pakistan’s calculus, ISKP was globally associated with Afghanistan and the international community would therefore naturally continue to blame Kabul for ISKP-related violence in the region and beyond.
Islamabad has been proactively publicising its counter-ISKP ops, with the aim of not only projecting itself as a “frontline state against terror” but also to cover the presence of ISKP ‘s safe sanctuaries in its backyard. As a balancing tactic, it occasionally captures ‘ a Big Fish’ and trades it with other countries as a strategic bargain. Meanwhile, the foot soldiers of ISKP enjoy safe sanctuary in Balochistan province with the tacit approval of Pakistan’s military establishment.
The “arrest and extradite” operations by Pakistan are thus strategically motivated, with authorities using it as a transactional gesture to boost foreign relations.
Apart from the four high profile arrests mentioned earlier i.e Mehmet Goren,Ozgur Altun, Sultan Azzam & Sharifullah, two ISKP members Adel Panjsheri and Abdullah Quetta, masterminds of the Kerman bombings, were arrested and handed over to Iran (reportedly in exchange of Baloch separatist leader Wahid Qambar). Another ISKP commander Abu Munzir, a Tajik national, considered as the mastermind of the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, was arrested and handed over to Russia while Four Azeri ISKP members were arrested and handed over to Azerbaijan.
Ironically however, the breakdown of Pakistan’s relationship with Afghan Taliban has ensured that Afghanistan which was most affected by ISKP has not figured amongst the countries with which Pakistan publicly cooperated regarding ISKP.
The 16th report of the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team also recently noted that IS-KP’s ability to operate in the region had been degraded as a result of several high-profile arrests by Pakistan.
Since the arrest of almost all the ISKP Commanders in Balochistan is bound to raise uncomfortable questions about the presence of their safe havens in Pakistan, Islamabad has simultaneously tried to reframe the narrative by portraying these operations as counter-terrorism successes while diverting attention from how such networks had taken root within its borders and managed to carry out global attacks.
An Uneasy Truce
Since the ISKP moved its sanctuaries to Balochistan, its cadres have not proactively targeted the armed forces of Pakistan. ISKP, unlike TTP and Baloch Separatists, consciously plans its activities within Pakistani territory without provoking the Pakistani Army thus raising questions about tacit support being given to it by ISI and other agencies.
A few incidents of violence attributed to ISKP so far have been restricted to targeted killings of police personnel and religious clerics such as recent targeting of a religious scholar affiliated with Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman’s party in Charsadda. Despite the involvement of ISKP in occasional suicide attack on political rallies Pakistan Army has not yet acted with its full force against the ISKP trg camps in its territory, thus further raising questions about tacit support.
A recent report in media outlet Al-Mirsaad claimed that “ISKP is a pawn of Pakistani intelligence and Pakistan’s military continues to exploit ISIS’s sectarian extremism to advance its own strategic objectives”. As per another report, Pakistani intelligence services are using Baloch tribal chief Shafiq-ur-Rehman Mengal to strengthen and control IS’s networks in Balochistan.
The origin of ISKP itself is also shrouded in mystery. The co-founder of ISKP Abdul Rahim Dost has publicly admitted that ISI (Brigadier Ashfaq and Colonel Arif ) had approached him & Hafiz Saeed to leave TTP and start ISKP with support from the ISI.
Prognosis
The recent events provide ample evidence of the fact that ISKP has sanctuaries in Balochistan which also underlines the complicity of Pakistan. ISKP also offers Pakistan a leverage factor in its fractured relationship with the Taliban govt in Afghanistan.The reported ISKP presence in Pakistan can be used to counterbalance the alleged presence of TTP and BLA sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
Pakistan in any case has a long tradition of using proxy militant groups as instruments of foreign policy and aligning itself with terror organisations for achieving its strategic goals. Its convert embrace of ISKP is just another chapter in its chequered history.
Pakistan however needs to be cautious as ISKP might soon start exploring alliances with local insurgent groups & other sectarian organizations with opportunities to spread in other provinces including PoGB and even Sindh.
For now Pakistan’s military establishment is comfortably “Running with the hare and hunting with the hounds” …but the question is for how long?
(Courtesy: Medals and Ribbons Publishers)
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