Col Ajay K Raina, SM
Afghans, throughout their actuality as a race, have been known for their indomitable spirit. Afghanistan, by implication, is known as the graveyard of empires for this particular trait that subsists in Afghan DNA, cutting across its clans, castes and tribes. From the British in 19th Century to Russians almost a century later and now the Americans-playing their roles in the star-crossed Great Game-all have dealt with extreme embarrassment and have beheld the entombment of their egotism first hand. And such debacles get attributed both to Afghans’ ability to resist and incompetence on part of foreign powers to read the situation correctly.
If that be so, there is a reason to ponder as how another foreign country (though not an empire or power; a proxy nevertheless), Pakistan has been able to exert itself in Afghan affairs time and again! As we, in India, express our worries and concerns about a threat developing towards Kashmir from Hindukush and Hindu Raj, there is a need to have a re-look at the changing equations, especially between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the region. Needless to say, such affairs are seldom simplistic and many circles exist inside as many circles.
Taliban that controls Afghanistan today, owes its cadre strength to the numerous religious seminaries in Pakistan, more so, to those located in the restive belt along and south of Durand Line. However, Taliban actually came into existence in early 1990s and that too in Kandahar and without Pakistan’s assistance. Those were the eventful days when, post-Soviet withdrawal, various groups were busy destroying Kabul after failure of power-sharing arrangements. Taking advantage of the prevailing chaos, some nefarious elements had started looting vehicles and convoys plying on pot-holed Kabul-Peshawar Road. A group of about 50 young students under Mullah Omar had then taken on itself to ensure that the supplies and aid meant for Afghans was not way-laid by such elements. That group did earn a lot of goodwill and soon started to be feared by those who had been trying to encash the sad situation. However, their control was not absolute and an utter lack of law enforcement then led to a situation wherein a convoy of Pakistan army trucks, carrying more rockets to ensure that not even a single house was left standing in Kabul, was stopped on that road for want of payment of ‘fee’! ISI, thus got in touch with Omar and requested him to have the road cleared. The road was cleared without much ado. It was at that moment that ISI realised the potential of the group that, unlike rest of the mujahedeen factions, was actually working for the good of Afghans. ISI, thereafter, decided to build on that group and negotiated with Mullah Omar with an unstated aim of unseating mujahedeen factions that were getting out of ISI’s control. Thousands of Afghan refugee kids from Peshawar-Quetta belt then joined in and Taliban was born.
When Taliban first took power in 1996, Pakistan was well-aware of the intrinsic trait in Afghan DNA. ISI did apprehend a situation wherein Taliban could show two fingers to the Pakistan establishment at some stage. To cull such a possibility, two major actions were undertaken by the Pakis. First was instant recognition and sending of a huge contingent of bureaucrats and military advisers to Afghanistan. Readers may remember how a massive airlift, referred to as Airlift of Evil, had to be organised from Kunduz airfield to evacuate about 5,000 Pakistanis and Taliban leaders in November 2001 as the Americans came riding into Afghanistan over the shoulders of Northern Alliance! Secondly, Pakistan ensured that families of Taliban leaders and important functionaries were kept back in Pakistan as a guarantee of their good behaviour and security of own elements. Inexperienced Taliban needed administrators and advisers and such an arrangement worked well till Taliban was shown door in 2001.
Once Taliban got on the backfoot, the first thing they did was to ‘liberate’ the complete border belt inside Pakistan. Pashtuns, as it is, don’t recognise Durand Line and soon, authorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Waziristan lost control over those territories. ISI was now in a spot. Taliban leaders, despite their influence in the region, however, didn’t want to spoil their relationship with ISI. As part of a face-saving exercise, TTP was created. TTP, touted to be an indigenous group, was now in control of that territory and Pakistan army could not be blamed for allowing a foreign group to capture their land! On other hand, Taliban could use TTP to pay back Pakistan as and when required.
Taliban of 2021, however, is an erudite lot. It is more conscious of world-wide recognition unlike the last time. It still needs Pakistani bureaucrats and advisers but dependence is not likely to last forever. Pakistan had jailed Mullah Baradar and handed over many top leaders to USA during the intervening period and Afghans have it on their mind. Also, public to public ties between two countries are virtually non-existent. No wonder then that the moment Taliban was thrown out, anti-Pak sentiment could clearly be seen inside Afghanistan. And not to forget that the present generation of Afghan nationals whose average age is only 18 years, was born and brought up inside Afghanistan and that too when there was peace of some sorts. Most of them have never visited any madrassa in Pakistan. This generation of modern Afghans is not likely to allow Taliban to dictate terms as was done in the past. Videos of women protesting for their rights in Kabul and citizens hoisting Afghan flags do point towards a changed ground situation inside Afghanistan.
Today, Taliban is vulnerable both due to lack of finances and control by ISI. Once recognitions happen and Chinese jump in with their excavators and digging tools to mine the minerals, Taliban may not only throw the yoke of ISI, it may create unrest inside Pakistan using TTP. We are headed into a long period of uncertainty now. What may or may not happen-can’t be predicted for a nation as volatile as Afghanistan but there is a distinct possibility of commerce (minerals, an alternate CPEC route or an oil pipeline from Iran to China) bringing in peace before the Afghans dig another grave for the Chinese in the decades to follow. There is an equal possibility of situation going south because of restlessness and domestic power struggles. In both the cases, Pakistan is likely to taste some really bitter wine and that too from a ‘made-in-Pakistan’ goblet!
The author is a Military Historian and a founding trustee of Military History Research Foundation ®
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