Dr K N Pandita, Fatima Baloch
Following the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the subsequent Shimla Agreement, India and Pakistan entered a prolonged phase of uneasy peace. The war, which culminated in the creation of Bangladesh, left Pakistan militarily weakened and politically fragile. In the ensuing years, Islamabad remained apprehensive about potential Indian offensives-particularly regarding Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the protection of Sikh religious sites within its Punjab province.
The strategic dynamics of South Asia witnessed a transformative shift in the 1980s with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This conflict became the crucible for low-cost, ideology-driven proxy warfare, supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan under the banner of jihad. Drawing heavily from this experience, Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq institutionalized the doctrine of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts”-a prolonged campaign of asymmetric warfare utilizing state-sponsored militant groups.
Over time, this doctrine evolved into a structured strategy involving well-trained operatives-often backed by Pakistan’s Border Action Teams (BAT)-to infiltrate Indian territory and carry out high-impact attacks on civilian and military targets. India’s response has largely centred on gathering evidence, engaging in diplomatic forums, and appealing to the international community. However, these measures have had limited deterrent effect, failing to curb the proxy war waged from across the border.
India has paid a heavy price for this sustained conflict. From the 2008 Mumbai attacks to the more recent Uri, Pulwama, and Pahalgam incidents, a clear pattern of cross-border terrorism has emerged. Despite presenting compelling evidence to the international community, India’s restrained approach has not deterred aggression.
The paradigm shifted with Operation Sindoor-a well-coordinated strike targeting terrorist infrastructure and command centres deep within Pakistani territory. Notably, India provided prior notice to Pakistan, a decision that allowed Pakistani forces to mobilize and intercept Indian jets-a strategic miscalculation. The Pakistan Army did not remain neutral; its direct involvement, including participation in funeral prayers for militants, underscored its deep entanglement with the proxy war apparatus. Consequently, the brief 2025 conflict reinforced a critical strategic truth: Pakistan is no longer a mere sponsor but an active participant in this conflict.
Although a ceasefire was later declared, India made it unequivocally clear that any future terrorist attack in Kashmir will be treated as an act of war by Pakistan, not merely the work of non-state actors. This declaration has changed the strategic calculus. Notably, the Baloch people expressed disappointment with the ceasefire. During the conflict, Pakistan reportedly lost several airbases, and a continuation of hostilities might have further eroded its military presence, particularly in Baluchistan. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) escalated its operations during this period, striking military targets with increased intensity. However, following the ceasefire, the Pakistani state has launched a brutal crackdown in Baluchistan, branding nationalists and secular Baloch fighters as “Fitnat’ul-Hindustan”-alleged collaborators with India.
In this context, a fundamental overhaul of India’s national security doctrine is imperative. Drawing inspiration from nations such as Israel, India must adopt a strategy of decisive and proportionate retaliation. This should involve direct targeting of military assets-such as bases, ammunition depots, and airfields housing strike aircraft-rather than merely degrading infrastructure with limited operational impact.
Concurrently, India must deepen its engagement with Afghanistan, particularly under the Taliban regime, by investing in education, healthcare, energy, telecom, and infrastructure sectors-including the strategic Kabul dam project, which can significantly influence Pakistan’s downstream water security. Robust ties with Kabul would serve as a counterweight to Pakistan’s regional influence. It is important to note that the Baloch nation has maintained friendly relations with Afghanistan for centuries. The Baloch population in Afghanistan’s Neemroz Province has also suffered under Pakistan’s brutality.
India should also consider supporting Baloch freedom fighters who uphold secular, democratic principles and who could serve as natural allies in counterbalancing Pakistan’s internal cohesion. Diplomatic and discreet moral-political support-within international legal frameworks-can multiply pressure on Pakistan, especially during future escalations.
In parallel, a long-term, calibrated strategy to reclaim Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) must be pursued. This should not be a single offensive, but a phased operation synchronized with internal destabilization within Pakistan. Every act of Pakistani aggression must trigger a calculated and proportional counter-response aimed at dismantling Pakistan’s grip over POK and its support for terror networks.
Finally, in the event of any future large-scale conflict, India should remain strategically poised to enable Baloch nationalists to revive their demand for self-determination. With Pakistan’s military likely to be stretched across multiple fronts, support for a Baloch liberation movement-executed with ethical responsibility and geopolitical awareness-could serve as a force multiplier, degrading Pakistan’s capacity for continued proxy aggression.
Most Important, Indus Water Treaty (IWT), which has to be discarded once for all and build multiple dams in Afghanistan first Kabul Dam, It is baseless the some Pakistani analysts and even some anti-BJP Indian journalists, believe that India is technically unable to fully block water during the monsoon season, given the massive volume and the structural limitations of the existing dam systems. It is important to note that after the Uri and Pulwama attacks as well, India had publicly declared its intention to stop the flow of water to Pakistan (in 2018). However, as of 2025, India has still not succeeded in doing so in a comprehensive manner.
Nevertheless, India does possess the ability to manipulate water flows in a manner that can cause significant agricultural damage to Pakistan. For example, Pakistan’s rice crops, which are planted in May and June, are highly dependent on consistent water supply during these months. By emptying Indian dams (decanting) before mid-April and releasing large volumes of water toward Pakistan, India could flood Pakistan’s fields, damaging wheat crops just before harvest. Subsequently, by withholding water from May to mid-July, India could severely impact the cultivation of rice and vegetables, inflicting a major blow to Pakistan’s food security and economy.
During this period, Indian dams would refill naturally with monsoon rains. Then, by releasing sudden, unannounced floods in late July or August, India could cause further infrastructure destruction across Pakistan. Finally, by decanting dams again by October and minimizing water release through February and March, Pakistan’s wheat and vegetable crops could be critically harmed during their next cycle.
This strategy is both technically feasible and could deliver serious strategic advantages. It is therefore recommended that Indian policymakers consult with civil engineers, hydrologists, and agricultural experts to thoroughly evaluate and refine such options, if deemed necessary for national interest.
Such strategies could inflict significant economic damage and food insecurity in Pakistan without violating the letter of the IWT. However, they should be carefully studied and, if deemed necessary, implemented with precision. Civil engineers, hydrologists, and agricultural experts should be consulted to ensure legality, effectiveness, and environmental safety.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor against Pakistan-backed terrorists and the subsequent escalation with the Pakistan Army, it is imperative that India’s national security doctrine evolves to effectively address the nature of contemporary threats. Passive diplomacy and reactive counterterrorism measures are no longer adequate. India must adopt bold, integrated strategies-militarily, territorially, and economically-to disincentivize Pakistan’s continued reliance on terrorism and compel a fundamental recalibration of its strategic behaviour.
By embracing decisive retaliation targeting Pakistan’s military installations, supporting Afghanistan’s stability and development, aiding the Baloch freedom fighters, pursuing the liberation of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), leveraging the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) as a strategic tool, and coordinating with Baloch nationalist movements and friendly Afghan elements, India can significantly shift the cost-benefit calculus for Pakistan. Such comprehensive measures will send an unequivocal message that India will no longer tolerate proxy warfare and terrorism as instruments of state policy.
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