Dr Kumar
The MiG-21 not only earned its reputation by shooting down advanced US-built fighters, such as Pakistan’s F-104 in 1971 and an F-16 in 2019, but its very entry into the Indian Air Force marked a watershed moment, fundamentally altering the course of India’s military strategy and aerial capabilities. It was the moment when Washington’s dominance over India’s military supply lines began to weaken, and Moscow emerged as the mainstay of India’s defence requirements.
The background lay in Washington’s strategic decision to arm Pakistan as part of its broader Cold War plans. In February 1954, the United States agreed in principle to provide military assistance to Pakistan, and by May that year, the two countries formally signed a Mutual Defence Agreement. Subsequently, Pakistan became a member of US-led alliances, SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955, which ensured continuous American military aid under the framework of these security pacts. This opened the door for Pakistan to receive advanced aircraft like the F-86 Sabre and, eventually, the supersonic F-104 Star fighter, along with B-57 Canberras. These aircraft were supplied on extremely favourable terms, if not free, as part of security assistance. Dennis Kux, in The United States and Pakistan, has pointed out how American policymakers viewed Pakistan as a reliable partner for containing the Soviet Union, even though this directly tilted the military balance in South Asia.
For India, the experience was starkly different. To modernise the IAF, New Delhi had to spend hard currency on costly imports from Britain, France, and Canada. Aircraft like the Hawker Hunter, Dassault Mystère, and the English Electric Canberra were acquired, but every purchase strained India’s limited foreign exchange reserves. By 1957, defence spending had climbed to 2.5 percent of GDP for the first time, triggering alarm at the Reserve Bank of India and among Western lenders.
It was in this environment that Prime Minister Nehru brought in V.K. Krishna Menon as Defence Minister in 1957. Menon was widely regarded as one of Nehru’s closest and most controversial lieutenants, with a reputation for being anti-Western. Instead of relying on continued imports, India’s defence policy in this era prioritised the strategic necessity of building domestic capability. The guiding principle became the transfer of technology and developing local production as the foundation for defence procurement, ensuring long-term national security could rest on self-reliance rather than dependence on foreign suppliers, thereby saving the depleting foreign exchange. This approach shaped major negotiations and policy decisions in the late 1950s and beyond.
The demand for supersonic fighters brought these issues to the forefront. Pakistan’s induction of the F-104 Star fighter, one of the most advanced jets of its time, compelled India to seek a counter. Delhi requested the same platform from Washington, but the request was rejected. As historian Tanvi Madan observes in Fateful Triangle, Washington’s calculus was shaped by its strategic embrace of Pakistan and its reluctance to dilute that by arming India in the same way. Similarly, India explored the possibility of acquiring the British Lightning, but London refused to part with production rights or permit licensed manufacture in India.
The Western reluctance created an opening for the Soviet Union. By the late 1950s, Moscow was keen to deepen relations with New Delhi, partly to offset American influence in South Asia. Unlike Britain or the United States, the Soviets were willing to go beyond simple sales. They offered the MiG-21, one of the most advanced fighters in their arsenal, along with a package for licensed production in India. This was extraordinary at the time, as even China, which had a closer ideological relationship with Moscow, had not been given such access to the MiG-21.
Negotiations unfolded against the backdrop of India’s fragile economy. The “Aid India Consortium”, comprising the US, Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the World Bank, had been assembled to assist India with its balance of payments. Nehru, therefore, was compelled to maintain a delicate balance: strengthening India’s defences without collapsing its economic programme. His December 1956 visit to Washington, accompanied by experts from the Planning Commission, underscored this tension. As declassified US records show, American policymakers saw India’s economic trajectory as a test case for whether democracy could deliver progress in Asia against the Communist model in China. Yet, they were unwilling to separate economic aid from political alignment in foreign policy.
Krishna Menon’s negotiations with Moscow culminated in a breakthrough. In August 1962, India signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for the supply of MiG-21s, beginning with 12 aircraft manufactured in the USSR, followed by licensed production at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. According to S.N. Singh’s analysis, this was the first time the Soviets had offered such a comprehensive transfer of technology for a frontline combat aircraft. Graham’s study of Soviet-Indian relations noted that the Kremlin viewed this as a strategic investment, ensuring that India’s defence industrial base would become tied to Soviet systems for the foreseeable future. The first Indian-built MiG-21s began rolling out by the late 1960s, marking the start of what would become one of the most numerous fighter fleets in the IAF’s history.
The implications of the MiG-21 deal went far beyond the aircraft itself. Thomas, in his work on Indian defence policy, has argued that this agreement symbolised the beginning of India’s structural dependence on Soviet arms. In the years that followed, Moscow became the principal supplier of not only fighters, but also transport aircraft, tanks, artillery, and naval systems, including submarines. By the early 1970s, when India and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, the defence relationship had become one of the central pillars of their bilateral ties.
Nehru’s position, however, remained nuanced. He did not see the MiG-21 agreement as an ideological shift into the Soviet camp. His objective was to maintain balance, to avoid dependence on a single bloc while safeguarding India’s strategic autonomy. Yet, as Tanvi Madan has observed, balance was difficult to maintain in practice when one power-Washington-was committed to arming Pakistan, while the other-Moscow-was ready to underwrite India’s defence-industrial ambitions. In effect, choices made in Washington narrowed India’s options, while Soviet flexibility expanded them.
The MiG-21 thus became far more than just another acquisition. It represented the convergence of defence, diplomacy, and industrial policy at a moment when India faced both economic stress and external threats. It was the first major step toward building an indigenous aerospace industry, while also binding India’s armed forces to Soviet supply chains for decades to come. Later controversies about the aircraft’s safety record, or its eventual obsolescence, do not diminish the historical significance of its induction in 1962.
Looking back, the MiG-21 deal can be seen as a watershed. It was the point where India’s pursuit of self-reliance collided with Cold War geopolitics, producing an outcome that reshaped the country’s strategic orientation. It showed that defence procurement was not merely a technical or financial decision, but one embedded in the larger architecture of international relations. For India, the MiG-21 was both a symbol of aspiration, for technological independence, and a marker of dependence, anchoring New Delhi ever more deeply to Moscow’s defence complex.
(The author is a research scholar who has extensively researched the 1962 Sino-India conflict and the Cold War)
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