Managing LOC

Harsha Kakar
Of all the countries India shares is borders with, tensions remain with China and Pakistan. While the border with China has its own dynamicsof standoffs and differing border perceptions, there has however been no firing or casualties since the border talks commenced. Population wise the border areas with China are thinly inhabited and remote, in addition to being climatically unsuitable (High altitude to extreme high altitude).
The border with Pakistan on the other hand, includes rich agricultural terrain. Therefore the population density along the border on both sides is generally high. In addition, in many areas, partition and the subsequent war of 1947-48 only created a line, but did not divide the local populace. The division of the people was the result of Government actions of sealing the borders, wars, firing and sowed hatredby both sides. Firing has always directly affected the population residing along the border.
This month the Border Security Force Director General hosted his Pakistani counterpart, the Ranger Chief for talks to reduce incidents of cease fire violations. During this visit, a slew of confidence building measures along the International Border (IB), were agreed upon and inked. This has seen an improvement in the situation along the IB, manned by the BSF and the Rangers. It should hopefully continue for some time, thus bringing succour to the populace.
The same has not been the case along the Line of Control (LOC), which is manned by the army on both sides. Here the intensity of firing has always remained high. It always creates a sense of insecurity amongst the villagers residing close to the border. The home minister on his visit to the state last week also mentioned that plans are afoot to create security bunkers for those villages, which are located close to the LOC. This would provide them with protection, whenever firing intensifies.
The strategy adopted by both countries in dealing with cross border firing is at a variance. India presently adheres to the cease fire agreement of 2003. Hence itdoes not initiate firing nor target Pakistani villages first. It retaliates to Pakistan’s aggression and responds in a similar manner on similar nature of targets. Pakistan on the other hand, continues to adhere to its 1965 strategy of pushing in terrorists to ignite the Valley and simultaneously target security forces. Targeting security forces has a dual purpose; firstly it affects morale and secondly it causes them to occasionally retaliate indiscriminately thus leading to civilian casualties and inflaming the local populace. This is then exploited by Pakistani media.
The ceasefire agreement of 2003 came into effect in Nov that year. Earlier in that year, there was an increased crescendo of firing along the LOC. In addition, Pakistan was hosting the SAARC summit in Jan 2004, and did not want it to be dominated by events along the LOC. The agreement was thus proposed by Pakistan for a specific and selfish purpose. However, it was logically sound and could be still beneficial, if strictly adhered to by both sides.
In Oct last year, when firing along the LOC and the Jammu border was on the increase, India enhanced its levels of retaliation. This sudden violent reaction by India shocked the Government and military of Pakistan. They would have expected something different with the change in Government at the centre, but it was far more intense. The complete freedom of retaliation given to the BSF and the army enabled them to fire and target at will. It forced Pakistan to put a clamp down on news on casualties at their end, to save face, though unofficially the casualty figures were known to be high. It also did cause immense hardships to the local population on both sides who had to leave their villages and seek shelter in rear areas.
This year, till now the Indian army has shown immense restraint and avoided escalation. It has only responded in a controlled manner.A Brigadier level flag meeting to defuse the tension along the LOC in the Poonch Sector was held last week. This is likely to have only a limited impact on the firing. With winters around the corner, and Pakistan aiming to push (as per intelligence reports) over 300 waiting militants across, firing has to recommence. Though most attempts to push in militants would be in the valley area, desperate measures south of the PirPanjal are also possible. Therefore in all probability it would soon be status quo ante.
The next SAARC summit is scheduled in 2016, the firm dates for the same have yet to be announced. Like the summit in 2004, the Pakistan government would aim to make it a historical one, with active participation of all members and a stable local environment. It would not desire the summit is dominated by events along the LOC. Therefore it would begin to take steps to deescalate the situation along the border as the summit dates are announced and draw close.
Therefore India would need to reconsider its immediate short term strategy for dealing with Pakistan’s proposed misadventures. With approaching winters and waiting militants, we would need to take a decision of either adhering to the ceasefire agreement of 2003 or hitting back hard as we did in Oct last year. We have limited time to enforce ourmilitary powerand force them to react and ask for a ceasefire or alternatively let them act and we react to their attempted misadventures. Both options have their advantages, disadvantages and impact on the local populace, but considering long term goals, a decision needs to be taken and implemented.
(The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com

Follow our WhatsApp channel