India’s Red Line On IWT

Union Power Minister M.L. Khattar’s visit to J&K, marked by firm deadlines for key hydroelectric projects and his blunt assertion that Pakistan has “no locus standi” in how India utilises its rivers, represents a watershed moment in India’s water and energy policy. What might earlier have been dismissed as routine project monitoring has now acquired strategic significance, underlining a decisive shift in India’s approach to the Indus Waters Treaty and the utilisation of its western rivers. For over six decades, the IWT has shaped India’s water policy with Pakistan, heavily constraining the upper riparian state. Despite being the source country for the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, India agreed in 1960 to allocate nearly 80 per cent of their waters to Pakistan-one of the most generous water-sharing arrangements in the world. Even as Pakistan repeatedly raised objections to Indian hydropower projects, internationalised disputes, and simultaneously sponsored cross-border terrorism, India largely adhered to both the letter and spirit of the treaty. That era is now over.
The Government’s decision to keep the IWT in abeyance following persistent terror attacks has fundamentally altered the strategic calculus. Water is no longer treated as a purely technical or diplomatic issue; it is now firmly embedded in India’s national security and development framework. Khattar’s unequivocal statement that Pakistan has no role in questioning Indian projects sends an unambiguous signal: India will exercise full sovereignty over its natural resources, especially when treaty obligations are rendered untenable by sustained hostility. The renewed push for hydropower development in J&K lies at the heart of this policy shift. Projects like Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwar (540 MW), Ratle (850 MW), and Sawalkote (1,856 MW) are not merely power-generation assets. They are instruments of economic self-reliance, regional stability, and strategic leverage. By setting clear deadlines-December 2026 for Pakal Dul and Kiru and March 2028 for Kwar-Khattar has signalled that delays caused by indecision, external pressure, or bureaucratic inertia will no longer be tolerated.
Hydropower is particularly vital for J&K. Despite hosting some of the country’s most powerful river systems, the Union Territory has long faced power shortages and revenue losses due to underutilisation of its hydro potential. Fast-tracking these projects promises clean energy, local employment, improved infrastructure, and sustained economic growth. At the national level, these projects strengthen India’s renewable energy portfolio at a time when energy security and climate commitments are converging priorities.
Equally important is the strategic message embedded in India’s actions. The closure of gates at Salal Dam and the temporary regulation of Chenab flows last year demonstrated, for the first time, India’s ability and willingness to operationalise its rights. These were not acts of coercion but statements of capability. They underscored that water, like trade or transit, is a legitimate instrument of statecraft when national interests are repeatedly undermined.
Pakistan’s dependence on rivers originating in India is an undeniable reality. While India has no obligation-legal or moral-to deprive downstream populations of water arbitrarily, it is equally not bound to perpetuate a system of unilateral restraint. Khattar’s assertion reflects this balance: India will utilise its rivers optimally for its people, within its sovereign domain, without seeking approval or validation from a hostile neighbour. The broader water strategy now unfolding reinforces this approach. The revival of the Tulbul Navigation Project, desiltation of reservoirs like Salal and Baglihar, and proposals to divert surplus waters to Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan through new canal networks reflect a comprehensive attempt to ensure that no drop of water is wasted. These initiatives aim to address irrigation stress, drinking water shortages, flood control, and navigation-transforming rivers from sources of dispute into engines of development.
New Delhi has made it clear that normal cooperation cannot coexist with sustained terrorism. “Water and blood cannot flow together” is no longer rhetoric; it is policy. By rejecting the jurisdiction of questionable international arbitration mechanisms and asserting its right to recalibrate obligations, India is redefining the terms of engagement. Khattar’s visit, words, and deadlines thus mark more than administrative resolve. They reflect a confident India shedding strategic diffidence, aligning water policy with national interest, and reclaiming control over its rivers.