By PiotrOpaliński
In mid-May, the foreign ministers of India and Afghanistan had a phone conversation, among other things, about the terrorist attack in Kashmir. This was perceived as a signal of Delhi’s pragmatic approach to the Taliban government and readiness for selective cooperation. Time will tell whether it is a temporary diplomatic maneuver or the beginning of a new chapter in bilateral relations based on strategic interests.
On May 15, India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, had a phone conversation with Afghanistan’s acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi. He thanked Kabul for condemning the terrorist attack in Pahalgam and for not accepting Pakistan’s narrative about tensions in Afghan-Indian relations. The conversation also touched on issues of economic, visa, and infrastructure cooperation, including the outline of further strengthening trade and transport links between India and Afghanistan through Iran’s port of Chabahar—bypassing Pakistani territory.
Although this contact does not mean formal recognition of the Taliban government by India, it is a clear signal of growing pragmatism in New Delhi’s approach to Afghanistan’s political reality. The importance of this dialogue is further emphasized by unofficial reports of an earlier visit by Mullah Muhammad Ibrahim Sadr—the influential deputy minister of interior affairs for security—to India’s capital. According to an anonymous source in Kabul, this visit took place in the first week of May, during serious Indian-Pakistani tensions after the attack in Kashmir. In this context, the possible tightening of Delhi’s contacts with selected Taliban factions takes on a strategic dimension.
Internal tensions
India, long perceiving Pakistan as the main source of regional destabilization, seeks to limit its influence in Afghanistan. The contemporary Taliban movement is not a uniform structure—internal factions differ both in their stance towards Islamabad and their approach to cooperation with external actors. Mullah Ibrahim Sadr, seen as a representative of the more independent Taliban wing, maintaining close contacts with Iran, is known for his cautious or even hostile attitude towards Pakistani interests. In the eyes of Indian strategists, he is seen as a potential partner in the policy of limiting operational space for terrorist groups linked to Pakistan.
For India, one of the security priorities remains to curb the smuggling of fighters across the Afghan border, especially in the context of the situation in Kashmir. Mullah Sadr, responsible for internal security in the Taliban government, is considered a key decision-maker who can influence the control of smuggling routes and the movement of armed groups. Closer ties with the more autonomous Taliban faction could bring India tangible benefits in this regard—even if the cooperation were to remain informal and behind the scenes.
Trade and economy
An important topic of Jaishankar’s conversation with Muttaqi was the possibilities of developing transport infrastructure to strengthen Indian-Afghan economic and trade cooperation. Of particular importance is India’s involvement in the development of the port of Chabahar in Iran, which not only allows them access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan but also serves as a strategic tool for limiting Chinese influence.
Reports of Sadr’s visit may indicate that Kabul is interested in further developing this infrastructure. This would be beneficial both for the Afghan economy and for India’s strategic positioning in the region.
Strategic triangle against China
The observed trend of tightening contacts between India, Iran, and selected Taliban factions indicates the possibility of forming an informal alliance aimed at balancing the Pakistan-China axis.
Iran, maintaining an extensive network of ties in Afghanistan, especially with Shiite minorities and factions hostile to ISIL, can serve as a geostrategic link that binds this configuration. However, Iran’s policy—burdened by sanctions and tensions around the nuclear program—requires India to maintain great flexibility and caution.
It is also impossible to ignore the growing role of China in the region. Beijing, through the CPEC project and economic presence in Afghanistan, is intensifying its presence in the region, perceiving a possible rapprochement between India, Kabul, and Tehran as a threat to its own interests. India, not being part of the Belt and Road Initiative, seeks alternative routes and partnerships. If cooperation with Afghanistan and Iran gains durability, it could result in a deeper reformatting of the balance of power in South and Central Asia.
limitations
Despite signs of pragmatic rapprochement, Delhi has yet to formally recognize the Taliban government. India is gradually opening communication channels—including the functioning of the consular representation in Mumbai and ministerial-level talks—but this process is fraught with numerous risks. Ideological differences, still vivid ties of some Taliban factions with Pakistani intelligence, and the presence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan make any rapprochement need to be carefully calibrated.—INFA
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