Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Much of Pakistan’s future India policy through 2017 will be based upon what transpired in 2016. Short term assessments are usually dangerous and trends become unpredictable but risk based assessment is still essential. 2016 was a year which saw Pakistan’s confidence lift a couple of notches. 2015 had carried the morbidity of the year end. Army Public School attack and a renewed resolve had emerged to go after the Pakistan focused terror organisations. Pakistan also then enjoyed the priority patronage of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, at least till Aug 2015 or so. In 2016 some happenings drastically changed things both from a negative and positive angle for Pakistan.
First, on the positive side, Pakistan appeared to have turned the tide against terror after almost nine years. The number of terror related incidents reduced drastically and the security agencies achieved a semblance of control over Karachi. Rogue terror groups were targeted and their leaderships eliminated. Second, Pakistan’s control over the Afghan Taliban diluted considerably; it could not prevent the spring offensive for the second consecutive year although news of Taliban operations did not emerge in international media. Third,the relationship with President Ashraf Ghani deteriorated leading to the kind of remarks the latter was willing to make at the Heart of Asia Conference at Amritsar in early Dec 2016. Fourth, the relationship with China continued to flower with the CPEC becoming the main hinge on which the strategic relationship now appeared to rest. Pakistan’s national confidence appeared to receive a boost. Fifth, the US control over Pakistan in President Obama’s last year as President appeared to reach a nadir as much as the surprise element of Russia’s overtures to Islamabad took observers by surprise. The sixth and the most important action was Pakistan’s decision to change priorities after Jul 2016 and concentrate on J&K among its various national security options. Burhan Wani’s killing may or may not have had a Pakistani hand but the situation thereafter surely did.
Pakistan’ military leadership probably felt that such a moment could not be allowed to pass. With J&K receiving full attention a diplomatic offensive was launched in the UN and all over major and minor capitals of the world. Using the old tack of home grown terrorists attacking defence installations in Kashmir Pakistan denied its own hand in the Uri terror attack and continued that game of denial even as surgical strikes were launched by India to target terror camps and launch pads. The ceasefire of 2003 almost ceased to exist even as street turbulence and vigilantism continued through four months with an enhanced element of fervour being displayed by the mosques in the Valley.
In end Nov 2016 the Pakistan Army Chief, Gen Raheel Sharif retired and was replaced by Gen Qamar Bajwa. The LoC went quiet even as Bajwa visited his erstwhile command, Pakistan’s 10 Corps which looks after PoK. The streets of Kashmir had already seen return of order and stability progressively through Nov 2016 once the seat of government shifted to Jammu. Strangely the Hurriyat also reportedly changed strategy inviting tourists to Kashmir and pilgrims to all religious sites in J&K and placing greater controls over its own calendar. The silence in the Valley is only an ominous one because it’s yet uncertain whether it has emerged due to running out of stamina or a deliberate understanding that violence in the streets would not budge Indian authorities.
So what could 2017 be like in terms of India Pakistan relations with special reference to J&K? Clearly among factors which dictate relations between estranged nations are the strategic environment, the immediate past, personalities at the helm, perceivedstrengths and weaknesses and payoffs from likely actions.
The strategic environment of 2017 is yet highly unpredictable with the onset of the Trump Administration, Donald Trump’s personal lack of experience and his probable dependence on a clutch of high level ex military men as advisers. The start point is Afghanistan where Trump may be advised to continue US engagement for some more time to prevent the Taliban making greater progress. That automatically involves greater cooperative commitments from Pakistan the key state which shares a boundary with Afghanistan and has some influence (although just marginal) over the Taliban. Recent reports suggest a Russia-China-Pakistan axis to work on accommodating Taliban as a tool against expansion of ISIS post the Aleppo-Raqqa-Mosul situation. Ignoring India and the US may well spur the US to pursue its interests and maintain or even enhance its presence in Afghanistan. If big power rivalry over the future of Afghanistan becomes a stronger realty through 2017 it could see Pakistan more intensely involved there. When that happens the degree of focus towards J&K dilutes. In the priority of things Afghanistan and the Taliban definitely score over J&K and the Hurriyat which can wait for appropriate times; strangely Pakistan too is aware that the Indian authorities will not get their act together in terms of placating and stabilising Kashmir. If this be the scenario Kashmir may see some stability and less Pakistani energy focused towards it.
Pakistan is also acutely aware that 2016 was a year which involved greater risk in its ‘war by thousand cuts’ with India. PM Modi’s utterances on Baluchistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, PoK and the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) would also have sent signals of increasing threats to India’s level of tolerance which is now under strain. The surgical strikes, bigger fire assaults and the increasing criticism against the Indian Army’s rear area security, all enhanced the risks. Pakistan would have the choice to spread itself thin through simultaneous focus on J&K and Afghanistan or pursue a more proactive policy towards Afghanistan in conjunction with China and Russia to keep Indian and US influence under control; interests in J&K could be pended with the presumption that not much may change and a policy of minimum action to keep the pot boiling may meet its requirement through the year.
The question is how much influence do Pakistan and the Hurriyat actually exercise? That remains the moot point because the new diffused leadership could just decide to resume where it left off in Nov 2016. In that case Pakistan would have little option but to grudgingly support and accept the risk. The latter could be calibrated by lowering the intensity of its actions and the utterances from time to time.
Gen Bajwa’s first 30 days being quiet gives no indication of the approach he would like to follow. He can choose to bide his time till better opportunities arise, look for one or two mid profile actions which may not risk escalation or he could just reverse policy and do what Musharaf did in Nov 2003; start lowering the temperature and create conditions for a long drawn engagement in a peace process. From the indicators available the latter is the least likely because in Pakistan’s strategic circles there appears a perception that the investment of 27 years in J&K may just be entering its pay off stage. A misreading of this kind is likely to be the cause of missing the opportunity and creating conditions for giving any kind of confidence to India that dialogue could be an option again.
For India the public pressure to no longer absorb but rather respond in kind or even proactively take military action has increased manifold. Fortunately the political leadership remains extremely mindful of its larger responsibility and will not act brashly unless absolutely driven against the wall. 2017, therefore can at best be assessed to be a lower profile year than 2016 with little chance of resumption of any dialogue with Pakistan. Temperatures at the LoC will remain low unless provoked by another terror act from Pakistan’s soil. The Valley’s diluted stamina may not allow a full throated agitation but terror acts will continue especially against convoys. One or two acts of terror in Jammu region will necessarily take place to keep an attempted balance north and south of the Pir Panjal.
The alliance of PDP and BJP is likely to receive a reprieve in terms of time. It must act quickly to curb corruption, enhance accountability and provide governance which will make some positive difference to the lives of the people. If this period is counted as a window in being it must be exploited to the hilt in political outreach both in Jammu and the Valley. Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has the ability to be uncomfortable while attempting to make others comfortable. This is what she must aim to do through winter to get back that trust which people had in her. It’s been difficult stewardship of the CM’s office but there is enough time to recover and get the act together.
(The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies)
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