B S DARA
As the daughter of Bangabandhu flees to India for safety, Pakistan’s political class applauds her fall, conveniently forgetting its own role in the 1971 genocide. India now confronts a volatile neighbour, a humanitarian dilemma, and a revived battle over historical truth.
Bangladesh today finds itself in the middle of one of the gravest political breakdowns since its birth in 1971. The dramatic conviction of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the death sentence imposed by the military-backed interim government has triggered one of the most serious political crises in South Asia in recent years. At the time of writing, Sheikh Hasina remains inside India under state protection, having fled Bangladesh amidst violent unrest, arson, and street killings that claimed thousands of lives. New Delhi now faces an uncomfortable diplomatic question of how to respond to calls for her extradition without compromising its long-standing security partnership with Dhaka and its own moral and strategic posture in the region.
To understand the current moment, one must revisit the historical roots of Bangladesh’s creation, Hasina’s political rise, and the decades of ties that link India and Bangladesh. It also requires acknowledging Pakistan’s reaction today, one steeped in selective memory and political opportunism. Islamabad’s political class has responded to Hasina’s downfall with unusual enthusiasm, painting her ouster as the “rightful course correction” for Bangladesh. This rhetoric ignores the basic historical truth that Pakistan’s military created the Bangladesh crisis through mass killings, political repression, and a refusal to honour a democratic mandate in 1971. The same forces now offering political commentary were responsible for the tragedy that gave birth to Bangladesh.
The story of Bangladesh begins with a violent political rupture. In 1971, after winning a clear democratic majority, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League were denied the right to form a government by Pakistan’s military leadership. What followed was one of the worst episodes of state-sponsored violence in South Asian history. The Pakistan Army launched “Operation Searchlight,” resulting in mass killings, systematic persecution, and the displacement of millions. Ten million refugees entered India, creating pressure on Indian resources, security, and society.
India’s military intervention in December 1971 was therefore not an act of expansionism, as some Pakistani commentators continue to claim even today. It was a response to a humanitarian disaster and to a neighbouring army that had rejected democracy. Pakistan surrendered in Dhaka on 16 December 1971, and Bangladesh was born. Mujibur Rahman, known as Bangabandhu, became the nation’s founding leader. India’s role, morally and militarily, cemented a long-lasting relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka.
Pakistan’s establishment, however, has never fully accepted this historical reality. The current celebration within sections of Pakistan’s political and media circles over Hasina’s conviction and exile echoes this unresolved past. The same political voices that refuse to acknowledge the military’s actions in 1971 now position themselves as commentators on Bangladesh’s democracy.
The international reaction during 1971 also remains relevant today. The United States, under President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, prioritised Cold War strategic goals and supported Pakistan. The now-declassified “Blood Telegram” stands as a rare example of American diplomats openly criticising their own government’s silence on the atrocities. India faced diplomatic pressure, including the U.S. naval deployment to the Bay of Bengal. This history still shapes regional perceptions about external interventions and the fragility of political transitions in South Asia.
Sheikh Hasina’s political journey has been deeply shaped by personal tragedy. In August 1975, her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, her mother, three brothers, and several relatives were assassinated in a military coup. Hasina and her sister were abroad at the time and survived. She spent years in exile before returning to Bangladesh, rising through the Awami League ranks, and eventually becoming Prime Minister in 1996.
Her subsequent years in power, particularly the long tenure from 2009 to 2024, transformed Bangladesh’s economic profile. The country moved from low-income to near middle-income status. Infrastructure projects, social welfare schemes, women’s education drives, and counterterrorism operations reshaped the state. She cracked down on extremist groups and ensured that northeastern India no longer faced insurgent threats from Bangladeshi territory.
For India, Hasina became the most dependable partner Bangladesh had offered since 1971. Her government signed key agreements with India on border management, land boundary finalisation, energy sharing, and trade connectivity. Issues like the Teesta water-sharing accord remained unresolved, but overall relations remained stable and cooperative. India trusted the Awami League to maintain a secular and friendly Bangladesh.
Hasina’s stance towards Pakistan remained firm. She repeatedly asked Islamabad to apologise for the events of 1971. Bangladesh’s war crimes tribunal, which prosecuted several collaborators, was heavily criticised in Pakistan but supported by large sections of Bangladeshi society. All this made Hasina an uncomfortable figure for those in Pakistan who still view Bangladesh’s liberation as a political humiliation rather than a historic correction.
The unrest leading to Hasina’s fall stemmed from economic pressures, allegations of authoritarianism, and anger among the youth. Protests escalated into widespread violence. Buildings were torched, police stations attacked, and clashes turned deadly. With the situation collapsing, the military stepped in and announced a transitional arrangement.
Fearing arrest or assassination, an unfortunate pattern in Bangladeshi political history, Hasina left Dhaka and sought refuge in India. New Delhi allowed her entry on humanitarian grounds. Soon after, the interim government conducted a trial criticised for procedural flaws and sentenced her to death. Bangladesh is now preparing an extradition request.
This has placed India in an extremely delicate diplomatic situation.
India and Bangladesh have an extradition treaty, but it allows exceptions in cases of political persecution, unfair trials, or exposure to capital punishment. International norms also restrict extradition where the accused faces the death penalty without assurances of commutation.
In Hasina’s case, experts across the world have raised concerns about the credibility of the trial. For India, the decision is not merely legal. It involves protecting a long-time partner, preventing extremist groups from regaining space in Bangladesh, preserving security in the Northeast, and ensuring that anti-India sentiment is not exploited by political factions in Dhaka or by Pakistan.
India is expected to take a cautious path: offering humanitarian protection to Hasina until political conditions stabilise; communicating clearly that extradition cannot proceed under current circumstances; engaging diplomatically with Dhaka to maintain bilateral cooperation; and encouraging a credible political roadmap that restores civil rights and elections. New Delhi will not publicly confront Dhaka, but it is unlikely to hand Hasina over to a government that cannot guarantee her safety or a fair trial.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s reaction to Hasina’s downfall reveals more about its own insecurities than about Bangladesh’s internal crisis. The Pakistani establishment has historically viewed the Awami League with suspicion due to its stance on 1971. Some political voices in Pakistan have described Hasina’s ouster as a “correction,” a view that India rejects given its own memory of the events that created Bangladesh.
Western countries have expressed concern about the trial and the violence that preceded it. Human rights bodies have flagged due process violations. China has maintained a neutral stance, focusing on stability and protection of its investments.
Hasina’s political future now depends on whether Bangladesh’s transition stabilises or fractures further. If the interim arrangement fails, her political support, especially among rural communities, may revive. International questioning of her trial will strengthen India’s case for protecting her. South Asia has often witnessed leaders returning from exile when political tides change, and Hasina may follow a similar path if conditions shift in Dhaka.
For now, India remains her safest home. As long as India hosts her, Hasina remains beyond the reach of Bangladeshi authorities. New Delhi is unlikely to extradite her without guarantees that meet international standards, which currently do not exist.
From India’s perspective, Hasina has been a steady and dependable partner. Her sudden downfall, followed by a death sentence, is not merely a political event in Bangladesh. It directly affects India’s strategic neighbourhood, border security, and long-term regional stability.
India will likely uphold humanitarian principles and resist pressure to extradite her under present circumstances. At the same time, India will avoid overt confrontation with the new leadership in Dhaka while working quietly to steer Bangladesh back toward democratic order.
The crisis has revived old wounds and exposed old truths. South Asia must choose between repeating its past or learning from it. This is a moment of caution, patience, and careful diplomacy for India. The decisions taken in the coming weeks will influence the trajectory of India–Bangladesh relations for years to come.
As an independent Indian foreign affairs observer, one can only hope that the region chooses stability over revenge, legality over haste, and cooperation over conflict, values that shaped the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 and must guide its future.
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