Maj Gen Sanjeev Dogra (Retd)
In the epic Mahabharata, warfare was never just physical; it was deeply psychological. On the 13th day of the Kurukshetra war, Arjuna’s vow to slay Jayadratha before sunset seemed destined to fail. But Krishna, master strategist and charioteer, created the illusion of an eclipse. Jayadratha, believing the day was done, emerged from hiding-only to face Arjuna’s arrow as Krishna dispelled the illusion. This was not mere trickery; it was strategic perception management-a masterstroke in timing, anticipation, and controlled messaging.
But Krishna’s greatest narrative act wasn’t against the enemy. It was the transformation of Arjuna. Faced with the moral crisis of fighting his kin, Arjuna’s will to fight dissolved. Krishna, offering no new weapon, delivered the Gita-a philosophical and psychological reawakening. Through clarity, purpose, and moral realignment, Krishna revived the warrior’s spirit. This was narrative warfare at its purest: the power to reshape reality through conviction and coherence.
These twin episodes from the Mahabharata illustrate that the true battlefield lies in the mind. In today’s world, this lesson is not ancient-it is urgent. Modern wars begin not with gunfire, but with competing stories. Whether in media rooms, Twitter threads, or encrypted chats, the first casualty is not truth-it is trust.
During Operation Sindoor, as UAVs loitered silently above contested terrain, an even louder war raged online. Fake casualty lists, AI-generated explosion videos, and exaggerated claims flooded social media. In homes, markets, and offices, people grappled with uncertainty. In the absence of a single authoritative narrative, rumor outran reason. As Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan later noted, up to 15% of the armed forces’ time was spent countering misinformation. “Our strategy was deliberate,” he said. “We chose to be measured, not reactive, because misinformation can distort public perception during high-stakes operations.”
In the early days of the operation, the communication strategy remained measured and focused, as senior military leadership was deeply engaged in operational execution. Public communication took time to consolidate, and the Directorate Generals of Military Operations only addressed the media after the initial surge of misinformation had already gained traction. The challenge was not one of effort-it reflected a natural prioritization of operational execution over narrative coordination. However, what emerged clearly was the need for stronger narrative readiness-an essential complement to our strategic posture.
This was not a failure of technology, but a reminder that even the most advanced military operations must be matched with equally sophisticated narrative strategies. In an era where perception defines momentum, information must be viewed not merely as a support function but as a core enabler of strategic objectives. Narrative dominance is now a recognised component of full-spectrum national power-essential, not optional.
India does possess institutional tools in the information domain. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) coordinates the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA). The tri-services Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA) handles cyber threats. The Indian Army’s Information Warfare branch, created in 2019, integrates public information and psychological operations under the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy). These bodies are essential-but they remain operationally tactical.
Where India remains vulnerable is at the strategic level of civil-military coordination-especially in grey-zone scenarios like Operation Sindoor. There is no unified command to anticipate and shape a national narrative before the adversary defines one. What we lack is not willpower-but a cognitive architecture that fuses tactical assets with strategic foresight.
This vulnerability is amplified by the double-edged nature of social media. Once a platform of empowerment, it now enables both expression and manipulation. Troll farms, deepfakes, viral distortions, and psychological operations flood digital space. But if weaponized effectively, India’s digital citizenry, veterans, media professionals, and influencers can become the first line of narrative defense. We must nurture cyber-sentinels, train youth in digital literacy, and enable civil society to distinguish signal from noise. Mainstream media, in turn, must recognize that every word during conflict is an act of national consequence.
India must also invest in future generations. Schools and universities should introduce courses in digital discernment, behavioral media studies, and civic engagement through communication. Students must be taught not just how to read the news, but how to question it responsibly. Just as NCC and NSS build physical and social resilience, digital resilience training should become a part of youth development programs.
Other nations have institutionalized narrative control. The UK’s Government Communication Service ensures synchronized public messaging. Israel’s Public Diplomacy Directorate coordinates strategic messaging across military and civilian sectors. The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center counters disinformation with real-time interventions. China runs its cognitive operations through its Central Propaganda Department. Each of these reflects a clear truth: without command and coordination, even the truth falters.
India now needs its own framework-not to control freedom, but to secure it. We propose the creation of a National Information Coordination Authority (NICA)-a sovereign cognitive command designed to protect the nation’s narrative integrity. But NICA must not be a bureaucratic ornament. It must be a dynamic, battle-ready entity, functioning as the national nerve centre for perception management.
NICA should operate under the National Security Council Secretariat, drawing representation from the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Home, and Information & Broadcasting. Its structure must integrate AI analysts, OSINT experts, strategic communicators, linguists, behavioral scientists, military public affairs officers, and digital media professionals. NICA’s core functions would include:
* Real-time monitoring of sentiment trends, disinformation spikes, and adversarial cognitive campaigns
* Coordinated, multilingual dissemination of government narratives across media and digital channels
* Verification and pre-bunking units that release authentic narratives before false ones take hold
* An integrated cyber-sentinel program embedded in universities, think tanks, and civil society
* Close coordination with tech platforms for takedowns and digital hygiene
* Strategic drills and simulation-based training modules in information warfare for key stakeholders
* A national response framework to deploy spokespersons, expert panels, and digital explainers during crises
NICA must be proactive during calm and decisive during crisis. It should be the first source of reassurance, information, and national coherence during future operations, crises, and national emergencies. Importantly, NICA must be credibility-first. Like Yudhishthira, whose word was beyond doubt, the organization must earn public trust not by volume, but by accuracy, speed, and reliability.
Because in the age of hybrid conflict, what is believed can shape what is real. The wars of the future will not be won only on peaks or straits, but in screens, feeds, and minds. As Krishna shaped both illusion and insight to alter outcomes, so we too must craft a narrative doctrine that secures both facts and faith.
The next eclipse may not come from the sun, but from a deepfake. The next panic may not be from a siren, but from a viral lie. And the next war may not be against a nation, but against doubt itself.
To guard our borders, we need battalions. To guard our minds, we need coherence.NICA is not just a policy suggestion. It is a cognitive necessity, and perhaps our last untapped frontier of national defense.
(The author is a retired Army officer and an expert in Operations Research and Systems Analysis.)
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