Brig Pankaj Chib (Retd)
In response to Indian Operation Sindoor, Pak named its operation as Operation Bunyan Marsoos, a Quaranic verse which finds mention in Surah As-saff (Chapter 61) verse 4. This verse symbolizes unity, strength and unity among the Believers. This operation was named on 10 May 25 and within hours, Pakistan claimed swift victory even though it suffered defeat specially after Indian strikes on night intervening 09-10 May and morning 10 May which made its majority of airbases nonoperational. To buttress this self-claimed victory, it forced its polity to promote its Army Chief to the rank of Field Marshal thereby clearly indicating that it is not the Pak Army which has been politicized but it is Pak politics which has been militarized.
In response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine / Pro-active Strategy, Pak in 2009, commenced its Exercise Azm-e-Nau (New Resolve) to change its military posture / strategy and warfighting doctrine. During any such Exercises/wargames planned to rework its military strategy, Pakistan analyses India in great detail wherein it also assess Indian politico-military aims. During Ex Azm-e-Nau too Pakistan assessed Indian maximum and minimum politico-military aims as follows :-
Indian Minimum Politico-Military Aim. In this Pakistan military brass assessed that Indian offensive will aim to discredit Pak Armed Forces credibility (in the eyes of Pakistan Awam) by capturing sensitive spaces, denying Pakistan any space to launch a riposte and calling a ceasefire on its own.
Indian Maximum Politico- Military Aim Degradation of Pakistan’s military and economic infrastructure coupled with capture of maximum territory was categorized as Indian maximum politico-military aim.
It was during Exercise Azm-e-Nau that concept “Notion of Victory” was introduced by then Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani. This concept was simultaneously introduced in Pakistan National Defence University’s précison Operational Strategy as Chapter No 7. Some of the key points (reproduced verbatim) from this précis are:-
* Given operational parity and nuclear capability (between Indian and Pak), (Indo-Pak war) is likely to end up in stalemate with heavy losses to military and civilian targets. This is an important assertion as it has bearing on the notion of victory.
* The notion of victory in South Asian context is likely to be driven by perceptions; importance of gains and losses notwithstanding.
* Hysteria, hatred and psychological impulses would enhance space for media and information operations. The importance of perception management would be many folds.
* Perception of victory, built around war objectives and media would be key to construct the victory.
* While denying adversary her politico – military objectives also constitute notion of victory, the trouble is in precisely defining these objectives at first place. This approach also allows, unduly, constructing self – serving notion of victory
Since May 2011 when US, using stealth technology and probably ensuring situational awareness blackout, eliminated OBL deep inside Pakistan territory, Pak Army is very conscious of being “discredited” by India in any future conflict. A repeat in 2019 by IAF’s deep penetration strike exacerbated its vulnerability and since then Pakistan Army has realized that it has to implement Kayani’s Notion of Victory in any future conflict.
Guided by the framework of minimum and maximum aims and its broader military concept of the Notion of Victory as taught at NDU, Pakistan applied the same logic during Operation Bunyan Marsoos. It quickly concluded-based solely on its own perception-that India had failed to meet even its minimum goal (of discrediting Pakistan Armed Forces) and promptly declared itself the winner.
However, the satellite pictures released after Indian Operation Sindoor did confirm significant damage caused to terror and mil infrastructure located deep in Pakistan. It was at that time it started feeling the heat of India having achieved its minimum politico-military aim (of discrediting Pakistan Armed Forces) as formulated by them during Ex Azm-e-Nau. Pakistan Army felt that it was falling short of its narrative war to convince its domestic audience. Hence within ten days, it elevated Asim Munir as Field Marshal.
So it is very apparent that Pakistan’s self-declared victory during Operation Sindoor reflects a broader strategy i.e to control the narrative at home and abroad, even if the ground reality tells a different story. But this raises important question-how can a nation assess both its own success and even adversary’s failure not by what it has achieved, but by whether the adversary has fulfilled what it believes were the adversary’s goals-regardless of whether those goals were ever actually stated? And how long can such narratives hold if they are built more on perception than actual performance.
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