Neeraj Singh Manhas
The Indian Ocean has grown increasingly vital to China’s foreign trade and energy security. Years of strategic pressure from the US and India have exacerbated China’s dilemma in the Malacca Strait. China must develop a long-term, security-oriented Indian Ocean strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of all favourable and adverse conditions. To protect its legitimate rights and interests in the region, it should build an Indian Ocean fleet, expand its base networks, and share power peacefully with the US and India.
A decade of hegemonic glory followed the Soviet Union’s demise. Its frequent use of military forces in the Middle East and elsewhere has weakened its power in recent years. Conversely, China has grown to be the second largest economy, with steadily expanding overseas interests and naval power. The rise of China and the decline of US influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans will reshape the regional power structure. For regional peace and security, and also the openness of maritime routes, China must seize every opportunity to develop a protracted Indian Ocean strategy and prepare for closer security engagement.
China’s Malacca Dilemma
The Indian Ocean, the world’s third largest ocean, separates Asia, Oceania, Antarctica, and Africa, and accounts for roughly 20% of the world’s total ocean area. The Indian Ocean divides India, Pakistan, and Iran from Australia, Indonesia, and the Malay Peninsula. The Indian Ocean connects the Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean Seas. It is now the main link between Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. The Indian Ocean has year-round ports, deep and wide waters, and is navigable in all four seasons, making it one of the most developed and busiest waterways. The northern Indian Ocean, extending from the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca, is known as the “arc of Islam” and contains many conflict zones. Historically, any power that controlled the northern edge of the Eurasian continent could control the entire Indian Ocean and penetrate Eurasia’s “heartland.” So the Indian Ocean has long been a key strategic battleground for the world’s superpowers. Currently, no single power dominates this region.
The 1,080-kilometer-long, 25- to 115-meter-deep Malacca Strait has been shared by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia since 1945. It is the world’s longest and busiest international waterway, supporting roughly a quarter of global maritime trade. Currently, over 50,000 ships pass through the Strait annually, nearly 60% of them Chinese.
A blockage in the Strait of Malacca would pose a serious threat to China’s energy security. This has been China’s “Malacca Dilemma” for decades. China’s net oil imports and consumption have risen steadily since 1993. In 2009, China ranked third in global oil imports, accounting for 7.5% of global trade. In 2007, China became the world’s largest oil consumer, consuming 9.3% of global demand. Although China’s energy demand growth has slowed in recent years, it still consumes nearly a quarter of global energy and accounts for over half of global net growth.
The “Malacca Dilemma” has been exacerbated by the Strait’s geography, piracy, India’s increased naval power and “Look East” policy, and the continued presence of American military forces. This would force China to back down, according to an American researcher at National Defence University. For example, he claims the US could send 13-15 marine corps units to intercept 800 cargo ships bound for Chinese ports. Recognizing this potential scenario, the Chinese government has begun building land transport networks through Pakistan and Myanmar. However, trade routes and energy supplies in the Indian Ocean, particularly through the Malacca Strait, remain vital for China.
The US and India’s Strategic
As the Maritime Silk Road gains support from Indian Ocean nations, China is increasing its political and military presence in the region, alarming the US and India. India has so far declined China’s invitation to join the Maritime Silk Road.
India is a “superpower” among Southeast Asian nations and a natural contender for strategy implementation in the Indian Ocean. As India’s “special interests” in the Indian Ocean have evolved from coastal defence to zone control and finally to “distant ocean offensive,” India has been strengthening its military forces, particularly a blue-water navy, and establishing security mechanisms like the “Indian Ocean Naval Symposium,” of which China became a viewer in 2014 after six years of trying to join.
The United States and India have comparative strategic advantages over China in the Indian Ocean. George W. Bush improved US-India relations. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with President Barack Obama last week to discuss India’s role in counter-terrorism and how to limit China’s growing influence. So both countries have increased military cooperation by holding joint military exercises, signing arms sales agreements, and exchanging security data. China’s maritime lifeline in the Indian Ocean faces greater challenges now that both countries share the strategic goal of countering China’s rise, as evidenced by the emerging security arrangement between the US, Japan, Australia, and India (the “Quad”) and the latest US National Security Strategy Report.
A History of China’s Naval Build-up in the Indian Ocean
At a time when all regional countries urgently need funds and technologies to accelerate development, both India and the US acknowledge that they cannot match China’s growing strategic influence in the Indian Ocean. Aside from extending the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” China’s creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provides a more viable platform for financing infrastructure projects in Indian Ocean countries.
In addition, China has established “all-weather strategic partnerships” with Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar, Mozambique, and South Africa, as well as “strategic partnerships” to Sudan and Sri Lanka. As a result, China has begun to launch naval vessels in the Indian Ocean to secure trade routes and other purposes.
China’s recent efforts to expand its overseas naval bases have gotten international attention. Indeed, China has begun by improving commercial relations with countries like Pakistan and Cambodia along the Indian Ocean shipping lanes, usually by building new or renovating existing ports. These ports are owned and operated by Chinese companies. Host countries would make it possible Chinese naval ships to use their ports for supply and other operations.
Currently, China has built “pearl” ports along the Indian Ocean trade routes, including Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port, Myanmar’s Sittwe Port and Coco Islands, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, and Tanzania’s Bagamoyo Port. These actions have enraged India, which is wary of China’s growing political, economic, and naval presence in its neighbourhood. Moreover, since those ports are not official naval bases, India as well as other countries have little reason to protest.
Conclusion
To summarise, China’s massive involvement in the Indian Ocean will quietly reshape regional power relations. With the new “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative, China seeks a stronger political, economic, and military presence in the region to protect its legitimate rights and interests, as well as provide more security public goods for the region.
In light of the growing interests of rising powers and President Trump’s “America First” policy, the United States’ exclusive protection of freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean is no longer feasible. The Indian Ocean is not India’s “sphere of influence,” though India’s concerns and interests should be respected. For peace and neutralisation of all open seas in the Indian Ocean, China, the US, India and other naval powers should try to reach an agreement like the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Straits Regime, which allows each party to protect their legitimate rights and interests without harming others.
Biographical Statement
(The author is a Doctoral Scholar in International Relations at Sardar Patel University in Gujarat)
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