Dr. Bhavna Singh
bhavna.singh984@gmail.com
A report by the US Pentagon recently became the reason for unease amongst the apparatchiks in the Chinese political circles with the US disclosing a huge build-up of China’s military arsenal. The assessment exposed that in 2024 China “tested essential components” of Taiwan invasion options, “including through exercises to strike sea and land targets, strike US forces in the Pacific, and block access to key ports.” US assessment of China’s military capabilities took into consideration the fact that its primary focus will be the First Island Chain that runs from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay peninsula and the PLA continues to a make steady progress toward its 2027 goals whereby PLA will try to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan. That is, to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by end of 2027.
US experts believe that China would not rule out unification of Taiwan by brute force and this could mean an amphibious invasion, firepower strike and possibly a maritime blockade. This is augmented by its ambitions to crackdown on proponents of separatist movements such as the “Tibetan independence” and the creation of “East Turkistan.” The report also highlighted that since the first full year of Xi Jinping in power, China’s announced defense budget has nearly doubled. In July 2024, Beijing announced a new wave of reforms for the PLA focused on political discipline and military modernisation, largely on spurring military-civilian fusion. This would be achieved through three major strategic capabilities – “Strategic decisive victory, strategic counter balance and strategic deterrence and control.” An interesting aspect of their understanding of Chinese strategic behaviour was how China views defense and military engagements as a tool to punish or reward the US for its perceived behaviour.
The reaction from Chinese officials was strong. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Foreign Ministry have strongly pushed back on the Pentagon’s annual report by stating that it misrepresents the country’s military intentions and distorts its defense policy, accusing the US of harbouring a ‘cold-war thinking.’ China also urged the US to stop fabricating false narratives and avoid stoking confrontation by interfering in its internal affairs. China strongly rejected claims by the US that it may have deployed over 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Chinese officials denied this interpretation and countered that the US is using such narratives to justify its own nuclear expansion, calling on Washington to reduce its arsenal and promote real arms control. Even Chinese state media and military experts echoed government criticisms that US warnings were exaggerated or misinformed, sometimes framing the report as part of sustained US efforts to contain China.
As a response to the US report, China imposed sanctions on 30 US firms and individuals on 26 December 2025, after the Donald Trump administration approved a USD 11.1 bn arms sale to Taiwan. It also imposed sanctions on several US defence firms, including a branch of the US’s Boeing and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, over their sale of weapons worth over USD11 billion to Taiwan. Notably, even the Taiwanese Parliament faced hurdles to push through a USD37 billion special military spending package due to political disagreements between China and the US.
Overall, the report highlights several issues that are critical to understand the Chinese military modernisation from the US perspective but more importantly, only a few days before, China had also published its White paper on ‘China’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in the New Era’ (27 November 2025, previous ones in 1995 and 2005), which re-emphasized its position vis-à-vis the current international security situation and reiterated its commitment to governance norms based on peaceful use of science and technology; entwining it with its peaceful rise and harmonious society perspectives. China’s assurances that it is firmly opposed to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, and it intends to strengthen its domestic export controls, are however by no means a guarantee against its domestic use of force against any threat that it considers needs a military response. In fact, the White paper only bolsters its confidence and showcases its increased capabilities as far as new frontiers of strategic security including outer space, cyberspace and artificial intelligence.
Notwithstanding the retorts from the Chinese government, it is extremely clear that the US assessment is likely the closet to reality that one can get considering China’s opaqueness in sharing its data and technology. While the US report is sensitive in nature due to the issues it raised, the Indian defence establishment has less inclination to comment on our neighbour’s military build-up and its cooperation with Pakistan. There was no formal statement from the Ministry of external Affairs directly addressing the Pentagons’ 2025 ‘China military and Security Developments report.’ On the other hand, China itself accused the US of trying to “undermine Sino-Indian ties” and distort its policies stating that China’s relationship with Pakistan was driven by Indian concerns.
So, though tensions have eased between the two Asian neighbours, renewed risks of friction on territorial issues could be portended. Perhaps, India has taken note of China’s attempts to frame its position on Arunachal Pradesh as a “core interest” but has not responded to a US sponsored document. India’s position on Arunachal has been clear and the understanding to resolve it bilaterally is what drives responses form the Indian government and the strategic community. India is likely to continue to handle its relations with China based on its own risk assessments and also the need not to derail the process of disengagement at the border.
(The author Visiting Fellow, CRF)
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