Recalibration of India’s National Security Doctrine
Fatima Baloch, Dr K N Pandita
For decades, Pakistan has employed radicalized and misguided Islamist militants as proxy forces against India. This policy became particularly pronounced in the mid-1980s, when US, Pakistani, and Saudi-funded religious militants were trained and deployed in Afghanistan during the Soviet intervention. This campaign emboldened then-Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq, who infamously declared, “We will bleed India with a thousand cuts.”
This doctrine has evolved into a strategy that uses low-cost, irregular militant groups to inflict disproportionately high damage on Indian military and civilian institutions. Small groups of 5-10 trained terrorists, often facilitated by Pakistan’s Border Action Team (BAT), have repeatedly infiltrated Indian territory, conducting high-profile attacks. Meanwhile, India is left to gather evidence, appeal to the international community, and request action from the United Nations, while Pakistan, the sponsor of these acts, faces little accountability.
India has long suffered the consequences of this asymmetric warfare, as evidenced in tragic incidents like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the Uri attack, the Pulwama attack, and the recent incident in 2025. The pattern is clear: Pakistan’s deep state continues to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy, while India’s measured responses have failed to yield a lasting deterrent effect. This failure largely stems from India’s reluctance to target the root cause of the problem – Pakistan’s military infrastructure. Had India retaliated by striking Pakistan’s military cantonments and installations after the 26/11 attacks, Uri, and Pulwama, the recurrence of such incidents might have been avoided. Pakistan knows that India continues to pursue low-level terrorists instead of directly confronting the core perpetrators. This has been enabled by a combination of poor political leadership and Pakistan’s consistent use of war threats as blackmail.
It is imperative that India rethinks its approach. Drawing lessons from nations like Israel, India must establish a doctrine of decisive retaliation, one that causes substantial destruction to Pakistan’s military infrastructure. This strategy should not only target foot soldiers but also focus on their enablers, facilitators, and patrons within Pakistan’s establishment. Immediate, multifaceted responses would send a clear message that proxy warfare will no longer go unpunished.
Simultaneously, India must actively pursue the liberation of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) – an integral part of Indian territory. This should not be viewed as a one-time military operation, but rather as a phased, strategic effort, with each provocation from Pakistan triggering targeted responses aimed at regaining control over territories in POK. This approach would not only address India’s long-standing territorial grievance but also dismantle the terrorist infrastructure thriving in that region under Pakistan’s control.
Additionally, it must be recognized that during a potential India-Pakistan conflict, the Baloch nation may find a golden opportunity to pursue its aspirations for independence. With the Pakistani military focused on the Indian front along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border, Baloch freedom fighters could take advantage of the situation to weaken Pakistan further. A coordinated effort between India and Baloch nationalist movements could cripple Pakistan’s internal stability and military capacity.
Such a recalibration of policy would shift the cost-benefit equation for Pakistan and send a powerful message that proxy warfare will no longer be tolerated. It is time for India to move beyond reactive diplomacy and adopt a proactive, assertive national security doctrine.
Third weapon is Indus Water Treaty (IWT), which has to be discarded once for all, It is baseless that some Pakistani analysts and even some anti-BJP Indian journalists, believe that India is technically unable to fully block water during the monsoon season, given the massive volume and the structural limitations of the existing dam systems. It is important to note that after the Uri and Pulwama attacks as well, India had publicly declared its intention to stop the flow of water to Pakistan (in 2018). However, as of 2025, India has still not succeeded in doing so in a comprehensive manner.
Nevertheless, India does possess the ability to manipulate water flows in a manner that can cause significant agricultural damage to Pakistan. For example, Pakistan’s rice crops, which are planted in May and June, are highly dependent on consistent water supply during these months. By emptying Indian dams (decanting) before mid-April and releasing large volumes of water toward Pakistan, India could flood Pakistan’s fields, damaging wheat crops just before harvest. Subsequently, by withholding water from May to mid-July, India could severely impact the cultivation of rice and vegetables, inflicting a major blow to Pakistan’s food security and economy.
During this period, Indian dams would refill naturally with monsoon rains. Then, by releasing sudden, unannounced floods in late July or August, India could cause further infrastructure destruction across Pakistan. Finally, by decanting dams again by October and minimizing water release through February and March, Pakistan’s wheat and vegetable crops could be critically harmed during their next cycle.
This strategy is both technically feasible and could deliver serious strategic advantages. It is therefore recommended that Indian policymakers consult with civil engineers, hydrologists, and agricultural experts to thoroughly evaluate and refine such options, if deemed necessary for national interest.
Such strategies could inflict significant economic damage and food insecurity in Pakistan without violating the letter of the IWT. However, they should be carefully studied and, if deemed necessary, implemented with precision. Civil engineers, hydrologists, and agricultural experts should be consulted to ensure legality, effectiveness, and environmental safety.
Conclusion
India’s national security doctrine must evolve to match the nature of the threats it faces. Passive diplomacy and reactive counterterrorism are no longer sufficient. India must consider bold, integrated responses – militarily, territorially, and economically – to disincentivize Pakistan’s reliance on terrorism and force a recalibration of its strategic behavior.
By embracing decisive retaliation, pursuing the liberation of POK, leveraging the IWT, and coordinating with Baloch nationalist movements, India can shift the cost-benefit equation for Pakistan. These steps would send a clear message that India will no longer tolerate proxy warfare and terrorism as instruments of state policy.
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